Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-768ffcd9cc-rq46b Total loading time: 1.297 Render date: 2022-12-06T11:12:53.564Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "useRatesEcommerce": false } hasContentIssue true

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2020

Rik Peels
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
René van Woudenberg
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
Get access

Summary

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Albert, D. 2000. Time and Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Alston, W. P. 1976. ‘Two Types of Foundationalism’. The Journal of Philosophy 73: 165–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alston, W. P. 1985. ‘Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles’. History of Philosophy Quarterly 2: 435–52.Google Scholar
Alston, W. P. 1991. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Alston, W. P. 1993. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Amoroso, R. L., Kauffman, L. H., and Rowlands, P. 2013. The Physics of Reality: Space, Time, Matter, Cosmos. Singapore: World Scientific.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’. 2nd rev. edn. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ásta, . 2018. Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 1999. ‘Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism’. In Greco, J and Sosa, E (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, London: Blackwell, 271302.Google Scholar
Austin, J. L. 1961a. ‘Other Minds’. In Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J. (eds), Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon, 4484.Google Scholar
Austin, J. L. 1961b. Philosophical Papers. Edited by Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J.. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Austin, J. L. 1961c. ‘A Plea for Excuses’. In Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J. (eds), Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon, 175204.Google Scholar
Austin, J. L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Edited by Warnock, G. J.. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Avenarius, R. 1891. Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland.Google Scholar
Avramides, A. 2017. ‘Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy’. In Glock, H and Hyman, J (eds), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 718–30.Google Scholar
Ayer, A. J. 1952. Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover.Google Scholar
Ayer, A. J. 1969. Metaphysics and Common Sense. New York: Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baggott, J. 2013. Farewell to Reality: How Modern Physics Has Betrayed the Search for Scientific Truth. New York: Pegasus Books.Google Scholar
Baker, G. 2002. ‘Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use’. The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208): 289302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baldwin, T. 2011. ‘Wittgenstein and Moore’. In McGinn, M (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 550–69.Google Scholar
Barnes, W. H. F. 1933. ‘A Suggestion about Value’. Analysis 1: 45–6.Google Scholar
Baz, A. 2012. When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beattie, J. 1770. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, J. Bell, and E. and C. Dilly.Google Scholar
Beattie, J. 1774. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. 5th edn. London: Edward and Charles Dilly and William Creech.Google Scholar
Beattie, J. 1775–6. ‘Hints for an Answer to Dr Priestley’s Remarks on the Essay on Truth’. MS 30/46, Aberdeen University Library.Google Scholar
Beattie, J. 1777. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. 6th edn. Edinburgh: William Creech et al.Google Scholar
Beilby, J. (ed.) 2002. Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Bergmann, G. 1957. Philosophy of Science. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
Berington, J. 1776. Letters on Materialism and Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, Addressed to Dr. Priestley, F.R.S. London: G. Robinson.Google Scholar
Berkeley, G. 1964. The Works of George Berkeley: Bishop of Cloyne. Edited by Luce, A. A. and Jessop, T. E.. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.Google Scholar
Bermes, C. 2004. ‘Welt’ als Thema der Philosophie. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blankenburg, W. 2012. Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit: Eine Beitrag zur Psychopathologie symptomarmer Schizophrenien. Berlin: Parados Verlag.Google Scholar
Bliss, R., and Trogdon, K. 2016. ‘Metaphysical Grounding’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding/.Google Scholar
Bloor, D. 1991. Knowledge and Social Imagery. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Boltzmann, L. 1895. ‘On Certain Questions of the Theory of Gases’. Nature 51: 413–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Bostrom, N. 2003. ‘Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211): 243–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boudry, M., and Pigliucci, M. (eds) 2017. Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bourget, D., and Chalmers, D. J. 2014. ‘What Do Philosophers Believe?Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 465500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandt, R. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bricker, P. 2016. ‘Ontological Commitment’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ontological-commitment/.Google Scholar
Broady, A. 1990. The Tradition of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy. Edinburgh: Polygon.Google Scholar
Brooks, T. 2017. ‘British Idealism’. Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy. www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577–0015.xml.Google Scholar
Brown, T. 1824. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 4 vols. 2nd edn. Edinburgh: W. and C. Tait.Google Scholar
Buffier, C. 1724. Traité des premières véritez et de la source de nos jugements, où l’on examine le sentiment des philosophes de ce temps, sur les premières notions des choses. Paris: François Didot.Google Scholar
