Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction and methods of interpretation
- Chapter 1 The idea of the juridical state and the postulate of public law
- Chapter 2 The state of nature and the three leges
- Appendix to Chapter 2 Iustitia tutatrix, iustitia commutativa, and iustitia distributiva and their differences
- Chapter 3 The right to freedom
- Chapter 4 The permissive law in the Doctrine of Right
- Chapter 5 The external mine and thine
- Chapter 6 Intelligible possession of land
- Chapter 7 The “state in the idea”
- Chapter 8 The state in reality
- Chapter 9 International and cosmopolitan law
- Chapter 10 The “idea of public law” and its limits
- Chapter 11 Contract law I. Why must I keep my promise?
- Chapter 12 Contract law II. Kant's table of contracts
- Chapter 13 Criminal punishment
- Chapter 14 The human being as a person
- Appendix I to Chapter 14 On the logic of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”
- Appendix II to Chapter 14 The system of rules of imputation
- Bibliography
- Index
Appendix I to Chapter 14 - On the logic of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction and methods of interpretation
- Chapter 1 The idea of the juridical state and the postulate of public law
- Chapter 2 The state of nature and the three leges
- Appendix to Chapter 2 Iustitia tutatrix, iustitia commutativa, and iustitia distributiva and their differences
- Chapter 3 The right to freedom
- Chapter 4 The permissive law in the Doctrine of Right
- Chapter 5 The external mine and thine
- Chapter 6 Intelligible possession of land
- Chapter 7 The “state in the idea”
- Chapter 8 The state in reality
- Chapter 9 International and cosmopolitan law
- Chapter 10 The “idea of public law” and its limits
- Chapter 11 Contract law I. Why must I keep my promise?
- Chapter 12 Contract law II. Kant's table of contracts
- Chapter 13 Criminal punishment
- Chapter 14 The human being as a person
- Appendix I to Chapter 14 On the logic of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”
- Appendix II to Chapter 14 The system of rules of imputation
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In Chapter 14 we established the foundation for the human being's duties, rights, and moral faculties. Having a duty means that one is required to commit or omit a specified action. “Duty is that action to which someone is bound.” Duty is predicated on the presumption that the individual who has the duty also has the ability to fulfill its requirements. In this Appendix we briefly discuss the well-known “‘ought’ implies ‘can,’” which, although often attributed to Kant, is indeed older.
The implication contained in “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” can be seen from both a prospective and a retrospective view of the actions we commit or omit. We begin with the prospective and consider rules of conduct functioning to model behavior. From this point of view, a rule tells us what we ought to do in the future (section 1). Inextricably connected to this function is the rule's function to evaluate behavior. In the retrospective, the rule sets the standard for evaluating our past conduct (section 2). From either point of view, when we apply a rule to an act we assume that the actor can act, or could have acted, according to the rule's requirements.
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- Information
- Kant's Doctrine of RightA Commentary, pp. 294 - 297Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010