Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- About the Author
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Conceptualizing Reluctance
- 3 Theorizing Reluctance in World Politics
- 4 India's Reluctant Crisis Management in South Asia
- 5 Germany's Mixed Approach: Not Always a Reluctant Hegemon
- 6 Brazil's Non-Reluctant Approach to Regional Crisis Management
- 7 Explaining Reluctance in Other Contexts
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix List of Interviewees
- References
- Index
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- About the Author
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Conceptualizing Reluctance
- 3 Theorizing Reluctance in World Politics
- 4 India's Reluctant Crisis Management in South Asia
- 5 Germany's Mixed Approach: Not Always a Reluctant Hegemon
- 6 Brazil's Non-Reluctant Approach to Regional Crisis Management
- 7 Explaining Reluctance in Other Contexts
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix List of Interviewees
- References
- Index
Summary
We believe that Germany has reacted too reluctantly to this dangerous situation, to these growing threats. We already warned [Germany] two months ago. We pointed out that this muscle flexing and these troops that are sent from all corners of Russia … to the borders of Ukraine, that all this shouldn't be taken lightly.
These were the warning words of the Ukrainian ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, in a radio interview on 13 February 2022 (Deutschlandfunk, 2022), a few days ahead of Russia's attack against Ukraine. This would not be the last time that a representative of the Ukrainian government asked Germany to do more to support Ukraine. In the following weeks and months, as the unthinkable – a fully-fledged war of aggression in Europe – was unfolding, Germany adopted a series of policies that disconcerted its international partners with their lack of coherence, frequent delays and lack of responsiveness. In the weeks immediately preceding the Russian attack of 24 February 2022, the German government was debating the delivery of 5,000 helmets to the Ukrainian army (FAZ, 2022), much to the bewilderment of its international partners (Dempsey, 2022b), which were providing substantial military aid. Germany, by contrast, long refused the delivery of weapons or other equipment, citing political and legal constraints on the provision of military equipment to conflict zones (BMWK, nd). Moreover, the German government was extremely slow in agreeing to the extension of sanctions. For example, when it came to the exclusion of Russia from the Swift payment system, the German government reacted late to mounting international pressure, being the last country in the European Union (EU) to agree to such a step (Zeit Online, 2022). Similarly, it only agreed to suspend the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project a few days before the start of the Russian invasion (Ischinger, 2022). An observer described Germany's approach as follows:
… this federal government is really highly talented in missing the right moment to act. Whether it dithers over sanctions against Nord Steam 2 or it fails to at least deliver quickly those … ridiculous 5,000 helmets to Ukraine: desperate calls for help from Kyiv were not sufficient [to induce Germany] to become active. It was only due to the pressure by the Western community of nations that the federal government finally felt obliged to act.
(Uken, 2022)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reluctance in World PoliticsWhy States Fail to Act Decisively, pp. 1 - 11Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2023