Burge, T. 1995. ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 69 (1): 91116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, R. 2008. ‘Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or, How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble’. Philosophical Studies 140: 118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, G. 1762. A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles Advanced by David Hume, Esq; in an Essay on Miracles. Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell.Google Scholar
Campbell, G. 1776. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. 2 vols. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.Google Scholar
Campbell, K. 1988. ‘Philosophy and Common Sense’. Philosophy 63: 161–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carnap, R. 1937. Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.Google Scholar
Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, N. 1999. The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chakravartti, A. 2015. ‘Scientific Realism’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/scientific-realism/.Google Scholar
Chalmers, D., and Jackson, F. 2001. ‘Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation’. Philosophical Review 110: 315–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Child, W. 2011. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chisholm, R. M. 1973. ‘On the Nature of Empirical Evidence’. In Chisholm, R. M. and Swartz, R. J. (eds), Empirical Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice–Hall, 224–49.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. M. 1977. Theory of Knowledge. 2nd edn. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S. 1986. Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S. 2002. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P. S. 2011. Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coady, C. A. J. 2007. ‘Moore’s Common Sense’. In Nuccetelli, S and Seay, G (eds), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 100–18.Google Scholar
Coliva, A. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coliva, A. 2015. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coliva, A., and Moyal-Sharrock, D. 2016. Hinge Epistemology. Leiden: Brill.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Copp, D. 2008. ‘Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism’. Philosophical Issues 18 (1): 186206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowley, S. 2015. Rational Piety and Social Reform in Glasgow: The Life, Philosophy and Political Economy of James Mylne (1757–1839). Eugene: Wipf and Stock.Google Scholar
Crary, A. 2002. ‘The Happy Truth: J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words’. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (1): 5980.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cuneo, T., and Shafer-Landau, R. 2014. ‘The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism’. Philosophical Studies 171 (3): 399443.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curd, P. 1998. The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Dainton, B. 2018. ‘Temporal Consciousness’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-temporal/.Google Scholar
Daley, C. 2010. An Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Peterborough: Broadview Press.Google Scholar
Davia, C. 2017. ‘Aristotle and the Endoxic Method’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (3): 383405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. 2013. ‘The Taming of Philosophy’. In Laerke, M, Smith, J. E. H., and Schliesser, E (eds), Philosophy and Its History: Aims and Methods of Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 178208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dembroff, R. 2019. ‘Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as Critical Gender Kind’. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16317/1/Beyond%20Binary%20Final.pdf.Google Scholar
Deng, N. 2013. ‘On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass’. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3): 367–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D., and Kinsbourne, M. 1992. ‘Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 183201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Ridder, J., Peels, R., and van Woudenberg, R. (eds) 2018. Scientism: Prospects and Problems. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Descartes, R. 1964. Oeuvres de Descartes. Edited by Adam, C and Tannery, P. Paris: Vrin.Google Scholar
Descartes, R. 1984–5. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Descartes, R. 1988. Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeVries, W. 2016. ‘Wilfrid Sellars’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/sellars/.Google Scholar
Diels, H., and Kranz, W. 1951. Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 6th edn. Berlin: Weidmann.Google Scholar
Dowe, P. 2007. ‘Causal Processes’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-process/.Google Scholar
Downing, L. 2005. ‘Berkeley’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Science’. In Winkler, K. P. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231–65.Google Scholar
Duhem, P. 1982. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Translated by P. Wiener. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Dupré, J. 1993. The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Eddington, A. S., Sir. 1928. The Nature of the Physical World. New York: Macmillan; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elmahalawy, Y., Hellaby, C., and Ellis, G. F. R. 2015. ‘Ricci Time in the Lemaître–Tolman Model and the Block Universe’. General Relativity and Gravitation 47: 113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Emery, N. 2017. ‘Against Radical Quantum Ontologies’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3): 564–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ewing, A. C. 1973. ‘Common Sense Propositions’. Philosophy 48: 363–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, J., and McGrath, M. 2010. ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’. In Bernecker, S and Pritchard, D (eds), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, 558–68.Google Scholar
Ferguson, A. 1785. Institutes of Moral Philosophy. 3rd edn. Edinburgh: John Bell and William Creech.Google Scholar
Fine, K. 2001. ‘The Question of Realism’. Philosophers’ Imprint 2: 130.Google Scholar
