Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- List of figures
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Foreword
- A Road Map for the Guidebook
- Introduction to New Institutional Economics: A Report Card
- Part I Foundations
- Part II Methodology
- Part III Strategy and Management
- Part IV Industrial Organization
- Part V Institutional Design
- Part VI Challenges to Institutional Analysis
- Notes
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- List of figures
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Foreword
- A Road Map for the Guidebook
- Introduction to New Institutional Economics: A Report Card
- Part I Foundations
- Part II Methodology
- Part III Strategy and Management
- Part IV Industrial Organization
- Part V Institutional Design
- Part VI Challenges to Institutional Analysis
- Notes
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- New Institutional EconomicsA Guidebook, pp. 489 - 542Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008
References
, , 2003. “Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets,” J. Regul. Econy., 23, 2, pp 125–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. “Compensation Structure and Product Market Competition,” Ann. Econ. Statist., 41:42, pp 207–218.Google Scholar
1986. “Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames,” J. Econ. Theory, 39, pp 191–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2003. “Root Causes: A Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of Institutions in Economic Development,” Finance Devel., 40, 2, pp 27–30.Google Scholar
2005. “Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions,” J. Econ. Lit., 43, 4, pp 1025–1048.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2005. “Unbundling Institutions”. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 949–995.
and 2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?” Quart. J. Econ., 115, pp 1167–1199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 91, pp 1369–1401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1985. “The Main Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 1, 2, pp 385–398.Google Scholar
and 2002. “Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form,” J. Polit. Economy., 110, 3, pp 564–591.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2001. “Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 19, 2, pp 445–490.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. “Dynamic Boundaries of the Firm: Are Firms Better off Being Vertically Integrated in the Face of a Technological Change?” Acad. Manage. J., 44, 6, pp 1211–1228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. “Choice of Foreign Market Entry Mode: Impact of Ownership, Location and Internalization Factors,” J. Int. Bus. Stud., 23, pp 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “Incomplete Social Contracts,” J. Europ. Econ. Assoc., 1, 1, pp 38–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2004. “Endogenous Political Institutions,” Quart. J. Econ., 119, 2, pp 565–611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1994. “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,” Econometrica, 62, 2, pp 257–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’ Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quart. J. Econ., 84, 3, pp 488–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1976. “The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales,” Quart. J. Econ., 90, 4, pp 599–617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 62, pp 772–795.Google Scholar
and 1992. “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare,” J. Law Econ., 35, 2, pp 397–426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. The Nature of the Farm – Contracts, Risk, and Organization in Agriculture. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1995. “Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex Contractual Relationships,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 85, 2, pp 433–436.Google Scholar
and 1993. “Paternalism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the U.S. South: Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 83, 4, pp 852–875.Google Scholar
and 1999. Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the U.S. South, 1865–1965. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2008. “Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron, and the demise of checks and balances in Argentina,” IBS work. Paper PEC2008:0001, University of Colorado. (Available at: www.colorado.edu/ibs/eb/alston)
and 1982. “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests,” J. Econ. Hist., 42, pp 327–353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Property Rights and the State,” in and , eds, Handbook for New Institutional Economics. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 573–590.Google Scholar
and 2006. “Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil,” J. Law Econ. Organ., 22, 1, pp 12–36.Google Scholar
, , and 1984. “Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transaction Costs,” J. Polit. Economy, 92, pp 1121–1133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1996. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1999a. “A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform Policy in Brazil,” Environ. Devel. Econ., 4, 2, pp 135–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1999b. Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2000. “Land Reform Policies: The Sources of Violent Conflict, and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,” J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 39, 2, pp 162–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1996. “The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier,” J. Law, Econ. Organ., 12, pp. 25–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States,” J. Theo. Polit., 5, 3, pp 341–365.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. “Do Companies Learn to Create Value?” Strategic. Manage. J., 21, 3, pp 295–316.3.0.CO;2-O>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs,” Theory Dec., 46, pp 23–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts,” Res. Econ., 58, pp 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1984. “Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination,” RAND J. Econ., 15, 3, pp 385–395.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. “Imperfect Contract Enforcement,” NBER work. paper, 8847, pp 1–50.
, , and 2000. “Competition and Privatization Amidst Weak Institutions: Evidence from Mongolia,” Econ. Inquiry, 38, 4, pp 527–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
and 1967. “A Program of Research in Business Planning,” Manage. Sci., 13, 6, pp 219–241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2003. “Why Is There So Little Money in US Politics?” J. Econ. Perspect., 17, 1, pp 105–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2002. “Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act,” Bus. Polit., 4, 2, pp 131–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1988. Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1995. “Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies,” in and , eds, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. “An Organizational Architecture of T-Form: Silicon Valley Clustering and Its Institutional Coherence,” Ind. Corp. Change, 13, 6, pp 473–487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1995. “Technology Strategy, Governance Structure and Interdivisional Coordination,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 28, pp 337–358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996a. “Capabilities, Technological Diversification and Divisionalization,” Strategic. Manage. J., 17, 5, pp 395–410.3.0.CO;2-E>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996b. “Evidence on the Role of Firm Capabilities in Vertical Integration Decisions,” Strategic Manage. J., 17, pp 129–150.3.0.CO;2-H>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2005. “Do transaction costs matter for survival at all stages of the industry life cycle?” Work paper, Boston University, presented at the 2004 ISNIE meetings in Tucson, AZ. (Available at: http://smgnet.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/ArgyresNicholas.html).
and 1999. “Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory,” Acad. Manage. Rev., 24, 1, pp 49–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry,” Organization Sci., 15, 4, pp 394–410.Google Scholar
and 2004. “R&D, Organizational Structure, and the Development of Corportae Technological Knowledge,” Strategic Manage. J., 25, pp 929–958.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1978. “Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis,” Bell J. Econ., 9, 1, pp 106–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence,” World Bank Res. Observer, 15, 1, pp 99–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1987. “Reflections on the Essays,” in , ed. Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. New York University Press, pp 727–734.Google Scholar
2001. “The Role of Institutions in the Contractual Process,” in and , eds, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp 177–196.Google Scholar
2003. “Third Party Moral Enforcement: The Rise and Decline of Christian Confession,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics and Business. Work paper 653. (Available at: www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/onepaper?653).
