Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-99c86f546-45s75 Total loading time: 0.299 Render date: 2021-11-30T21:52:12.786Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

10 - Carnap’s quest for analyticity: the Studies in Semantics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2008

Michael Friedman
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Richard Creath
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
Get access

Summary

FROM SYNTAX TO SEMANTICS

Carnap's project to construct a comprehensive language of science, which occupied his attention from about 1935 to 1945, was centered on his search for a satisfactory definition of logical truth, or analyticity. The need for such a definition grew out of the logical syntax program he had first conceived in early 1931, which dropped the conception of meaning of Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1922) and instead applied the metalinguistic methods of Hilbert, Tarski, and Gödel to the scientific language as a whole.

Specifically, the need for a definition of analyticity had been precipitated by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, which had shown that there are apparently true sentences of arithmetic that are not logically provable, even given the axioms of arithmetic. Before this, the obvious criterion of logical and mathematical truth had always been provability, but Gödel had shown that this identification is unfounded and that logical and mathematical truth could not be understood as provability in a fixed axiom system. This not only threatened the logicist thesis of the logical character of all mathematical truth; it also called into question the fundamental tenet of logical empiricism that non-empirical (a priori) knowledge is analytic in the sense of being trivial and ultimately tautological. It was in this way, in fact, that the Vienna Circle developed a new “logical” brand of empiricism through a novel combination of two recent scientific advances: Wittgenstein’s notion of tautology and Frege–Russell logicism. This new doctrine solved empiricism’s traditional problem of the status of mathematics in a way that had not been conceivable before.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)
5
Cited by

Send book to Kindle

To send this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Send book to Dropbox

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Send book to Google Drive

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×