Fischer, E. 2005. ‘Austin on Sense-Data: Ordinary Language Analysis as “Therapy”’. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70: 6799.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fish, S. 1980. Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 1974. ‘Special Sciences: Or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’. Synthese 28: 97115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fogelin, R. J. 1996. ‘Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy’. In Sluga, H. D. and Stern, D. G. (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3458.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fogelin, R. J. 2009. Taking Wittgenstein at His Word: A Textual Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, R. 1993. ‘What’s to Be Said for Simplicity?Philosophical Issues 3: 209–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forbes, W., Sir. 1807. An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie, LL.D. Late Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen. 3 vols. 2nd edn. Edinburgh: Archibald Constable et al.Google Scholar
Fordyce, D. 1735. ‘David Fordyce to William Craig, 23 December 1735’. MS 2670, fo. 158v, National Library of Scotland.Google Scholar
Fordyce, D. 1748. ‘David Fordyce to John Canton, 30 April 1748’. Canton Papers, vol. II, fo. 15r, Royal Society of London.Google Scholar
Forguson, L. 1989. Common Sense. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. Journal of Philosophy 66: 828–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frede, D. 2012. ‘The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They Are Not’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43: 185215.Google Scholar
French, S. 2000. ‘The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial Structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics’. Synthese 125: 103–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frye, M. 1983. The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Berkeley: The Crossing Press.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Garvey, B. (ed.) 2014. J. L. Austin on Language. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaskin, R. 2013. Language, Truth, and Literature: A Defence of Literary Humanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerard, A. 1760. The Influence of the Pastoral Office on the Character Examined; with a View, Especially, to Mr. Hume’s Representation of the Spirit of that Office. Aberdeen: James Chalmers.Google Scholar
Gettier, E. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Analysis 23 (6): 121–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glasgow Literary Society. 1764–79. ‘Minutes of the Glasgow College Literary Society, 1764–1779’. MS Murray 505, Glasgow University Library.Google Scholar
Goff, P., Seager, W., and Allen-Hermanson, S. 2017. ‘Panpsychism’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/panpsychism/.Google Scholar
Grayling, A. C. 2005. ‘Berkeley’s Argument for Immaterialism’. In Winkler, K. P. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 166–89.Google Scholar
Greco, J. 2011. ‘Common Sense in Thomas Reid’. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41: 142–55.Google Scholar
Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Gustafsson, M., and Sorli, R. (eds) 2011. The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haack, S. 2007. Defending Science – Within Reason. New York: Prometheus.Google Scholar
Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, I. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Hankinson, R. J. 2003. ‘Stoic Epistemology’. In Inwood, B (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5984.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanson, N. R. 1958. Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hanson, N. R. 1969. Perception and Discovery: An Introduction to Scientific Inquiry. Belmont: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
Hardie, P. 1719. Dissertatio philosophica de immaterialitate animæ. Aberdeen: James Nicol.Google Scholar
Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Hare, R. M. 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Hare, R. M. 1981. Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harris, J. A 2015. Hume: An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haselager, P. 2020. ‘Conceptual Revisions: Intentions and Free Will in the Light of Cognitive Neuroscience’. In Peels, R, de Ridder, J, and van Woudenberg, R (eds), Scientific Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy, London: Routledge, 104–20.Google Scholar
Haslanger, S. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heisenberg, M. 2009. ‘Is Free Will an Illusion?Nature 459: 164–5.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Heisenberg, W. K. 1958. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Hirsch, E. 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P. 2011. Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hossenfelder, S. 2018. Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1739–40) 2007 . A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Norton, D. F. and Norton, M. J.. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1740) 2007. An Abstract of a Book Lately Published, Entitled, A Treatise of Human Nature, &c. Wherein the Chief Argument of that Book Is Farther Illustrated and Explained. In D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Norton, D. F. and Norton, M. J.. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 403–17.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1745) 2007. A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh. In D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Norton, D. F. and Norton, M. J.. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 419–31.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1748) 2000. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Beauchamp, T. L.. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, D. 1777. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 2 vols. New edn. London: T. Cadell, A. Donaldson and W. Creech.Google Scholar
Hume, D. 1932. The Letters of David Hume. Edited by Greig, J. Y. T.. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Hursthouse, R., and Pettigrove, G. 2016. ‘Virtue Ethics’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.Google Scholar
Husserl, E. 1950a. Die Idee der Phänomenologie. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Google Scholar
Husserl, E. 1950b. Ideen I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Google Scholar
