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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Éric Brousseau
Université de Paris X
Jean-Michel Glachant
Université de Paris XII
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New Institutional Economics
A Guidebook
, pp. 489 - 542
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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