2004. “The Economic Effects of Christian Moralities,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics and Business. Work paper 743. (Available at: www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/onepaper?743).
and , forthcoming. “Judges' Cognition, and Market Order,” Review of Law and Economics.
and , 2005. “Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking,” in and , eds, Handbook of New Institutional Economics,” Norwelll, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 229–50.Google Scholar
and 2005. “The Choice of Titling System in Land,” J. Law Econ., 48, 2, pp 709–727.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , 2004. “Determinants of Organizational Form: Transaction Costs and Institutions in the European Trucking Industry,” Ind. Corp. Change, 13, 6, pp 687–692.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2001. “Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution,” J. Law Econ. Organ., 17, 1, pp 257–284.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events,” Econ. J., 99, 394, pp 116–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation,” J. Pol. Econ., 108, 6, pp 1235–1269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1997. The Complexity of Cooperation – Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1999. “Introduction,” in The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 1–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. “Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public-Goods Provision,” J. Econ. Manage. Strategic., 9, 1, pp 85–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. “Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights,” J. Law Econ., 35, pp 183–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “Incentives versus Transactions Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts,” RAND J. Econ., 32, 3, pp 387–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 91, 2, pp 189–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “Make or Buy in Trucking: Assets Ownership, Job Design and Information,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 93, 3, pp 551–572.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking,” Quart. J. Econ., 119, 4, pp 1443–1479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2004. “Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between ‘Islands of Conscious Power’,” Work paper: Harvard Business School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Southern California.
and 2003. “Cooperation Without Enforcement? A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Online Reputation as Quality Assurance Mechanisms,” MIT Sloan Work paper 4295-03, pp 1–33.
and 1986. “Technical Change, Competition and Vertical Integration,” Strategic. Manage. J., 7, 4, pp 347–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. and 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources – Is There a Role for Rural Communities?Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
, and 2001. “Bureaucracy and Public Policy in Argentina,” American Political Science Association Meetings.
and 2000. “Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry,” Quart. J. Econ., 15, 3, pp 989–1017.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” Mimeo, MIT. (Available at: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=517).
and 2004. “How Efficiently is Capital Allocated? Evidence from the Knitted Garment Industry in Tirupur,” Rev. Econ. Stud., 71, 1, pp 19–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and , 1982. “A Political Theory of Regulation with some Observations on Railway Abandonments,” Public Choice, 39, pp 73–106.Google Scholar
1991. “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” J. Manage., 17, 1, pp 99–120.Google Scholar
1994. “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters,” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., 88, 1, pp 33–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. Business and Its Environment, third edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
, , , , , , et al. 2006. “The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities Are Right to Be Cautious,” Electricity J., 19, 2, pp 62–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1982. “Measurement Cost and Organization of Markets,” J. Law Econ. 25, pp 27–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
2000. Prelude to Political Economy – A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1987. “The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of the New Institutional Economics in Economic History,” Explorations Econ. Hist. 24, 1, pp 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2000. “Don't Go It Alone: Alliance Networks and Startup Performance in Canadian Biotechnology,” Strategic. Manage. J. 21, 3, pp 267–294.3.0.CO;2-8>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2003. “Where Do Small Worlds Come From?” Industrial Corpor. Change., 12, 4, pp 697–725.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1995. “The Foundation of Franchise Regulation: Issues and Evidence,” J. Corp. Finan., 2, pp 157–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , and 2000. “New Tools and New Tests,” in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions, Washington, DC: World Bank.Google Scholar
, , and van 1998. “Chain Science as an Emerging Discipline,” in , , and , eds, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Chain Management in Agribusiness and the Food Industry. Wageningen University, Management Studies Group, pp 295–330.Google Scholar
and 2003. “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,” Rev. Econ. Stud., 70, 3, pp 489–520.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Are Voters Better Informed when They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland,” Public Choice, 119, 1–2, pp 31–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. An Analysis of Contract Provisions in Business-Format Franchise Agreement. Mimeo, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business.Google Scholar
2003. The Option to Expand: The Use of Multi-Unit Opportunities to Support Self-Enforcing Agreements in Franchise Relationships. Mimeo, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business.Google Scholar
, and 2006. “The Antecedents and Performance Implications of Cooperative Exchange Norms,” Organization Science, 17, 6, pp 724–740.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2003. “Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: the Congressional Constraint,” Legisl. Stud. Quart., 28, pp 247–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. “Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,” J. Legal Stud., 21, 1, pp 115–157.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Norms, Rules, and Institutions,” Mich. Law Rev., 99, pp 1724–1788.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “Judicial Accountability and Economic Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Employment Discrimination Charges.” Mimeo, June.
and 1995. “Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts,” RAND J. Econ., 26, 4, pp 761–781.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. “Reversing Corporate Diversification,” J. Appl. Corp. Fin., 3, 2, pp 70–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2003. “Transaction Alignment and Survival: Performance Implications of Transaction Cost Alignment,” Work paper, Olin School of Business, Washington University.
2006. “Technology Choice, Transaction Alignment and Survival: The Impact of Sub-Population Organizational Structure,” Advan. Strategic. Manage., 23, pp 301–334.Google Scholar
2000. “The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View,” Constit. Polit. Econ., 11, 1, pp 27–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2004. “The Impact of Voter Initiatives on Economic Activity,” Europ. J. of Polit. Econ., 20, 1, pp 207–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1995. “Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water,” Arizona Law Rev., 37, pp 701–738.Google Scholar
, , and 2005. “Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making,” Quart. J. of Polit. Sci., 1, pp 139–169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2005. “Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying Across Venues and Policies,” paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.
and 2002. “Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe – Lessons from Economic Theory and International Experiences,” Ecolog. Econ., 43, 2–3, pp 213–230.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Science,” Georgetown University, work paper. (Available at: www.msb.edu/faculty/jtm4/Macher.CV.htm).
, , and 2001. “Supply Chain Relationships in the Polish Pork Sector,” Suppl. Chai. Manage., 6, 2, pp 74–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. “From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order,” Admin. Sci. Quart., 41, 4, pp 600–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies,” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., 93, 3, pp 609–724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1991. “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 81, 5, pp 1097–1136.Google Scholar
, , , and 1991. “A Subsector Approach to Small Enterprise Promotion and Research,” Worl. Devel. 19, pp 199–212.Google Scholar
2004. Microeconomics – Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
and 1999. “Power in Competitive Exchange,” in , , and , eds, The Politics and the Economics of Power. London: Routledge, pp 13–31.Google Scholar
1997. “Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains,” Admin. Sci. Quart., 42, 2, pp 276–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1994. “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers,” J. Theo. Polit., 6, 3, pp 345–368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1999. “Incentives Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising,” J. Law Econ., 42, 2, pp 745–774.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. “Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising,” J. Law Econ. Org., 18, 2, pp 511–535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1987. “The Choice of Organizational Form: the Case of Franchising,” J. Finan. Econ., 18, pp 401–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1991. “The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws,” J. Law Econ., 34, 1, pp 101–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , Jr. 1997. “Do Campaign Donations Alter How A Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?” J. Law Econ., 40, 2, pp 317–350.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000a. “Confiance ou Contrat, Confiance et Contrat,” in and , eds, Confiance et Rationalité. INRA: Les Colloques, 97, pp 65–80.Google Scholar
2000b. “Processus Evolutionnaires et Institutions: Quelles alternatives à la rationalité parfaite?” Revue Economique, Special Issue, 51, 5, pp 1185–1213.Google Scholar
2000c. “What Institutions to Organize Electronic Commerce: Private Institutions and the Organization of Markets,” Econ. Innovation New Tech., 9, 3, pp 245–273.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. “Property Rights in the Digital Space,” in , ed., Companion to Economics of Property Rights. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp 438–472.Google Scholar
and 2006. “Public and Private Institutions in the Governance of Intellectual Property Rights,” in , ed, Intellectual Property Rights: Innovation, Governance and the Institutional Environment. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishers, pp 243–277.
