Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-99c86f546-cxxrm Total loading time: 0.309 Render date: 2021-12-01T19:56:57.427Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

5 - DISEASE OR CURE? POLITICAL PARTIES AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE

Political parties and fiscal discipline

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2010

Jonathan A. Rodden
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Get access

Summary

Party-spirit is an inseparable appendage of human nature. It grows naturally out of the rival passions of Men, and is therefore to be found in all Governments. But there is no political truth better established by experience nor more to be deprecated in itself, than that this most dangerous spirit is apt to rage with greatest violence in governments of the popular kind, and it is at once their most common and their most fatal disease.

Alexander Hamilton, The Defense No. 1

The one agency that might be expected to harmonize the policies of central and constituent governments is a political party. If the officials of both sets of governments are adherents of the same ideology or followers of the same leader or leaders, then they might be expected to pursue harmonious policies.

William Riker and Ronald Schaps “Disharmony in Federal Government”

The peril of decentralization is that along with increased responsibility for local officials – and the potential for increased local accountability – comes increased local self-seeking that can impose externalities and undermine the provision of national collective goods. The previous two chapters have explored a serious implication for fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability: Subnational governments might manipulate the central government's cofinancing obligations and make fiscal decisions that shift their burdens onto others. This can create a cooperation problem.

Type
Chapter
Information
Hamilton's Paradox
The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
, pp. 119 - 139
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Send book to Kindle

To send this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Send book to Dropbox

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Send book to Google Drive

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×