Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions
- The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Authors’ Affiliations
- Acknowledgment
- Part I General Chapters
- 1 The Quest to Create an Effective Set of Competition Law Sanctions
- 2 The Role of Fines in the Toolkit of Competition Agencies
- 3 Sanctions on Legal Persons
- 4 The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines
- 5 Corporate Governance and Competition Law Sanctions
- 6 Antitrust Criminalization As a Legitimate Deterrent
- 7 Criminalization of Anticompetitive Conducts
- 8 “Consensus”-Based Sanctions and Commitments
- 9 Effectiveness of Commitment Decisions
- 10 Compliance Policies and Sanctions
- 11 The Role of Administrative Courts in the Effective Enforcement of Competition Law Sanctions
- 12 Civil Sanctions in Antitrust Public Enforcement
- 13 What Role for Private Enforcement in EU Competition Law?
- 14 The Insights of Labor Law
- 15 Human Rights Jurisprudence and the Effectiveness of Competition Law Sanction
- 16 Catholic Teaching on Just Punishment, Especially in Connection with Financial Matters: According to the 1983 Code of Canon Law
- Part II Country Reports
- References
3 - Sanctions on Legal Persons
An Economic Analysis
from Part I - General Chapters
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2022
By
Edited by
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions
- The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Authors’ Affiliations
- Acknowledgment
- Part I General Chapters
- 1 The Quest to Create an Effective Set of Competition Law Sanctions
- 2 The Role of Fines in the Toolkit of Competition Agencies
- 3 Sanctions on Legal Persons
- 4 The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines
- 5 Corporate Governance and Competition Law Sanctions
- 6 Antitrust Criminalization As a Legitimate Deterrent
- 7 Criminalization of Anticompetitive Conducts
- 8 “Consensus”-Based Sanctions and Commitments
- 9 Effectiveness of Commitment Decisions
- 10 Compliance Policies and Sanctions
- 11 The Role of Administrative Courts in the Effective Enforcement of Competition Law Sanctions
- 12 Civil Sanctions in Antitrust Public Enforcement
- 13 What Role for Private Enforcement in EU Competition Law?
- 14 The Insights of Labor Law
- 15 Human Rights Jurisprudence and the Effectiveness of Competition Law Sanction
- 16 Catholic Teaching on Just Punishment, Especially in Connection with Financial Matters: According to the 1983 Code of Canon Law
- Part II Country Reports
- References
Summary
The chapter examines four economic models, the implications of behavioural economics and the main normative implications of the sanctioning policies. Classical economic analysis of sanctions and crimes presumes that decision-makers are sanctioned directly, personally. Yet this model can only be applied in the case of competition law sanctions levied on the company, if the decision-maker of the firm is at the same time the owner of the company. If companies are sanctioned, the key issue is whether they apply internal sanctions against the decision-maker. Such sanctions can be ex-ante or ex-post, fitted perfectly of imperfectly to the goals of the decision-maker. However, not all companies apply sanctions, some because of agency problems, others because the owners of the company are not able to learn who should be sanctioned and when. There are also cases where the owners are not interested in preventing unlawful decisions even if the company is later sanctioned. The reason for that might be that they do not bear the burden of the sanctions or they make a credible commitment not to levy full (or any) sanctions on managers in order to induce them to take more risks.
Keywords
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions , pp. 37 - 53Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
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