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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language
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In this textbook, Michael Morris offers a critical introduction to the central issues of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Texts include classic writings by Frege, Russell, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Austin, Grice and Wittgenstein. Theoretical jargon is kept to a minimum and is fully explained whenever it is introduced. The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, de re and de dicto necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism about meaning. The book will be invaluable to students and to all readers who are interested in the nature of linguistic meaning.

Reviews

"'This is a knowledgeable and very useful addition to contemporary introductions to the philosophy of language, somewhere in difficulty between Lycan's 2008 and Taylor's (1998) worthy texts. It is the right size for a 15-week semester course, at one chapter a week (students like to use what they buy) ...this book will give any motivated student a good survey of the subject."
--Robert Harnish, University of Arizona, Philosphy in Review

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Contents

Works cited
Works cited
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Davidson, D., ‘On Saying That’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 93–108
Davidson, D., ‘Radical Interpretation’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 125–40
Davidson, D.,‘Belief and the Basis of Meaning’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 141–54
Davidson, D.,‘Thought and Talk’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 155–70
Davidson, D.,‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 183–98
Davidson, D.,‘Reply to Foster’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 171–80
Davidson, D.,‘Reality without Reference’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 215–25
Davidson, D.,‘The Inscrutability of Reference’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 227–41
Davidson, D.,‘Moods and Performances’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 109–21
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Frege, G.,The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. Austin, J. L. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980)
Frege, G.,‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitung für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100 (1892), pp. 25–50; trans. as ‘On Sense and Meaning’ in Frege, G., Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy
Frege, G.,‘Function and Concept’, in G. Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy
Frege, G.,‘On Concept and Object’, in G. Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy
Frege, G.,‘Thoughts’, in G. Frege
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Frege, G.,Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, eds. G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, and A. Veraart, abridged for the English edn by McGunness, B. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980)
Frege, G.,Posthumous Writings, eds. Hermes, J., Kambartel, F., and Kaulbach, F. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979)
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Grice, H. P., ‘Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning’, Foundations of Language, 4 (1968), pp. 225–42; reprinted in his Studies in the Ways of Words
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Grice, H. P., Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989)
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