and , eds. 2007. Internet and Digital Economics: Principles Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. “Incomplete Contracts and Governance Structures: Are Incomplete Contract Theory and Transaction Cost Economics Substitutes or Complements?” in , ed., Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from the New Institutional Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 399–421.Google Scholar
and 2002. “Règle de Droit et Exécution des Contrats : Réflexion d'Économistes sur le Droit comparé des Contrats,“ Revue Econ. Politique, N° Spécial “L'Economie du Droit”, sld Deffains, B., 112, 6, pp 823–844.Google Scholar
and 2002. The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2006. “The Economics of Private Institutions: An Introduction to the Dynamics of Institutional Frameworks and to the Analysis of Multilevel Multi-Type Governance,” Mimeo, EconomiX, University of Paris X.
and 2007. “The Economics of Multilevel Governance,” Mimeo, EconomiX, University of Paris X.
and 2000. “Privatization and Enterprise Restructuring in Russia: New Evidence from Panel Data on Industrial Enterprises.” Work paper 1, RECEP, Moscow.
, , and 2003. “Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions,” IZA Discussion Paper, 897.
, 347 U.S. 483, 47 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. eds. 873.
1977. Freedom in Constitutional Contract – Perspectives of a Political Economist. London: College Station and Texas, TX: A&M University Press.Google Scholar
. 1984. “Sources of Opposition to Constitutional Reform,” in Constitutional Economics – Containing the Economic Powers of Government. , ed. Lexington: Lexington Books. pp 21–34.Google Scholar
1986. “Political Economy and Social Philosophy,” in , ed., Liberty, Market and State – Political Economy in the 1980s. New York, pp 261–274.Google Scholar
1987. “Constitutional Economics,” in The New Palgrave. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp 588–595.Google Scholar
1959. “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy,” J. Law Econ., 2, pp 124–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1975a. “A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory: Conflict and Contract,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 65, 2, pp 225–230. (Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association.)Google Scholar
1975b. The Limits of Liberty – Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
and 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2006. “The Allocation of European Union Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles,” FEEM work paper, 116, Milan.
and 2006. “Legal Institutions and the Structure of Informal Networks,” J. Theoret. Pol., 18, 1, pp 40–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability,” J. Econ. Theory, 118, 1, pp 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
, , and 2003. The Governance of Relations in Markets and Organizations. Amsterdam: JAI Press.Google Scholar
, and 2007. “Law, economics and institutional complexity: An introduction,” in Legal Orderings and Economics Institutions. in , and , eds. London, Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1965. “The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Non-Fault Allocation for Costs,” Harvard Law Rev., 78, 4, pp 713–745.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1968. “Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules: A Comment,” J. Law Econ., 11, 1, pp 67–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1970. The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
and 1972. “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Rev., 85, 6, pp 1089–1128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1985. “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence,” Amer. J. Polit. Sci., 29, 1, pp 69–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1947. Diario de Sesiones del Honorable Senado de la Nacion. Constituido en Tribunal. 4, Buenos Aires.
1998. “Behavioral Economics and Nonrational Organizational Decision Making,” in Halpern, J. J. and Stern, R. N., eds, Debating Rationality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp 53–77.Google Scholar
1999. “Behavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics,” Proceed. National Acad. Sci., 9, 19, pp 10575–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. New York, NY: Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
and 1999. “Experienced-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games,” Econometrica, 67, 4, pp 827–874.Google Scholar
and 1995. “Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,” J. Econ. Perspect., 9, 2, pp 209–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. “Coordination, Organizational Boundaries and Fads in Business Practice,” Industrial Corp. Change, 5, 1, pp 89–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” Elect. Stud., 14, 4, pp 417–439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “Caring About Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Solution to the Hold-up Problem,” J. Law Econ. Organ., 19, pp 106–118.Google Scholar
1980. “Egalitarianism Among Hunters and Gatherers,” Amer. Anthropol., 82, 1, pp 116–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2005. Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services, World Bank edition.
and 1976. “Franchising: Firms, Markets and Intangible Assets,” Southern Econ. J., 42, 4, pp 572–586.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “On the Efficiency of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Construction,” USC CLEO Research paper series, C04-17.
, and , 1998. “Reliability management in competitive electricity markets,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 14, pp 189–200.Google Scholar
and 1998. “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms,” Quart. J. Econ., 113, 2, pp 467–496.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 89, 1, pp 125–148.Google Scholar
1970. “The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource,” J. Law Econ., 13, 1, pp 49–70.Google Scholar
1973. “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation,” J. Law Econ., 16, 1, pp 11–33.Google Scholar
1937. “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, pp 386–405. Reprinted in Coase, R. H. 1988. The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago Univerrsity Press, pp 55–57.Google Scholar
1946. “The Marginal Cost Controversy,” in Coase, R. H., 1988.
1964. “The Regulated Industries – Discussion,” American Economic Review, 54, 3, pp 194–197.Google Scholar
1972. “Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research,” in 1988, pp 57–74.
1974. “The Lighthouse in Economics,” in Coase, R. H., 1988, Chapter 7.
1988. “The Nature of the Firm: Origin, Meaning, Influence,” J. Law Econ. Org., 4, pp 3–59.Google Scholar
1992. “The Institutional Structure of Production,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 82, 4, pp 713–719.Google Scholar
1993a. “Coase on Posner on Coase and Concluding Comment,” J. Inst. Theoretical Econ., 149, 1, pp 73–87.Google Scholar
2000. “The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors,” J. Law Econ., 43, 1, pp 15–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 2003. “Mergers and Acquisitions in the European Electricity Sector.” GRJM and CERNA, École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris.
