Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- The Promethean Pragmatist
- 1 The Ethics of Prometheanism
- 2 The Willfulness of Belief
- 3 The Freedom of Belief
- 4 The Will to Believe
- 5 The Ethics of Truth
- 6 The Semantics of “Truth”
- 7 Ontological Relativism: William James Meets Poo-bah
- The Anti-Promethean Mystic
- Appendix
- Bibliography of Works Cited
- Index
3 - The Freedom of Belief
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- The Promethean Pragmatist
- 1 The Ethics of Prometheanism
- 2 The Willfulness of Belief
- 3 The Freedom of Belief
- 4 The Will to Believe
- 5 The Ethics of Truth
- 6 The Semantics of “Truth”
- 7 Ontological Relativism: William James Meets Poo-bah
- The Anti-Promethean Mystic
- Appendix
- Bibliography of Works Cited
- Index
Summary
The previous chapter presented James's reasons for thinking that belief is an intentional action, or inducible by intentional actions. The purpose of this chapter is to explore his reasons for claiming that belief also is a free action in his Libertarian sense. The next chapter will lay bare his doctrine of the will to believe and how it justifies believing that the will and belief are free in this sense. This chapter will be subdivided into four parts. The first presents James's theory of freedom. The second gives his reasons why it cannot be decided on epistemic or evidential grounds through empirical inquiry that we are or that we are not free in this sense. The third expounds his reasons for thinking that it is desirable in terms of maximizing desire-satisfaction to believe that we are free. The fourth presents some objections to his theory of freedom and how James could respond to them; herein some of the finer points in his analysis will emerge. It will be found in Chapter 4 that among the several necessary conditions for having a will-to-believe option are that the proposition to be believed cannot have its truth or falsity determined on epistemic or evidential grounds and that believing it has desirable consequences. Thus, if one or more of the objections to James's theory should prove fatal, his theory would not qualify as a candidate for a will-to-believe option, because its falsity can be epistemically determined.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Divided Self of William James , pp. 72 - 92Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999