Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility
- 3 The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship
- 4 Stability and longer brinkmanship crises
- 5 Crisis stability in the nuclear age
- 6 Stability and the lack of control
- 7 The strategy of limited retaliation
- 8 An appraisal
- Appendix Some introductory notes on game theory
- References
- Index
7 - The strategy of limited retaliation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility
- 3 The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship
- 4 Stability and longer brinkmanship crises
- 5 Crisis stability in the nuclear age
- 6 Stability and the lack of control
- 7 The strategy of limited retaliation
- 8 An appraisal
- Appendix Some introductory notes on game theory
- References
- Index
Summary
Both the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation attempt to relate force or the threat of it to states' efforts to further their ends in the same fundamental way. An array of limited options bridges the gap between doing too much and doing too little. What distinguishes these two approaches to the credibility problem is not their reliance on limited options but rather the way in which these options are differentiated. Each option in brinkmanship generates a different risk of losing collective control of events. Each option in the strategy of limited retaliation inflicts a different level of punishment.
The strategy that leaves something to chance and the analysis of the problem of crisis stability are direct conceptual descendants of the doctrine of massive retaliation. All of them ultimately appeal to the same sanction: a massive, unlimited nuclear attack. The strategy of limited retaliation, in contrast, relies on limited sanctions. The crucial difference between a limited sanction and an unlimited sanction is that if a state imposes the former on an adversary, the adversary still has something left to lose, and the fear of losing what is left may constrain its retaliation. Imposing an unlimited sanction, however, leaves an adversary with nothing more to lose and little, if any, incentive to restrain its retaliation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Nuclear Deterrence TheoryThe Search for Credibility, pp. 148 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990