1998. “The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large Firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States,” J. of Public Polit., 118, 1, pp 75–100.Google Scholar
and 1997. “Transaction Cost Theory: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Vertical Integration,” Rev. Econ. Polit., 107, 2, pp 145–181.Google Scholar
, , , , , , and 1996. “Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations,” Contemp. Res. Issues, Industrial and Corporate Change, 5, 3, pp 653–698.Google Scholar
and 1990. “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation,” Administ. Scien. Quart., 35, 1, pp 128–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. “Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation,” Amer. J. Agr. Econ., 72, 5, pp 1184–1192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1995. “Competing on Resources: Strategy in the 1990s,” Harvard Bus. Rev., 73, 4, pp 118–128.Google Scholar
1924. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley, reprinted: Transaction Publishers, 1995.Google Scholar
1932–1933. “The Problems of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics,” Wisconsin Law Rev. 8, 1, pp 3–26.Google Scholar
and 1996. “A Resource-based Theory of the Firm: Knowledge versus Opportunism,” Organ. Sci., 7, 5, pp 477–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1988. “Why Should Firms Cooperate? The Strategy and Economics Basis for Cooperative Ventures,” in and , eds., Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
1995. “The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo-Institutional Approach,” Amer. J. Agr. Econ., 77, 5, pp 1153–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. “Ill-defined Property Rights in Collective Action: The Case of US Agricultural Cooperatives,” in , ed., Institutions, Contracts and Organizations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 335–348.Google Scholar
and 2004. “Redesigning Cooperative Boundaries: The Emergence of New Models,” Amer. J. Agr.Econ. 86, 5, pp 1249–1253.Google Scholar
and 1984. “Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law,” Int. Rev. Law Econ, 4, 1, pp 15–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1989. “Economic Analysis of Legal Dispute and Their Resolution,” J. Econ. Lit., 27, 3, pp 1067–1097.Google Scholar
and 2004. “The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling,” J. Law, Econ. Organ., 20, 1, pp 230–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1985. “Deduction or Darwinian Algorithms? An Explanation of the Elusive Content Effect of the Wason Selection Task.” PhD dissertation, Department of Psychology, Harvard University.
1989. “The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task,” Cognition, 31, 3, pp 187–196.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
and 1992. “Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange,” in , , and , eds, The Adapted Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp 163–228.Google Scholar
and 1994. “Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 84, 2, pp 327–332.Google Scholar
2001. “Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises,” in , ed., Readings in the Theory of Contract Law. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
and 1998. “What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 88, 1, pp 198–225.Google Scholar
, , , , and 2004. “Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies,” J. Polit., 166, 3, pp 823–846.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1988. “Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length,” RAND J. Econ., 19, 3, pp 327–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1991. “Pretia ex Machina?: Prices and Process in Long Term Contracts,” J. of Law and Econ., 34, pp 64–99.Google Scholar
and 1996. “Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons From Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation,” J. Regul. Econ., 9, pp 5–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1993. “The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement,” RAND J. Econ., 24, 1, pp 126–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2006a. Bribing Voters. Mimeo: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
2006b. Regulatory Capture: A Review. Mimeo: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
, , and 2006. “Plato O Plomo? Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence,” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., 100, 1, pp 41–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1994. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. New York, NY: Grosset/Putnam.Google Scholar
, , and 1986. “Choice of Agricultural Tenancy in the Presence of Transaction Costs,” Land Econ., 62, 2, pp 145–158.Google Scholar
and 1957. A Concept of Agribusiness. Boston, MA: Division of Research, Harvard Business School.Google Scholar
and 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1998. “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study,” J. Urban Econ., 43, 2, pp 244–257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1987. “Cooperative Behavior in Vertical Markets: The Influence of Transaction Costs and Competitive Strategies,” Rev. Marketing, pp 39–66.Google Scholar
1998. “Litigating Regulation: Corporate Strategy in Telecommunication,” unpublished manuscript.
2005. “Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 21, 2, pp 501–523.Google Scholar
and , Jr. 2002. “The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation, and Administrative Regulation,” Bus. Politics, 14, 2, pp 161–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Jr. and 2004. “Why Do Regulatory Outcomes Vary So Much? Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Regulated Prices in the US Telecommunications Industry.” Work paper, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
and 2002. “Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 49, pp 597–625.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Jr., , and 1999. “An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 15, 1, pp 283–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 2001. Access to Land, Rural Poverty, and Public Action. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1997a. “Contracts, Co operation, and Competition,” in Studies in Economics, Management, and Law. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
and 1997b. “Contracts and Competition,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 21, 2, pp 121–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1985. Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human behavior. New York, NY: Plenum.Google Scholar
and 2001, in , ed., Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries, the Economics of Legal Relationship. Amsterdam: JAI Press, Elsevier Science BV.Google Scholar
, , and 2004. “Self-Interest, Reciprocity, and Participation in Online Reputation Systems,” MIT Sloan work paper 4500–04 (Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=585402).
1969. “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,” J. Law Econ., 12, 1, pp 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1988. “Profit as a Functional Return: Reconsidering Knight's Views,” in , ed., Ownership, Control and the Firm. The Organization of Economic Activity. Oxford and New York, NY: Blackwell, pp 236–247.Google Scholar
1976. “Cattlemen's Associations and Property Rights in Land in the American West,” Explorations Econ. Hist., 13, 4, pp 423–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 2001. “Market Power in a Deregulated Electrical Industry,” Decision Support Systems, 30, 3, pp 357–381.Google Scholar
and 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests get Represented,” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., 80, 1, pp 89–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1994. “Culture and Economy,” in and , eds, The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton University Press, pp 27–57.Google Scholar
1996. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
2004. Lawlessness and Economics. Alternative Modes of Governance. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
and 1993. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Every Day Life. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.Google Scholar
and 2002. “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey,” J. Econ. Lit., 40, 3, pp 793–837.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , and 2003. “The New Comparative Economics,” J. Compar. Econ., 31, 4, pp 595–619.Google Scholar
, La Porta, R., Lopez de , and 2002. “The Regulation of Entry,” Quart. J. Econ., 117, 1, pp 1–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1993. “A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts,” J. Legal Stud., 22, 2, pp 367–393.Google Scholar
2000. Innovation, Organization, and Economic Dynamics: Selected Essays. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
and 1994. “Some Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Organizational Competences,” in , ed., Evolutionary Concepts in Contemporary Economics. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, pp 157–178.Google Scholar
and 2000. “On the Tangled Discourse between Transaction Cost Economics and Competence-based Views of the Firm: Some Comments,” in and , eds, Competence, Governance, and Entrepreneurship. Oxford University Press, pp 80–92.Google Scholar
1987. “The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 8, 1, pp 13–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1965. Three Negro Classics: Up from Slavery. The Souls of Black Folks. The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man. New York, NY: Avon Books.Google Scholar
and 2004. “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games Econ. Behav., 47, 2, pp 268–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2000. “Learning from Competing Partners: Outcomes and Durations of Scale and Link Alliances in Europe, North America and Asia,” Strategic Manag. J., 21, 2, pp 99–126.3.0.CO;2-G>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 1995. “Understanding Dual Distribution: The Case of Rep and House Accounts,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 11, 1, pp 189–204.Google Scholar
1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar
1997. “Effective Interfirm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize Transaction Costs and Maximize Transaction Value,” Strategic Manage. J., 18, 7, pp 535–356.3.0.CO;2-Z>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1998. “Breach Remedies,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. London: Macmillan, pp 174–179.Google Scholar
and 1996. “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 86, 3, pp 478–01.Google Scholar
(European Bank for Reconstrucion and Development). 2004. Transition Report : Infrastructure, London.
