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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 October 2022

William A. Bauer
William A. Bauer
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North Carolina State University
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Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum , pp. 212 - 226
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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