Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 A Peacemaking Way of Doing Philosophy
- 2 From Rationality to Morality
- 3 From Liberty to Equality
- 4 From Equality to Feminism
- 5 From Feminism to Multiculturalism
- 6 From Anthropocentrism to Nonanthropocentrism
- 7 From Just War Theory to Pacifism
- 8 Conclusion: Justice for Here and Now
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - From Anthropocentrism to Nonanthropocentrism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 A Peacemaking Way of Doing Philosophy
- 2 From Rationality to Morality
- 3 From Liberty to Equality
- 4 From Equality to Feminism
- 5 From Feminism to Multiculturalism
- 6 From Anthropocentrism to Nonanthropocentrism
- 7 From Just War Theory to Pacifism
- 8 Conclusion: Justice for Here and Now
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
A central debate, if not the most central debate, in contemporary environmental ethics is between those who defend an anthropocentric ethics and those who defend a nonanthropocentric ethics. This debate pits deep ecologists like George Sessions against reform or shallow ecologists like John Passmore. It divides biocentric egalitarians like Paul Taylor from social ecologists like Murray Bookchin. In this chapter I propose to go some way toward resolving this debate in accord with a peacemaking model of doing philosophy by showing that, when the most morally defensible versions of each of these perspectives are laid out, they do not lead to different practical requirements. In this way I hope to show how it is possible for defenders of anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric environmental ethics, despite their theoretical disagreement concerning whether humans are superior to members of other species, to agree on a common set of principles for achieving environmental justice. I also propose to show how this approach to environmental justice can be extended to deal with environmental racism.
NONANTHROPOCENTRISM
Consider first the nonanthropocentric perspective. In support of this perspective, it can be argued that we have no non-question-begging grounds for regarding the members of any living species as superior to the members of any other. It allows that the members of species differ in a myriad of ways, but argues that these differences do not provide grounds for thinking that the members of any one species are superior to the members of any other.
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- Justice for Here and Now , pp. 125 - 150Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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