and 1999. “Contracts between Farmers and Farmers Processing Cooperatives: A Principal Agent Approach for the Potato Starch Industry,” in and , eds, Vertical Relationships and Coordination in the Food System. Hiedelberg: Physica, pp 267–284.Google Scholar
and 2003. “Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995–1999,” RAND J Econ., 34, 2, pp 356–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1983. Explaining Technical Change. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Cambidge University Press.Google Scholar
1994. “Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies,” unpublished manuscript, remarks given at the University of California, Berkeley.
and 2003. “Decentralization and Political Institutions,” CEPR Discussion paper 3857.
1992. Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
and 1995. “A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyist and the Bureaucracy,” J. Law, Econ. Organ., 11, 2, pp 227–255.Google Scholar
, 1991. “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,” Yale Law J., 101, 2, pp 331–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. “The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana,” World Devel., 24, 3, pp 427–448.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Price Uncertainty and Vertical Integration: An Examination of Petrochemical Firms,” J. Corp. Finan: Contracting, Governance, and Organ., 6, 4, pp 345–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
H. and P. 2000. “The Measurement of Relatedness: An Application to Corporate Diversification,” J. Bus., 73, 4, pp 629–660.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance,” in , , and , eds, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press,Google Scholar
and 2002. “Why Social Preferences Matter. The Impact of Non Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives,” Econ. J., 112, 478, pp C1–C33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,” J. Econ. Perspect., 14, pp. 159–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. “Do Incentive Contracts Crowd-out Voluntary Cooperation?” Work paper W34. (Available at: www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp034.pdf).
and 2006. “Reciprocity and Contract Enforcement,” Handbook of Experimental Economics, in press.Google Scholar
and 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” Quart. J. Econ., 114, pp 769–816.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2001. “Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness,” CESifo work paper W445, Zurich IEER work paper W72. (Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=262015).
and 1997. “Patterns of Credible Commitments: Territory and Brand Selectivity in Industrial Distribution Channels,” J. Marketing, 61, 2, pp 19–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “The Political Economy of Direct Legislation: Direct Democracy and Local Decision-Making,” Econ. Pol. Rev., 33, pp 329–367.Google Scholar
and 1997. “Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation,” Kyklos, 50, 4, pp 507–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators,” Europ. J. Polit. Economy, 19, 3, pp 497–527.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary,” CESifo work paper W1260.
, , and 2003. “Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments,” CESifo Work paper W1087.
, , and 2004. “Federalism, Decentralization and Economic Growth,” Discussion Paper Series Work papers 200430, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
and 2004. “Methodological Individualism and the Organizational Capabilities Approach,” Work paper W2004-5, Center for Knowledge Governance, Copenhagen Business School. (Available at www.cbs.dk/ckg).
1999. “Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability,” in , , and , eds, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
and 1990. “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 6, pp 1–20.Google Scholar
and 2006. “Incentives and Motivations: To What Extent Can Economics Benefit from Psychology?” Mimeo, ATOM, University of Paris 1.
and 2005. “Self-Enforcing Federalism,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 21, 1, pp 103–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1982. “Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” Public Choice, 39, 1, pp 33–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. “Games Economists Play: A Non-Cooperative View,” RAND J. Econ., 20, 1, pp 113–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries,” J. Public Econ., 83, pp 325–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “Assets, Attributes and Ownership,” Int. J. Econ. Bus., 8, pp 19–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1993. “Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives,” J. Evolutionary Econ., 3, 2, pp 127–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. “The Rhetorical Dimensions of Bounded Rationality: Herbert A. Simon and Organizational Economics,” in , ed., Cognitive Paradigms in Economics. London: Routledge, pp 158–176.Google Scholar
2003. “Herbert Simon's Grand Theme in the Economics of Organization: Much Cited and Little Used,” J. Econ. Psych., 24, pp 245–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2005. Strategy and Economic Organization in the Knowledge Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2005. “Entrepreneuship and the Theory of the Firm: Any Gains From Trade?” in , , and , eds, Handbook of Entrepreneurship: Disciplinary Perspectives. New York, NY: Kluwer.Google Scholar
1987. “If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?” Amer. Econ. R., 79, 3, pp 594–596.Google Scholar
and 1992. “Transaction Costs as Determinants of Vertical Coordination in the US Food Industries,” Amer. J. Agr. Econ., 74, 4, pp 941–950.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. “The Firm as a Minisociety,” draft manuscript.
1997. Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
and 1997. “The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 87, 4, pp 746–755.Google Scholar
and 2006. “Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution,” in , ed., Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy – Analysis and Evidence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
1998. “Law and Economics,” in The New Palgrave. A Dictionary in Economics. London: Macmillan, pp 144–147.Google Scholar
1997. “Modern Macroeconomics and its Evolution from a Monetarist Perspective,” Rev. Econ. Stud, 24, 4, pp 192–222.Google Scholar
and 2001. “Contractual Mix Analysis in the Brazilian Franchising,” Work paper, University of Sao Paulo.