Husserl, E. 1952. Ideen II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Google Scholar
Husserl, E. 1992. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 1910/1911. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Inwood, B., and Donini, P. 1999. ‘Stoic Ethics’. In Algra, K, Barnes, J, Mansfeld, J, and Schofield, M (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 675738.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 1989. ‘A Puzzle about Ontological Commitment’. In Heil, J (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 191200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, W. 1897. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, F. 1803–4. ‘Review of D. Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D.D.F.R.S. Edin. Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow’. Edinburgh Review 3: 269–87.Google Scholar
Jenkins, J. J. 1983. Understanding Locke. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Google Scholar
Jensen, H. 1979. ‘Reid and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Language’. Philosophical Studies 36 (4): 359–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jessop, T. E. 1953. Berkeley: Philosophical Writings. Austin: University of Texas Press.Google Scholar
Johansen, T. K. 2016. ‘Parmenides’ Likely Story’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50: 129.Google Scholar
Joyce, R. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1783) 1950. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Translated by L. W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1783) 1971. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Translated by Lucas, P. G.. Manchester: Manchester University Press.Google Scholar
Kaplan, M. 2000. ‘To What Must an Epistemology Be True?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 279304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, T. 2008. ‘Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 5378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kienzler, W. 2006. ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty’. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71: 117–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kimberg, D. Y., and Farah, M. J. 1993. ‘A Unified Account of Cognitive Impairments Following Frontal Lobe Damage: The Role of Working Memory in Complex, Organized Behavior’. Journal of Experimental Psychology 122: 411–28.Google Scholar
Kline, A. D. 1987. ‘Berkeley’s Theory of Common Sense’. International Studies in Philosophy 19 (3): 2131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korman, D. 2014. ‘Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects’. Philosophers’ Imprint 14: 121.Google Scholar
Korman, D. 2019. ‘Easy Ontology without Deflationary Metaontology’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1): 236–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kovacs, D. M. 2019. ‘How to Be an Uncompromising Revisionary Ontologist’. Synthese: 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ladyman, J., and Ross, D. 2007. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lawlor, K. 2013. Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lawlor, K. 2017. ‘Austin on Perception, Knowledge, and Meaning’. In Tsohatzidis, S. L. (ed.), Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 165–85.Google Scholar
Lawlor, K. 2018. ‘Ordinary Language Philosophy Needs Situation Semantics (or, Why Grice Needs Austin)’. In Marchesan, E and Zapero, D (eds), Context, Truth and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism, London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Leite, A. 2012. ‘Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism’. In Gustafsson, M and Sorli, R (eds), The Philosophy of J. L. Austin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 78113.Google Scholar
Lemos, N. 2004. Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lemos, N. 2008. ‘Moore and Skepticism’. In Greco, J (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 330–47.Google Scholar
Lemos, N. 2020. ‘Common Sense, Philosophy, and Science’. In Peels, R, de Ridder, J, and van Woudenberg, R (eds), Scientific Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2039.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lesher, J. H. 1991. ‘Xenophanes on Inquiry and Discovery: An Alternative to the ‘Hymn to Progress’ Reading of Fr.18’. Ancient Philosophy 11: 229–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lesher, J. H. (ed.) 1992. Xenophanes of Colophon, Fragments: A Text and Translation with a Commentary. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Libet, B. 2004. Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. 1983. ‘Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act’. Brain 106: 623–42.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Linde, A. 2017. ‘A Brief History of the Multiverse’. Reports on Progress in Physics 80 (2). https://doi.org/10.1088/1361–6633/aa50e4.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Linnebo, Ø. 2018. ‘Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/.Google Scholar
Locke, J. (1690) 1990 . An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Nidditch, P. H.. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Locke, J. 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Nidditch, P. H.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Locke, J. 1997. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Woolhouse, R. New York: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Long, A. A. 2002. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. N. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Longino, H. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Longworth, G. 2015. ‘John Langshaw Austin’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/austin-jl/.Google Scholar
Loux, M. J. 2006. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd edn. New York: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Luce, A. A. 1963. The Dialectic of Immaterialism. London: Hodder & Stoughton.Google Scholar
Lycan, W. 2001. ‘Moore against the New Skeptics’. Philosophical Studies 103 (1): 3553.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marcil-Lacoste, L. 1982. Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.Google Scholar
Margolis, E., and Laurence, S. 2019. ‘Concepts’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/concepts/.Google Scholar
