Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-544b6db54f-kbvt8 Total loading time: 0.692 Render date: 2021-10-19T10:01:27.581Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

5 - International coordination of environmental taxes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 January 2010

Carlo Carraro
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Venezia
Domenico Siniscalco
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Politicians and others often argue that environmental policy, and in particular environmental taxes, ought to be coordinated across countries. Two types of arguments for the desirability of international coordination of environmental taxes are frequently given. The first argument states that uncoordinated tax policy will lead to unequal taxes across countries, with a corresponding distortion of the relative competitiveness of countries. Related to this argument is also the fear that when environmental taxes are set individually at the country level, each country's concern about its own competitiveness may imply that environmental taxes throughout are set too low. The starting point of the second type of argument is that several important environmental problems are characterised by international spillovers, i.e., that the environment in one country depends not only on emissions in this country, but also on emissions in one or more other countries. When the environmental problem is international in this sense, environmental policy must also be coordinated according to this type of argument.

This chapter makes a closer study of the arguments for an international coordination of environmental taxes. Section 2 covers the first type of argument, in the context of an environmental problem with no international spillovers. It is first shown that under ‘ideal conditions’ there is no need for international coordination of environmental taxes. ‘Ideal conditions’ include the following assumptions: (a) there are no market failures other than the environmental externality, (b) governments maximise the welfare of a representative household, (c) the environmental externality can be monitored at the micro level, e.g., emission levels from a firm or consumption levels of a good which has a negative impact on the environment.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)
4
Cited by

Send book to Kindle

To send this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Send book to Dropbox

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Send book to Google Drive

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×