2002. “Entrepreneurship, Transaction-Cost Economics, and the Design of Contracts,” in and , eds, The Economics of Contracts. Cambridge University Press, pp 72–97.Google Scholar
and 1997. Institutions and Economic Theory: An Introduction to and Assessment of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
and 2000. Institutions and Economics Theory: The Contributions of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
and 2005. “Self-Determination Theory and Work Motivation,” J. Organ. Behavior, 26, pp 331–362.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. “Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising,” J Law, Econ. Organ. 8, 3, pp 471–501.Google Scholar
2003. The Political Economy of Argentine Development. PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
, , and 2003. “Standards in Wireless Telephone Networks,” Telecommunications Pol. 27, pp 325–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. “Contractual Form in Domestic and International Strategic Alliances,” Organization Studies, 17, 5, pp 773–794.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,” J. Polit. Economy, 108, 5, pp 874–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. “The New Property Rights Theory of the Firm,” in , ed., The Edward Elgar Companion to the Economics of Property Rights, E. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 370–382.Google Scholar
and 2005. “Looking for a Theory of the Firm,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 58, 2, pp 178–199.Google Scholar
1997. “Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry,” J. Law Econ., 40, 1, pp 261–288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1990. “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 6, 2, pp 263–300.Google Scholar
and 1992a. “The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan,” Int. Rev. Law Econ., 12, 1, pp 45–67.Google Scholar
1971. The Entropy Law and Economic Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1989. “The Importance of Control in International Joint Ventures,” J. Int. Bus. Stud., 20, pp 235–254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1991. “Measuring Performance of International Joint Ventures,” J. Int. Bus. Stud., 22, 2, pp 249–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “Governance Value Analysis and Marketing Strategy,” J. Marketing, 63, pp 131–145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. “Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory,” Acad. Man. Rev., 21, 1, pp 13–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Why Organizations Are Such a Mess (and What an Economist Might Do About It)?” MIT Sloan work paper. (Available at: http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/Org_mess.pdf).
2001. “Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games,” in , ed., Trust in Society. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, pp 332–353.Google Scholar
2005. “Four Formalizeable Theories of the Firm,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 58, 2, pp 200–245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
and 1999. “Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox,” in , , and , eds, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. G. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp 3–34.Google Scholar
2002. “Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 3, 1, pp 49–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. “Why Regulate Deregulated Network Industries?” J. Network Industries, 3, pp 297–311.Google Scholar
and 2000. “Why do the European Union's electricity industries continue to differ? A new institutional analysis,” in , eds., Institutions, Contracts and Organizations. Edward Elgar, pp. 313–34.Google Scholar
and 2003. Competition in European Electricity Markets: A Cross Country Comparison. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2006. “France Electricity Reform: A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent,” in Energy Journal, 26.Google Scholar
and 2007. European Union Electricity Internal Market: Towards an Achievement?Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
, , 2007. “Deregulating with No Regulator: Is the German Electricity Transmission Regime Institutionally Correct? Energy Policy, 36, pp 1600–1610.
and 2003. “The Rise of the Regulatory State,” J. Econ. Lit., 41, 2, pp 401–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” J. Econ. Growth, 9, 3, pp 271–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2000. “Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,” Quart. J. Econ., 115, 3, pp 791–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1976. “Regulation and Administered Contracts” Bell J. Econ., 7, 2, pp 426–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. “Ownership Structures of Foreign Subsidiaries: Theory and Evidence,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 11, 1, pp 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1994. “Group vs. Group: How Alliance Networks Compete,” Harvard Bus. Rev., 72, 4, pp 62–74.Google Scholar
2003. Regulating Infrastructure: Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
and 1996. “The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements,” J. Law Econ., 39, 2, pp 405–434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1998. “Regulation as Cause of Firm Fragmentation: The Case of Spanish Construction Industry,” Int. Rev. Law Econ., 18, 4, pp 433–450.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1954. “The Economic Theory of A Common-property Resource: The Fishery,” J. Polit. Economy, 62, 2, pp 124–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. “Bad Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory,” Academy of Management Review, 21, 1, pp 13–47.Google Scholar
, , and 2000. “Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource,” J. Law Econ., 43, pp 679–713.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” Amer. J. Sociology, 91, 3, pp 481–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2006. “Benchmarking in the European Union,” work paper, University of Cambridge.
1989. “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,” J. Econ. Hist., 49, 4, pp 857–882.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. “Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 82, 2, pp 128–33.Google Scholar
1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Magrhibi Traders Coalition,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 83, 3, pp 525–548.Google Scholar
1994. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” J. Pol. Econ., 102, 5, pp 912–950.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1997. “Microtheory and Recent Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions Through Economic History,” in and , eds, Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge University Press, pp 79–113.Google Scholar
1998. “Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 88, 2, pp 80–89.Google Scholar
2000. “Economic History and Game Theory: A Survey,” in and , eds, Handbook of Game Theory. Amsterdam: North Holland.Google Scholar
2005. “Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange,” in and , eds, Handbook of New Institutional Economics, New York, NY: Kluwer Academic Press, pp 727–786.Google Scholar
2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1994. “Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” J. Polit. Economy, 102, 4, pp 745–776.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. “Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunities for Reform,” Natural Res. J., 32, pp 265–288.Google Scholar
, , and 2004. “US Hog Marketing Contract Study,” University of Missouri, Work paper AEWP 2004–07.
and 1999. “Insider Power and Wage Setting in Transition: Evidence from a Panel of Large Polish Firms,” Europ. Econ. Rev., 43, 4, pp 1137–1147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” J. Polit. Economy, 94, 4, pp 691–719.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing It Right. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.Google Scholar
and 1999. Managing the Regulatory Process: Design, Concepts, Issues, and the Latin America and Caribbean Story, Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Chapter 6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1995a. “Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances,” Academy of Manage. J., 38, 1, pp 85–112.Google Scholar
1995b. “Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A Longitudinal Analysis,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 4, pp 619–650.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1999. “Network Location and Learning: The Influence of Network Resources and Firm Capabilities on Alliance Formation,” Strategic Manage. J., 20, 5, pp 397–420.3.0.CO;2-K>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2005. Interorganizational-Trust: The Choice of Make, Buy, or Ally; and the Performance of Interorganizational Relationships in the U.S. Auto Industry. Manuscript, Olin School of Business.Google Scholar
and , forthcoming. “Inter–organizational Trust: the Choice of Make, Buy, or Ally; and the Performance of Interorganizational Relationships in the US. Auto Industry”, Organization Science.
, , and 2005. “Adaptation in Vertical Relationships: Beyond Incentive Conflict,” Strategic Manage. J., 26, 5, pp 415–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , 1982. “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 3, pp 367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , and 2007. “The Liberalisation of the Continental European Electricity Market,” Energy Stud. Rev., 14, 2, pp 1–29.Google Scholar
1990. “Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts,” Stanford Law Rev., 42, pp 927–992.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. “Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from the Middle and the Digital Ages,” Work paper 195, John M. Olin program in Law and Economics, Standford Law School.