Margolis, E., Samuels, R., and Stich, S. P. (eds) 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McAllister, B. 2016. ‘Re-Evaluating Reid’s Response to Skepticism’. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14: 317–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDermid, D. 2018. The Rise and Fall of Scottish Common Sense Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 2009. ‘Wittgenstein’s “Quietism”’. Common Knowledge 15: 365–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGinn, M. 1989. Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
McKay, R. T., and Dennett, D. 2009. ‘The Evolution of Misbelief’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32: 493561.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
McQueen, K., and Vaidman, L. 2020. ‘How the Many Worlds Interpretation Brings Common Sense to Paradoxical Quantum Experiments’. In Peels, R, de Ridder, J, and van Woudenberg, R (eds), Scientific Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy, London: Routledge, 40–61.Google Scholar
Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mill, J. S. 1979. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1914. ‘The Status of Sense-Data’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 14: 355–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1917. ‘The Conception of Reality’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 18: 101–22.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1918–19. ‘Some Judgements of Perception’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 19: 129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1922. Philosophical Studies. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1925. ‘A Defence of Common Sense’. In Muirhead, J. H. (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy (second series), London: George Allen & Unwin, 193223.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1925) 1993. ‘A Defence of Common Sense’. In Baldwin, T (ed.), G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, London: Routledge, 106–33.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1939. ‘Proof of an External World’. Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5): 273300.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1942. ‘A Reply to My Critics’. In Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, La Salle: Open Court, 533687.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1953a. ‘Hume’s Theory Examined’. In Moore, G. E., Some Main Problems of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, 124–43.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1953b. ‘Sense-Data.’ In Moore, G. E., Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin, 2840.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1953c. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1959a. ‘Certainty’. In Moore, G. E., Philosophical Papers, London: George Allen & Unwin, 226–51.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1959b. ‘A Defence of Common Sense’. In Moore, G. E., Philosophical Papers, London: Allen & Unwin, 3259.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1959c. ‘Four Forms of Skepticism’. In Moore, G. E., Philosophical Papers, London: George Allen & Unwin, 196226.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1959d. Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1960a. ‘Hume’s Philosophy’. In Moore, G. E., Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 147–67.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1960b. ‘Some Judgements of Perception’. In Moore, G. E., Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 220–52.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1966. Lectures on Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Moser, P. 1998. ‘Epistemological Fission’. The Monist 81 (3): 353–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mossner, E. C. 1948. ‘Beattie’s “The Castle of Scepticism”: An Unpublished Allegory against Hume, Voltaire and Hobbes’. University of Texas Studies in English 27: 108–45.Google Scholar
Moyal-Sharrock, D. 2004. Understanding Wittgenstein’s ‘On Certainty’. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Muirhead, J. H. 1924. ‘Editor’s Preface’. In Muirhead, J. H. (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, London: George Allen & Unwin, 912.Google Scholar
Nahmias, E. 2014. ‘Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences’. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W (ed.), Moral Psychology. Vol. IV: Freedom and Responsibility, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 126.Google Scholar
Newman, J. H. (1870) 1979. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
Nichols, R., and Yaffe, G. 2015. ‘Thomas Reid’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/reid/.Google Scholar
Nola, R., and Sankey, H. 2007. Theories of Scientific Method. Durham: Acumen.Google Scholar
Nolan, D. 2016. ‘Method in Analytic Metaphysics’. In Cappelen, H, Gendler, T. S., and Hawthorne, J (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, New York: Oxford University Press, 159–78.Google Scholar
Norton, D. F. 1982. David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
O’Connor, T., and Wong, H. Y. 2015. ‘Emergent Properties’. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent/.Google Scholar
Oswald, J. 1766–72. An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion. 2 vols. Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, J. Bell, et al.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. 2001. ‘The Rise of Physicalism’. In Gillette, C and Loewer, B (eds), Physicalism and Its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136.Google Scholar
Pappas, G. S. 1991. ‘Berkeley and Common Sense Realism’. History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1): 2742.Google Scholar
Pappas, G. S. 2000. Berkeley’s Thought. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, L. A. 2010. ‘A New Role for Experimental Work in Metaphysics’. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 461–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, L. A. 2012. ‘Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden’s Tale’. Philosophical Studies 160 (1): 129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, L. A. 2016. ‘Experience, Metaphysics, and Cognitive Science’. In Sytsma, J and Buckwalter, W (eds), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 419–33.Google Scholar
