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6 - Particularistic Political Institutions and Tax Neutrality in Latin America*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2019

Gustavo A. Flores-Macías
Cornell University, New York
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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