2005. “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments,” in and , eds, Handbook of New Institutional Economics. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 175–204.Google Scholar
2000. “Interest, Institutions and Policy Reform,” in , ed., Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage. Chicago University Press, pp 21–61.Google Scholar
and 1990. “No Business is an Island: The Network Concept of Business Strategy,” Scand. J. Man., 5, pp 187–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1991. “Competition for Competence and Inter-Partner Learning within International Strategic Alliances,” Strategic Manage. J., 12, pp 82–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2003. “Correcting for Endogeneity in Strategic Management Research,” Strategic Organ, 1, 1, pp. 53–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and (2003) “Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation,” Journal of Political Economy, 111, 3, pp 465–497.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1963. “The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior,” Amer. Naturalist, 97, pp 354–356.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1964. “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I and II,” J. Theoretical Biology, 7, pp 1–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1984. “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change,” Amer. Sociological Rev., 49, pp 149–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. “Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights,” Harvard Law School Public Law Research paper 37.
2004. “Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?” Amer. Econ. Rev., 94, 3, pp 712–729.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. “Why a Constitution?” in and , eds, The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. New York, NY: Agathon Press, pp 100–120.Google Scholar
1985. “Vertical Integration and Corporate Strategy,” Acad. Manage. J., 28, 2, pp 397–425.Google Scholar
1988. “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 4, pp 119–141. Reprinted in Williamson O. E. and Winter S. G., eds, 1991, The Nature of the Firm. Oxford University Press, pp 138–159.Google Scholar
1990. “Is ‘Bounded Rationality’ an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?” J. Inst. Theoretical Econ., 146, pp 696–702.Google Scholar
and 1987. “The Theory of the Contracts,” in , ed., Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress. Cambridge University Press, pp 71–85.Google Scholar
and 2002. “A Theory of Firm Scope,” Mimeo. (Available at: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=514).
and 1988. “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica, 56, 4, pp 755–785.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1990. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” J. Polit. Economy, 98, pp 1119–1158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” Rev. Econ. Stud., 66, 1, pp 115–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In,” Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, 465.
and 2005. “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization with John Moore,” J Political Econ., 113, 4, pp 675–702.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jr. 2005. “Why Did You Do That? An Economic Examination of the Effect of Extrinsic Compensation on Intrinsic Motivation and Performance,” J. Econ. Psych., 26, 4, 549–566.
2000. “The Anti-Theoretic Nature of Civil Law Contract Scholarship and the Need for an Economic Theory,” Mimeo, Chicago Law School, and University of Thessalonica.
2006. “Civil Contract Law and Economic Reasoning: An Unlikely Pair?” in and , eds, The Architecture of European Codes and Contract Law. Kluwer Law International, Private Law in European Context Series, 8, pp 159–191.Google Scholar
1998. “Introduction,” in Toward the Rural-Based Development of Commerce and Industry: Selected Experiences from East Asia, Washington, DC: World Bank.Google Scholar
and 1981. Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to Institutional Change. Tokyo University Press, Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
and 2000. A Rice Village Saga –Three Decades of Green Revolution in the Philippines, Lanham. Boulder, CO, and New York, NY: Barnes & Noble.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2007. “Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence,” Int. Rev. Law Econ., 27, 3, 269–290.Google Scholar
and 2002. “Towards Reconciling Transaction Cost Economics and the Knowledge-based View of the Firm: The Context of Interfirm Collaborations,” Int. J. Econ. Bus., 9, pp 97–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Empirical Evidence Regarding the Tension between Knowledge Sharing and Knowledge Expropriation in Collaborations,” Managerial Dec. Econ., 25, pp 401–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?” J. Law Econ., 47, 1, pp 167–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1998. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,” Harvard Law Rev., 111, 3, pp 621–688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2003. “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture and Influence in Transition Economies,” J. Comp. Econ., 31, 4, pp 751–773.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. Energy, the State and the Market: British Energy Policy Since 1979. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. “Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative,” Amer. J. Agr. Econ., 84, pp 104–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001a. “Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure: A Transaction Cost Economics Analysis,” J. Agr. Econ., 26, pp 205–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001b. “Marketing Cooperatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective,” J. Agr. Econ., 52, pp. 53–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000a. “The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth,” Econ. Politics, 12, 1, pp 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000b. “The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 16, 2, pp 334–364.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. “Comparative Economic Organization – Within and Between Countries,” Bus. Polit, 1, 3, pp 261–276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1991. “The Transaction Cost Theory of Joint Ventures: An Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries in the US,” Manage. Sci., pp 483–497.Google Scholar
1993. “Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most Transactions Are a Mix of Market and Hierarchy,” Organization Sci., 4, 4, pp 529–547.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , , , and 2001. “Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 91, pp 73–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , , , et al. 2005. “‘Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in fifteen Small-Scale Societies,” Behavioral and Brain Science, 28, pp 795–815.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1962. “The Architecture of Complexity,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106, pp 467–482.Google Scholar
2001. “Why Contracts are Written in Legalese,” Chicago Kent Law Rev., 77, 1, pp 59–85.Google Scholar
and 1999. “Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions,” Academy Manage. Rev., 24, 4, pp 825–842.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. “Shallow Cost and Deep Cost, An Assessment,” Work paper GRJM, Université Paris-Sud 11.
1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
and 1996. “Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study,” Manage. Sci., 42, pp 659–679.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. Oxford: Polity Press.Google Scholar
1998. “Competence and Contract in the Theory of the Firm,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 35, pp 179–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004a. The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism. London and New York, NY: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2005. “How Much You Know versus How Will I Know You: Supplier Selection for Innovative Components,” Strategic Manage. J., 26, 1, pp 75–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1998. “Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress,” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., 92, 4, pp 775–790.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2002. “Institutional or Structural: Lessons from International Electricity Sector Reforms,” in and , eds, The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications. Cambridge University Press, pp 463–502.Google Scholar
, and 2004. “Influencing Agencies through Pivotal Political Institutions,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 20, 2, pp 458–483.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1991. “Multitask Principal–Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 7, pp 24–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1998. “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,” J. Econ. Perspect., 12, pp 73–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1938. “The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates,” Econometrica, 6, 3, pp 242–269.Google Scholar
and 2005. “Reputation in Auctions: Theory and Evidence from eBay,” J. Econ. Manage. Strategy, 15, 2, pp 353–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1994. Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.Google Scholar
, , and 1990. “Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers,” University of Colorado Law R., 61, pp 393–405.Google Scholar
and 1991. “Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry,” J. Law Econ., 34, 1, pp 25–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. “Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking,” RAND J. Econ., 32, 2, pp 369–386.Google Scholar
2006. “Partenariats Publics–Privés et Concurrence pour le Marché: Quelles Avancées depuis Demsetz (1968)?” Work paper ATOM, Université Paris 1.
