Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-768ffcd9cc-b9rrs Total loading time: 0.507 Render date: 2022-12-02T03:32:13.038Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "useRatesEcommerce": false } hasContentIssue true

Chapter 4 - Conceptions of Reason and Epistemic Normativity

from Part II - Virtue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 April 2018

Melissa Merritt
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, Sydney
Get access

Summary

This chapter paves the way for the remaining chapters in Part II, which argue for the “specification thesis”: i.e., that moral virtue is a specification of general cognitive virtue, and general cognitive virtue is nothing other than the notion of healthy understanding discussed in Part I, Chapter 2. The specification thesis presupposes a certain conception of reason: namely, that reason is at bottom a cognitive capacity, albeit one admitting of distinct theoretical and practical employments. But many Kantians think that only the theoretical exercise of reason is genuinely cognitive, and assume that when Kant speaks of “practical cognition”—as he often does—the cognition in question does not share anything basic, qua cognition, with theoretical cognition. This chapter lays out the textual evidence that supports the ascription of the former view to Kant, and confronts competing accounts of Kantian epistemic normativity (O’Neill 1989 and Cohen 2014) that assume only the theoretical employment of reason to be genuinely cognitive. It also explains why the specification thesis does not run afoul of Kant’s claims about the “primacy of practical reason”.
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×