Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Preface
- 1 The Common Sense Tradition
- 2 Common Sense and Reliability I
- 3 Common Sense and Reliability II
- 4 Reid, Reliability, and Reid's Wrong Turn
- 5 Moore, Skepticism, and the External World
- 6 Chisholm, Particularism, and Methodism
- 7 Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology
- 8 Particularism, Ethical Skepticism, and Moral Philosophy
- Conclusion
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 August 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Preface
- 1 The Common Sense Tradition
- 2 Common Sense and Reliability I
- 3 Common Sense and Reliability II
- 4 Reid, Reliability, and Reid's Wrong Turn
- 5 Moore, Skepticism, and the External World
- 6 Chisholm, Particularism, and Methodism
- 7 Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology
- 8 Particularism, Ethical Skepticism, and Moral Philosophy
- Conclusion
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
Summary
I have defended the common sense tradition from a variety of philosophical objections. Among the most important of these objections are (1) that common sense philosophers fail to offer any non-circular proof for the reliability of their ways of forming beliefs, and (2) that they assume that they know various things without knowing a criterion of knowledge. We examined the first sort of objection chiefly in Chapters 2 and 3 and the second in Chapter 6. I have argued that neither of these objections provides a good reason for rejecting the basic approach of the common sense tradition to the philosophical questions that concern us.
I have not sought to prove that there is an external world or that there are other people who are conscious, or to prove a great many other things that may be considered matters of common sense. One does not need philosophy to know such things. One also does not need to be a philosopher to know that one knows things. You don't need to be a philosopher, for example, to know that you know there are other people. Instead, I have defended the view that we may assume that we do know much of what we ordinarily think we know and that we use such beliefs as data for philosophical reflection. When we think philosophically, we need not assume or pretend that we really don't know anything or that we don't know what we ordinarily think we know.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Common SenseA Contemporary Defense, pp. 181 - 182Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004