Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I THE THEORY OF POLITICAL FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY: SLAVERY, MUTUAL REGARD, AND MODERN EGALITARIANISM
- PART II DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN MODERN SOCIAL THEORY
- 5 Historical materialism and justice
- 6 Two kinds of historical progress
- 7 The Aristotelian lineage of Marx's eudaemonism
- 8 Radical democracy and individuality
- 9 The Protestant Ethic and Marxian theory
- 10 Nationalism and the dangers of predatory “liberalism”
- 11 Democracy and status
- 12 Bureaucracy, socialism, and a common good
- 13 Levels of ethical disagreement and the controversy between neo-Kantianism and realism
- Conclusion: the project of democratic individuality
- Bibliography
- Index
12 - Bureaucracy, socialism, and a common good
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I THE THEORY OF POLITICAL FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY: SLAVERY, MUTUAL REGARD, AND MODERN EGALITARIANISM
- PART II DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN MODERN SOCIAL THEORY
- 5 Historical materialism and justice
- 6 Two kinds of historical progress
- 7 The Aristotelian lineage of Marx's eudaemonism
- 8 Radical democracy and individuality
- 9 The Protestant Ethic and Marxian theory
- 10 Nationalism and the dangers of predatory “liberalism”
- 11 Democracy and status
- 12 Bureaucracy, socialism, and a common good
- 13 Levels of ethical disagreement and the controversy between neo-Kantianism and realism
- Conclusion: the project of democratic individuality
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Intention, responsibility, and sociological reductionism
As opposed to a democratic, eudaemonist conception of the state, Weber's “Politics as a Vocation” and Economy and Society defend a sociological, instrumental one. The latter does not countenance a contrast of rational authority – one that serves a common good – with repressive authority – one instrumental to particular purposes. In sociologically insisting that instruments overshadow aims, Weber promoted a non-Aristotelian, nondemocratic political science. But once again he did not compare his standpoint to any other. Instead, he contended that since political associations have pursued a diversity of particular tasks, they can have no end in common, even, say, to protect their members’ lives and capacity for moral personality:
But what is a “political” association from the sociological point of view? What is a “state”? Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those [political] associations.
Thus, Weber sought to analyze all state activity in terms of common means, primarily, the use of physical violence, and secondarily, the need for legitimacy and an administrative staff. His argument weaves together positivist and neo-Kantian features in a way that, as the first section of Chapter 9 emphasizes, has enduringly influenced behavioral sociologists and political scientists.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Democratic Individuality , pp. 423 - 450Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990