This chapter examines Kant’s qualified endorsement of the idea that moral virtue may be a certain sort of skill (Fertigkeit) in the Metaphysics of Morals (6:383-4). Although the skill model of virtue goes back to ancient Socratic thought, and was developed by the Stoics, the immediate historical context of this idea for Kant was Moses Mendelssohn’s adoption of the model in his 1761 Philosophical Writings. The chapter exposes the sense in which skills, for Mendelssohn, are unreflective — and argues that it is this assumption that Kant rejects. Rather, Kant’s qualified endorsement of the skill model of virtue rests on his recognition that certain kinds of skills have reflection embedded in them. Therefore, his qualified endorsement of the skill model of virtue suggests new avenues for thinking about the role of reflection in practical thought, and so in turn in moral life, from a Kantian point of view.