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Chapter 4 - An Anscombian Account of Intentional Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2021

Joshua Stuchlik
Affiliation:
University of St Thomas, Minnesota
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Summary

An agent who acts intentionally typically foresees that she will bring about a number of effects and that her conduct will fall under a variety of different descriptions. Which of these effects and descriptions are intentional and which are incidental? To answer this question, Chapter 4 presents an Anscombian account of intentional action. I first show how Anscombe uses a special sense of the question “Why?” to elucidate the teleological order characteristic of intentional action. I then explain how the teleological order of an agent’s intentional action is determined by the calculation on the basis of which she acts, where the concept of calculation is illuminated by the notion of practical reasoning. Next, I explain how Anscombe’s account of intention and intentional action differs from a false conception she calls “Cartesian psychology.” Finally, I apply the Anscombian account to three controversial cases.

Type
Chapter
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Intention and Wrongdoing
In Defense of Double Effect
, pp. 81 - 100
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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