Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Key to abbreviations and translators
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The context for Kant's moral philosophy
- Part I The nature of morality
- 3 The nature of human action
- 4 Prudence: taking care of our own interests
- 5 Morality: living autonomously
- 6 Morally obligatory ends
- 7 The defense of morality
- 8 The primacy of morality
- Part II The moral norm for persons
- Part III The norm for moral judgment
- Part IV Kant on history, politics, and religion
- Appendixes
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
7 - The defense of morality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Key to abbreviations and translators
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The context for Kant's moral philosophy
- Part I The nature of morality
- 3 The nature of human action
- 4 Prudence: taking care of our own interests
- 5 Morality: living autonomously
- 6 Morally obligatory ends
- 7 The defense of morality
- 8 The primacy of morality
- Part II The moral norm for persons
- Part III The norm for moral judgment
- Part IV Kant on history, politics, and religion
- Appendixes
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
Summary
Kant has set out what it must mean to say that we human beings are moral agents. He has also concluded that all other philosophers were badly mistaken in thinking of human morality as a high species of prudence. What he has not yet shown is that we are moral agents. His analysis has yielded hypothetical claims only: If there are moral agents, this is what a moral agent must be – one who can act autonomously; and if there are contingently moral agents, the Law of Autonomy necessarily appears to them as a categorical imperative. (See Gr. 124/461.) Kant therefore has offered only this claim about our own purported moral agency: If our common belief that we are moral agents is true, we are bound by the Law of Autonomy as a categorical imperative. (See, e.g., Gr 72/432.) But he also remarks that getting this far should not be underestimated; by itself it represents “a quite considerable gain” (Gr. 103/449).
Clearly, people commonly believe that they have a moral nature, that they can make moral judgments, and that they are obligated to act morally. Most do not feel any great need for a defense of these beliefs. In fact, they would find it odd that anyone thought such a defense necessary. As we know, Kant had enormous respect for the ordinary person's ability to think about moral matters.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory , pp. 76 - 94Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1989