Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter I Reid's Questions
- Chapter II The Way of Ideas: Structure and Motivation
- Chapter III Reid's Opening Attack: Nothing Is Explained
- Chapter IV The Attack Continues: There's Not the Resemblance
- Chapter V Reid's Analysis of Perception: The Standard Schema
- Chapter VI An Exception (or Two) to Reid's Standard Schema
- Chapter VII The Epistemology of Testimony
- Chapter VIII Reid's Way with the Skeptic
- Chapter IX Common Sense
- Chapter X In Conclusion: Living Wisely in the Darkness
- Index
Chapter VI - An Exception (or Two) to Reid's Standard Schema
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter I Reid's Questions
- Chapter II The Way of Ideas: Structure and Motivation
- Chapter III Reid's Opening Attack: Nothing Is Explained
- Chapter IV The Attack Continues: There's Not the Resemblance
- Chapter V Reid's Analysis of Perception: The Standard Schema
- Chapter VI An Exception (or Two) to Reid's Standard Schema
- Chapter VII The Epistemology of Testimony
- Chapter VIII Reid's Way with the Skeptic
- Chapter IX Common Sense
- Chapter X In Conclusion: Living Wisely in the Darkness
- Index
Summary
We have been exploring the standard schema, as I called it, which Reid proposes for the analysis of what transpires in perception. The schema is this: The perceived entity evokes in the mind a sensation that is a sign of itself; this in turn evokes an apprehension of that entity and an immediate belief as to its external existence (or a belief which entails that). Here's how Reid himself states the schema in one passage: “The signs in original perception are sensations, of which nature hath given us a great variety, suited to the variety of the things signified by them. Nature hath established a real connection between the signs and the things signified; and nature hath also taught us the interpretation of the signs; so that, previous to experience, the sign suggests the things signified, and [immediately] creates the belief of it” (IHM VI, xxiv [195a; B 190]). Acquired perception differs from original perception in that whereas in the latter it's on account of an innate disposition that the sensation sign evokes the apprehension and belief, in the former it's on account of a disposition acquired in the course of experience.
One can thus think of perception, says Reid, as
a kind of drama, wherein some things are performed behind the scenes, one succeeding another. The impression made by the object upon the organ, either by immediate contact, or by some intervening medium, as well as the impression made upon the nerves and brain, is performed behind the scenes, and the mind sees nothing of it. […]
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- Information
- Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology , pp. 132 - 162Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000