Peacock, H. 2011. ‘Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment’. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242): 79104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peels, R. 2017a. ‘The Fundamental Argument against Scientism’. In Boudry, M and Pigliucci, M (eds), Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 165–84.Google Scholar
Peels, R. 2017b. Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peels, R., de Ridder, J., and van Woudenberg, R. (eds) 2020. Scientific Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perkins, P. 2016. ‘The Philosophical Relation between Husserl and Avenarius in “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology”’. Ideas y Valores 65 (162): 409–11.Google Scholar
Pigliucci, M. 2008. ‘Is Evolvability Evolvable?Nature Reviews Genetics 9: 7582.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pigliucci, M. 2018a. ‘Scientism and Pseudoscience: In Defense of Demarcation Projects’. In Boudry, M and Pigliucci, M (eds), Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 185201.Google Scholar
Pigliucci, M. 2018b. ‘Stoicism’. In Fiesner, J (ed.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018). http://www.iep.utm.edu/stoicism/.Google Scholar
Pitcher, G. 1984. Berkeley. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plantinga, A. 2011. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Polger, T., and Shapiro, L. 2016. The Multiple Realization Book. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pomeroy, R. 1974. ‘Moore as an Ordinary-Language Philosopher’. Metaphilosophy 5 (2): 76105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priestley, J. 1774. An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Dr Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and Dr. Oswald’s Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion. London: J. Johnson.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priestley, J. 1775. Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, on the Principles of the Association of Ideas; with Essays Relating to the Subject of It. London: J. Johnson.Google Scholar
Prinz, J. 2007. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2015a. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2015b. ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman’. In Szatkowski, M (ed.), God, Truth and Other Enigmas, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 141–64.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2017. ‘Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty’. In Glock, H and Hyman, J (eds), Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, Oxford: Blackwell, 563–75.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2020. ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism’. In Vogt, K. M. and Vlasits, J (eds), Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 173–92.Google Scholar
Proctor, R. W., and Capaldi, E. J. 2012. Psychology of Science: Implicit and Explicit Processes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pryor, J. 2004. ‘What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?Philosophical Issues 14 (Epistemology): 349–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Psillos, S. 2009. Knowing the Structure of Nature. London: Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. 1967. ‘Psychological Predicates’. In Capitan, W. H. and Merrill, D. D. (eds), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 3746.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1982. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1953. ‘On What There Is’. In Quine, W. V., From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper, 119.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1969. ‘Natural Kinds’. In Quine, W. V., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 114–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rae, M. (ed.) 1997. Material Constitution: A Reader. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rayo, A. 2007. ‘Ontological Commitment’. Philosophy Compass 2 (3): 428–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Recanati, F. 2004. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Reid, T. (1764) 1983. Inquiry and Essays. Edited by Beanblossom, R. E. and Lehrer, K. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Reid, T. (1764) 1997 . An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edited by Brookes, D. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reid, T. 1769. ‘Of Common Sense Curâ primâ’. MS 2131/2/III/7, Aberdeen University Library.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1770. ‘[Untitled Discourse on Common Sense]’. MS 2131/2/III/8, Aberdeen University Library.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1775. ‘Review of J. Priestley, Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, on the Principles of the Association of Ideas; with Essays Relating to the Subject of It’. Monthly Review 53: 380–90.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1775? ‘Of Constitution’. MS 3061/8, Aberdeen University Library.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1776. ‘Review of J. Priestley, Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, on the Principles of the Association of Ideas; with Essays Relating to the Subject of It’. Monthly Review 54: 41–7.Google Scholar
Reid, T. (1785) 2002. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edited by Brookes, D. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1915. Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Chicago: Open Court Publishing. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/reid-selections-from-the-scottish-philosophy-of-common-sense.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1969. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 1989. The Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid Delivered at Graduation Ceremonies in King’s College, Aberdeen, 1753, 1756, 1759, 1762. Edited by Todd, D. D.. Translated by S. D. Sullivan. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.Google Scholar
Reid, T. 2002. The Correspondence of Thomas Reid. Edited by Wood, P. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Google Scholar
Reppert, V. 2012. ‘The Argument from Reason’. In Craig, W. L. and Moreland, J. P. (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Oxford: Blackwell, 344–90.Google Scholar
Rescher, N. 2005. Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.Google Scholar
