Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
Due to the low cost and ease of deployment associated with wireless devices, wireless networks will continue to be the dominant choice for connecting to the future Internet. Beyond serving as an edge-connecting medium, the rapid improvement in communication rates for emerging wireless technologies suggests that wireless networks will also play an increasingly important role in building the backbone of the future Internet. As wireless components become integrated into the design of future network architectures, one significant concern that will arise is whether their pervasiveness, affordability, and ease of programmability might also serve as a means to undermine the benefits they might bring to the future Internet.
Just as the future Internet initiative has brought new perspectives on how protocols should be designed to take advantage of improvements in technology, the future Internet initiative also allows us to reexamine how we approach securing our network infrastructures. Traditional approaches to building and securing networks are tied tightly to the concept of protocol layer separation. For network protocol design, routing functions are typically considered separately from link layer functions, which are considered independently of transport layer phenomena or even the very applications that utilize such functions. Similarly, in the security arena, MAC-layer security solutions (e.g., WPA2 for 802.11 devices) are typically considered as point-solutions to address threats facing the link layer, while routing and transport layer security issues are dealt with in distinct, nonintegrated protocols like IPSEC, TLS, or even in the abundance of recent secure routing protocols.