Introduction

In his reflection upon Dwight Eisenhower's prospects in the Oval Office after the Republican's landslide victory in 1952, outgoing President Harry Truman suggested of his successor that “[h]e’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won't be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.”Truman's quip marks a truism of the modern presidency. Nearly every chief executive has been enticed to lead by command by drawing upon the broad contours of “executive power” framed in Article II of the Constitution. The appeal of unilateral action is particularly alluring in view of the wearisome challenges of persuading Congress, an unenviable task which is often likened to herding cats even under the best circumstances. An exasperated Barack Obama, who marshalled his signature Affordable Care Act through Congress in 2010, made the quintessential point as he waged battle against an intransigent opposition majority several years later. Squaring off against the Republican Congress, Obama noted that “I’ve got a pen and I’ve got a phone—and I can use that pen to sign executive orders and take executive actions and administrative actions that move the ball forward.”

Obama's frustration after losing his partisan majority on Capitol Hill just two years into his term conveys why, according to most scholars, presidents must think big and act boldly early in their term to take the reins of Congress and accomplish their goals quickly. Their influence naturally diminishes across time, and the condition of divided government can further limit the potential for legislative success, particularly in this age of institutional hyper-partisanship.