Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Miscellaneous Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- Timeline
- Introduction
- 1 The Macroeconomics of UK Austerity
- 2 Eurozone
- 3 The Consequences of Austerity
- 4 The 2015 UK General Election
- 5 The Transformation of the Labour Party
- 6 Brexit
- 7 The Media, Economics and Electing Donald Trump
- 8 Economists and Policy Making
- 9 From Neoliberalism to Plutocracy
- Conclusions
- Notes
- Index
5 - The Transformation of the Labour Party
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 April 2023
- Frontmatter
- Miscellaneous Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- Timeline
- Introduction
- 1 The Macroeconomics of UK Austerity
- 2 Eurozone
- 3 The Consequences of Austerity
- 4 The 2015 UK General Election
- 5 The Transformation of the Labour Party
- 6 Brexit
- 7 The Media, Economics and Electing Donald Trump
- 8 Economists and Policy Making
- 9 From Neoliberalism to Plutocracy
- Conclusions
- Notes
- Index
Summary
Introduction
After the election, Labour MPs seemed to collectively decide that defeat was a result of Miliband moving to the left. Post 5.1 suggests a very different story. Many Labour MPs also argued that it was time to embrace austerity: Posts 5.2 and 5.4 argue this was the wrong thing to do, on political as well as economic grounds. Corbyn’s initial popularity should therefore come as no surprise: while the media talked about Labour Party members moving to the left, I argue in Post 5.3 that in reality the Parliamentary Labour Party had moved to the right. Post 5.5 presents a fuller analysis of why Corbyn looked like he was going to win.
When he did win, suddenly all this became personal. I was invited onto Labour’s newly established Economic Advisory Council (EAC). I explain why I accepted in Post 5.6, and report the stick I got in some quarters for doing so in Post 5.7. One of the arguments suggested for not joining was that it would all be a waste of our time because Corbyn was bound to be a disaster in any general election, which I discuss in Post 5.8. Post 5.9 discusses the stupidity of continuing internal division among Labour MPs. Post 5.10 discusses Labour’s alternative fiscal policy rule, and how it was reported in the media.
Labour’s fiscal credibility rule, which was part of the party’s 2017 manifesto and at the time of writing remains party policy, is for me one of the key achievements of the EAC. The EAC came to an end as a result of Brexit. I have not included any posts from that period because I do not think they are of lasting interest, but it seems appropriate here to explain briefly what happened.
Before the Brexit vote the Council had stressed the serious implications of leaving the EU (discussed in detail in the next chapter). Five days after the vote, around 80% of Labour MPs expressed no confidence in the leadership, which then led to a new leadership contest, where Corbyn was challenged by Owen Smith. One EAC member, Danny Blanchflower, resigned and supported Owen Smith. I also supported Smith, as he opposed Brexit while Corbyn believed (at the time) that the referendum vote meant that we had to leave the Customs Union and Single Market.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Lies We Were ToldPolitics, Economics, Austerity and Brexit, pp. 133 - 161Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2018