Rettler, B. 2016. ‘The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment’. Philosophical Studies 143: 1405–25.Google Scholar
Rinard, S. 2013. ‘Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense’. In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. IV, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rinard, S. 2017. ‘No Exception for Belief’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1): 121–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roberts, J. R. 2007. A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, S. 2002. The Elusiveness of the Ordinary. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenberg, A. 2011. The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions. New York: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Rosenfeld, S. 2011. Common Sense: A Political History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roskies, A. L. 2012. ‘How Does the Neuroscience of Decision Making Bear on Our Understanding of Moral Responsibility and Free Will?Current Opinion in Neurobiology 22: 1022–6.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ross, D., Ladyman, J., and Spurrett, D. 2007. ‘In Defence of Scientism’. In Ladyman, J and Ross, D, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 165.Google Scholar
Ruse, M. 1986. Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1914. Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Sankey, H. 2008. Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science. London: Ashgate.Google Scholar
Sankey, H. 2014. ‘Common-Sense and Realism’. Kairos: Revista de Filosofia & Ciencia 10: 1124.Google Scholar
Sattig, T. 2006. The Language and Reality of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2009. ‘The Deflationary Meta-ontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects’. Philosophical Books 50 (3): 142–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schönbaumsfeld, G. 2016. The Illusion of Doubt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schultze-Kraft, M., Birman, D., Rusconi, M., Allefeld, C., Görgen, K., Dähne, S., Blankertz, B., and Haynes, J. D. 2016. ‘The Point of No Return in Vetoing Self-Initiated Movements’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113: 1080–5.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schurger, A., Sitt, J. D., and Dehaene, S. 2012. ‘An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-Initiated Movement’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109: E2904–13.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Scott, R. E. 1810. Inquiry into the Limits and Peculiar Objects of Physical and Metaphysical Science, Tending Principally to Illustrate the Opinions of Philosophers, Ancient and Modern, concerning That Relation. London: Longman et al.Google Scholar
Searle, J. 1999. Mind, Language and Society. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson.Google Scholar
Sellars, W. 1962. ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’. In Colodny, R (ed.), Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 3578.Google Scholar
Sellars, W. 1963. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Semendeferi, K., Lu, A., Schenker, N., and Damasio, H. 2002. ‘Humans and Great Apes Share a Large Frontal Cortex’. Nature Neuroscience 5: 272–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shafer-Landau, R. 2012. The Fundamentals of Ethics. 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shenker, O. 2017. ‘Flat Physicalism: Some Implications’. Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 66: 211–25.Google Scholar
Sidelle, A. 2008. ‘Review of Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary Objects’. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230): 172–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. 2009. ‘Ontological Realism’. In Chalmers, D, Wasserman, R, and Manley, D (eds), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, New York: Oxford University Press, 384423.Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. 2010. The Contents of Visual Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, B. 1995. ‘Common Sense’. In Smith, B (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 394437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soldinger, E. 2010. ‘Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Avenarius und Mach und ihr Verhältnis zur Lebensweltproblematik’. In Merz, P, Staiti, A, and Steffen, F (eds), Geist – Person – Gemeinschaft: Freiburger Beiträge zur Aktualität Husserls, Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 189217.Google Scholar
Sommer, M. 1985. Husserl und der frühe Positivismus. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. 1994. ‘Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 68: 263–90.Google Scholar
Stevenson, C. L. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Stewart, D. 1793. Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh: William Creech.Google Scholar
Stewart, D. 1803. Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D.D.F.R.S. Edin. Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. 2nd edn. Edinburgh: William Creech, and Longman and Rees.Google Scholar
Stewart, D. (1815–21) 1854–60. Dissertation: Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy, since the Revival of Letters in Europe. In Hamilton, Sir W. (ed.), The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, Esq., F.R.S.S. 11 vols. Edinburgh: T. Constable, vol. I.Google Scholar
Street, S. 2006. ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’. Philosophical Studies 127 (1): 109–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strevens, M. 2019. Thinking Off Your Feet: How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suderman, J. M. 2001. Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century. Montreal, Kingston, London, and Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen’s University Press.Google Scholar
Surowiecki, J. 2003. The Wisdom of Crowds. New York: Doubleday.Google Scholar
