As far as theory is concerned, France is probably the most interesting case among those covered by this study. Policy-makers unintentionally created ideal conditions for testing hypotheses concerning the determinants of pension policy and the factors that favour or hamper success in pension reform. In the space of only two years, two very similar plans for pension reform were put forward. The first concerned only private sector employees and was successfully transformed into law in summer 1993. The second, in 1995, consisted of the extension of the same measures to public sector employees. It generated a massive wave of strikes, mainly among rail workers, which forced the government to withdraw its plans. This chapter covers both events, and tries to answer the question of why two very similar plans for the reform of pensions generated such different public reactions.

Institutions and patterns of policy-making

Political scientists have generally considered France as a country where policy-making is characterised by a substantial degree of centralisation. Typically, public policy is decided at the top with little or no negotiation with external interests. In his comprehensive study of interest-group politics in France, Wilson points out that, albeit with some exceptions, the relationship between the state and organised interests in France is characterised by ‘a power situation of a state capable of resisting interests and proceeding with its own ends regardless of group pressures’(Wilson 1987: 238). This view is reflected in the literature on corporatism, which typically views France as a counter-example. Lijphart and Crepaz, in their review of expert opinion on the degree of corporatism in various countries, found that France is most often considered as one of the least corporatist countries (1991: 240).