Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-dc8c957cd-wvcbk Total loading time: 0.342 Render date: 2022-01-28T09:24:34.990Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Chapter 3 - Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism about Reasons

from Part II - Reasons of the Good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 October 2018

Arash Abizadeh
Affiliation:
McGill University, Montréal
Get access

Summary

According to conative subjectivists, agents’ normative reasons are all grounded in their desires; according to cognitive subjectivists, normative reasons all derive from (or are relativized to) actual beliefs about what reasons they have. Hobbes was neither a conative nor cognitive subjectivist about normative reasons. He was committed to the irreducible normativity of at least two objective sets of precepts: (a) precepts of instrumental transmission that prescribe desiring and taking the relevant means to one’s normative ends; and (b) prudential precepts that prescribe caring for one’s ongoing good or felicity. The normativity of the prudential precepts implies that rational agents have reasons of the good; these precepts are the normative foundation of natural law. Affective and practical normative reasons, moreover, are relativized not to what agents think, nor to what actually turns out to be the case, but to the evidence epistemically accessible to them, i.e., to what they have a sufficient epistemic reason to believe. Thus when natural laws prescribe the means to self-preservation, they prescribe to agents the means they each can reasonably know or foresee will favour their self-preservation—where self-preservation denotes not bare survival, but the preservation of a life worth living.
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Send book to Kindle

To send this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Send book to Dropbox

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Send book to Google Drive

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×