Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The G-24
- List of Contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?
- 3 Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
- 4 Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making
- 5 Issues on IMF Governance and Representation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options
- 6 Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable
- 7 Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations
- 8 Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula
- 9 Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
- 10 Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board
- 11 Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote
- 12 Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress
9 - Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The G-24
- List of Contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?
- 3 Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
- 4 Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making
- 5 Issues on IMF Governance and Representation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options
- 6 Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable
- 7 Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations
- 8 Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula
- 9 Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
- 10 Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board
- 11 Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote
- 12 Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress
Summary
Abstract:
The paper looks into the pitfalls and promise of double majority voting as one element of a comprehensive reform package to enhance the voice of developing countries and countries in transition in the governance structure of the World Bank. It is argued that in order to effectively fulfil a mandate that is dramatically different from the one envisaged when the World Bank was created, the Bank must refashion its decision-making structure. Since there are, however, tremendous obstacles and reservations to the introduction of double majority voting, notably the legal requirement to amend the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, I argue that a two-year pilot phase approach should be pursued. This would leave time to inform others about the promise of the idea and to gather support from key constituencies. Very much like the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in its initial phase, a pilot phase approach would lower the resistance against ‘definite’ commitments, while also leaving a chance for agreed upon revisions in the light of lessons learned after a defined number of years.
Double majority voting is essentially a concept pioneered in the GEF over the last decade in the sense of a true North-South partnership. Ownership and ‘voice’ of all sides involved are an inbuilt feature of this innovative voting structure. Different stakeholders' claims are appropriately respected, including donors without whom the GEF could not function and recipient countries whose cooperation and participation is required to enable the institution to achieve its objectives.
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- Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank , pp. 213 - 234Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2005
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