Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The development of the union movements of Britain and the United States
- 3 The orthodox theoretical framework: an overview
- 4 Trade union objectives and the monopoly union model
- 5 Bargaining models of the trade union
- 6 Empirical estimates of the union wage differential
- 7 The impact of trade unions on productivity, investment, profitability, employment and hours
- 8 Unions and the macroeconomy
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- Index
9 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The development of the union movements of Britain and the United States
- 3 The orthodox theoretical framework: an overview
- 4 Trade union objectives and the monopoly union model
- 5 Bargaining models of the trade union
- 6 Empirical estimates of the union wage differential
- 7 The impact of trade unions on productivity, investment, profitability, employment and hours
- 8 Unions and the macroeconomy
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
In the introduction to this book, it was argued that the textbook perfectly competitive model of the labour market, where labour is treated essentially as a commodity in an auction, is not a good characterisation when workers have some bargaining power. It is well known that labour is characterised by certain features that distinguish it from other inputs. These features may in some circumstances give workers or management a degree of bargaining power. Some examples of these characteristics were provided in chapter 1. In general, in circumstances where it is costly for the firm to replace existing workers by outsiders, incumbent workers have some market power. And where it is costly for the worker to be laid off for whatever reason (be it loss of firm-specific human capital or because there are no alternative jobs), management will have some bargaining power. In such a situation of bilateral monopoly, emerging as a result of labour turnover costs, wages may be determined through a bargaining process rather than through an auction process. In principle, such bargaining may be either between individuals and management, or between an agent of the workers and management, where the agent could be a trade union. While bargaining may be more effective between a trade union and management, there may still be scope for individual bargaining with management in some production processes.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Economics of the Trade Union , pp. 258 - 265Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994