Tahko, T. 2016. Introduction to Metametaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Taylor, C. C. W. 2010. The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus; Fragments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2007. Ordinary Objects. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2015. Ontology Made Easy. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tipton, I. C. 1974. Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Tomeček, M. 2015. Berkeley’s Common Sense and Science. New York: Peter Lang.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Traill, R. 1755. The Qualifications and Decorum of a Teacher of Christianity Considered; with a View to the Temper of the Present Age Respecting Religion, and to Some Late Attacks Which Have Been Made upon It. Aberdeen: James Chalmers.Google Scholar
Travis, C. 2008. Occasion-Sensitivity: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsohatzidis, S. L. (ed.) 2018. Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Turnbull, G. (1726) 2014. ‘On the Most Beautiful Structure of the Material and the Rational World’. In Turnbull, G, Education for Life: Correspondence and Writings on Religion and Practical Philosophy. Edited by Stewart, M. A. and Wood, P. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 5974.Google Scholar
Ulman, H. L. (ed.) 1990. The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 1758–1773. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.Google Scholar
Unger, P. 1982. ‘Toward a Psychology of Common Sense’. American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 117–29.Google Scholar
Unger, R. M., and Smolin, L. 2014. The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time: A Proposal in Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vachaspati, T., Pogosian, L., and Steer, D. A. 2015. ‘Cosmic Strings’. Scholarpedia 10 (2): 316–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Cleve, J. 2015. Problems from Reid. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. 1997. ‘Foreword’. In Rae, M (ed.), Material Constitution: A Reader, Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, ix–xii.Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. 2009. ‘Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment’. In Chalmers, D, Wasserman, R, and Manley, D (eds), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, New York: Oxford University Press, 472506.Google Scholar
Van Woudenberg, R. 2006. ‘Conceivability and Modal Knowledge’. Metaphilosophy 37: 210–21.Google Scholar
Van Woudenberg, R. 2014a. ‘Disagreement, Design, and Thomas Reid’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41: 224–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Woudenberg, R. 2014b. ‘True Qualifiers for Qualified Truths’. The Review of Metaphysics 68: 336.Google Scholar
Van Woudenberg, R. 2018. ‘Reading as a Source of Knowledge’. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229–018–02056-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Woudenberg, R. 2021. The Epistemology of Reading and Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Van Woudenberg, R., and Peels, R. 2018. ‘The Metaphysics of Degrees’. European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1): 4665.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Varzi, A. 2011. ‘Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism’. In Campbell, J. K., O’Rourke, M, and Slater, M (eds), Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 129–53.Google Scholar
Virvidakis, S. 2006. ‘Varieties of Quietism’. Philosophical Inquiry 30: 157–75.Google Scholar
Wagner, S. 2014. Squaring the Circle in Descartes’ Meditations: The Strong Validation of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waterfield, R. 2000. The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wegner, D. M. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wegner, D. M., and Wheatley, T. 1999. ‘Apparent Mental Causation’. American Psychologist 54: 480–92.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
White, A. 1986. ‘Common Sense: Moore and Wittgenstein’. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 40 (158): 313–30.Google Scholar
Wigner, E. 1960. ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences’. Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 13 (1): 114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilkins, J. S., and Griffiths, E. P. 2013. ‘Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion’. In Dawes, J. M. G. (ed.), A New Science of Religion, New York: Routledge, 133–46.Google Scholar
Williams, M. 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Williams, M. 2004. ‘Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism’. In McManus, D (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism, London: Routledge, 7696.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wisdom, J. 1942. ‘Moore’s Technique’. In Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, La Salle: Open Court, 421–50.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan Company.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 1969. On Certainty. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H.. Translated by D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wolpert, L. 1992. The Unnatural Nature of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wolterstorff, N. 2001. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wood, P. 1993. The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.Google Scholar
Wood, P. 2012. ‘Dugald Stewart’s Original Letter on James Beattie’s Essay on Truth, 1805–1806’. History of European Ideas 38: 103–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, P. 2018. ‘The “New Empire of Common Sense”: The Reception of Common Sense Philosophy in Britain, 1764–1793’. In Bow, C. B. (ed.), Common Sense in the Scottish Enlightenment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 165–99.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 1985. ‘Facts and Certainty’. Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429–72.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2004a. ‘Scepticism, Certainty, Moore and Wittgenstein’. In Köbel, M and Weiss, B (eds), Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, London: Routledge, 228–48.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2004b. ‘Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78: 167212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, C. 2014. ‘On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology’. In Dodd, D and Zardini, E (eds), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 211–47.Google Scholar
Wright, J. P. 1987. ‘Hume vs. Reid on Ideas: The New Hume Letter’. Mind 96: 392–8.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. T. 2012. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar