Engaging in this debate with Jan Narveson has been a valuable experience for me. I know of no better way to defensibly hold a moral and political perspective than by testing one's arguments out against one's philosophical opponents. In this regard, Jan Narveson has proven to be a worthy adversary. In this brief reply, let me see if I can add just a bit to our debate by making the choice between our two perspectives even clearer and starker.

Surprisingly or maybe not so surprisingly, there is a parallel structure to the main arguments that both Jan Narveson and I advance in our essays. We each begin by specifying what negative liberties we think are morally justified. We then go on to claim that our support for those negative liberties cannot rest on morality alone but must have an even more basic foundation. We then attempt to provide that more basic foundation for the negative liberties we support.

Narveson's main argument

Accordingly, Narveson begins by arguing that we all have a morally justified right not to be harmed, hindered, have costs imposed on us, or be made worse off by the actions of others unless we have first inflicted such acts on others. Narveson thinks that this captures the basic right to liberty or noninterference we all possess. He further argues that those who are first to appropriate something do not thereby harm, hinder, impose costs on, or make worse off those who come later.