In the debates about Guantanamo, one of the central questions is whether or not the denial of habeas corpus to the detainees is a serious violation of their human rights. The denial of habeas corpus is the abridgement of a procedural right, at its most minimal the right to be brought out of prison and to have the charges against one publicly proclaimed. And while it may be that the abridgement of such a right also violates substantive rights to liberty of the detainees, it may not if, as the Bush administration claimed, the detainees were guilty and highly dangerous, and hence deserving of being detained. But what are we to make of the denial of a procedural right, like habeas corpus, when no substantive right is also denied? To begin to answer this question, I take a step back and ask what is the nature and value of procedural rights, as distinguished from substantive rights?

I will begin this chapter by discussing Joel Feinberg's thought-experiment about Nowheresville. Feinberg said it was characteristic of a place where there are no rights that people do not make claims since they “do not have a notion of what is their due.” In recent cases at Guantanamo and Bagram, the lack of procedural rights is not a matter of failing to see what is one's due, but rather of having officials recognize what are their duties in light of claiming by inmates and detainees under their care. Being able to claim is only part of what rights involve. And if there are places where only claiming goes on, without corresponding recognition of the claiming person's status, that is another instance of Nowheresville. Guantanamo and Bagram are unfortunately like Nowheresville in this latter sense, as is also true of some refugee camps and of those who are held as political prisoners.