1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
1972. “On Informationally Decentralized Systems,” in and , eds, Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp 297–336.Google Scholar
, , and 2002. “Judicial Independence in an Unstable Environment, Argentina 1935–1998,” Amer. J. Politic. Sci., 46, 4, pp 699–716.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2006. “Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation,” Amer. J. Politic. Sci., 100, 1, pp 85–97.Google Scholar
. 2001. Regulatory Institutions in Liberalised Electricity Markets. AIE OCDE.
and 2006. “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute more Than Others,” American Political Science Review, 100, pp 165–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1989 “Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger,” in and , eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp 415–473.Google Scholar
Jr. and 2004. “Generalized and Particularized Trust in Organizations,” University of Missouri, work paper, presented at the 2004 ISNIE meetings in Tucson, AZ. (Available at: http://cori.missouri.edu/jamesh/).
Jr. and 2005. “Organizational Antecedents of Trust in Producer-Owned Firms,” Ann. Public Coop. Econ., 76, 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jr. and 2006. “Farmer Trust in Producer- and Investor-Owned Firms: Evidence from Missouri Corn and Soybean Producers,” Agribusiness: An International Journal, 22, 1, pp 135–153.Google Scholar
and 1982. “Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery,” Amer. Econ.Rev., 72, 5, pp 1005–1022.Google Scholar
and 1994. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. Chicago University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2001. “Information Distortion and Competitive Remedies in Government Transfer Programs: The Case of Ethanol,” Econ. Governance, 2, 2, pp 1001–1034.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2000. “Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional Reform,” Econ. Transition, 8, 1, pp 1–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2002a. “Courts and Relational Contract,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 18, 1, pp 221–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
; , and . 2002b. “Property Rights and Finance,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 92, 5, pp 1335–1356.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1998. “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,” Stanford Law Rev., 50, pp 683–668.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and 1997. “A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms,” Academy of Management Review, 22, 4, pp 911–945.Google Scholar
and 2000. “The Effects of Privatization upon Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Baltic Republics,” Ann. Public Coop. Econ., 71, 3, pp 415–439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 2002. “Amateur Legislators – Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System,” Amer. J. Politic. Sci., 46, 3, pp 656–669.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1985. “Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal Burning Electric Generating Plants,” J. Law, Econ. Organ., 1, 1, pp 33–80.Google Scholar
1987. “Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investment: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 77, 1, pp 168–185.Google Scholar
1988. “Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 4, 95–117.Google Scholar
1991. “The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulation,” J. Law Econ. Organ., 7, pp 53–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. “Introducing Competition into Regulated Network Industries: From Hierarchies to Markets in Electricity,” Ind. Corp. Change, 5, 2, pp 341–383.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. “Transaction Costs Economics, Antitrust Rules and Remedies,” J. Law, Econ. Organ., 18, 1, pp 95–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2003. “New Institutional Economics: A Report Card,” ISNIE Presidential Address: Budapest, Hungary.Google Scholar
2004. “Vertical Integration,” in and , eds, Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 319–348.Google Scholar
and 2000. “Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Network I: Financial Rights,” RAND J. Econ., 31, 3, pp 450–487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1970–1971. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
and 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk,” Econometrica, 47, pp 263–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2000. “Learning and Protection of Proprietary Assets in Strategic Alliances: Building Relational Capital,” Strategic. Manage. J., 21, pp 217–237.3.0.CO;2-Y>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2002. “Alliance Capability, Stock Market Response, and Long-Term Alliance Success: The Role of the Alliance Function,” Strategic. Manage. J., 23, pp 747–767.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Multi-Unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from the Texan Fast-Food Industry,” RAND J. Econ., 35, 4, pp 747–761.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2004. “Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology,” J. Law Econ.Organ., 20, 1, pp 207–229.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1985. “Food Sharing among Ache Foragers: Test of Explanatory Hypotheses,” Current Anthropology, 26, pp 223–239.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1994. “Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees,” J Law Econ., 37, pp 417–454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1997. “Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Environment,” Econ. Inquiry, 35, pp 590–602.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
1992. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. A translation of the first edition of the Reine Rechtlehere. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
2004. “Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition,” World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1998. “The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition, Cooperation and Relative Scope,” Strategic. Manage. J., 19, 3, pp 193–210.3.0.CO;2-C>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1988. “Understanding Alliances: The Role of Task and Organizational Complexity,” in and , eds, Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
and 1992. “Global Strategy and Multinationals' Entry Mode Choice,” J. Int. Bus. Stud., 23, 1, pp 29–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1990. “Volksabstimmung und direkte Demokratie: Ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsdiskussion,” in and , eds, Wahlen und Wähler – Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl. Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen, pp 42–69.Google Scholar
and 2006. “The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts,” Amer. J. Econ. Sociology, 65, 4, pp 863–889.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1998. “The Role and Evolution of Beliefs, Habits, Moral Norms, and Institutions,” in , ed., Merits and Limits of Markets. Berlin: Springer, pp 83–108.Google Scholar
1980. “Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 70, pp 356–362.Google Scholar
1988. “Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body–General Motors Relationship Revisited,” J. Law, Econ., Organ., 4, 1, pp 199–213.Google Scholar
1995. “The Economics of Franchise Contracts,” J. Corp. Finan., 2, 1/2, pp 9–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. “Why Hold-Ups Occur? The Self Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships,” Econ. Inquiry, 34, pp 444–463.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1981. “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,” J. Polit. Economy, 89, 41, pp 615–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1997. “Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 87, 2, pp 415–420.Google Scholar
and 1985. “The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts,” J. Law Econ., 27, pp 345–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,” J. Law Econ., 21, 2, pp 297–326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2005. “The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies,” in and , eds, Handbook on New Institutional Economics. New York, NY: Springer, pp 435–464.Google Scholar
, , , , , and 1997. “Do Subjects Understand Base Rates,” Orga. Behav. Human Dec. Process., 72, pp 25–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. “What Really Matters in Auction Design,” J. Econ. Perspect., 16, 1, pp 169–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation,” Quart. J. Econ., 112, 4, pp 1251–1288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. “A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers,” J. Law Econ. Organ., 5, pp 271–292.Google Scholar
2000. “Land and Livestock Contracting in Agriculture: A Principal–Agent Perspective,” in and , eds, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Aldershot, Edward Elgar, pp 1133–1153.Google Scholar
1988. “Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives,” Strategic. Manage. J., 9, pp 319–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. “Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology,” Organ. Sci., 3, pp 383–397.Google Scholar
and 1996. “What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning,” Organ. Sci., 7, pp 502–518.Google Scholar
and 1991. “Joint Venture Formations and Stock Market Reactions: An Assessment in the Information Technology Sector,” Academy Manag. J., 34, pp 869–892.Google Scholar