Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 The creation of myths after 1945
- 2 British policy and strategy
- 3 British generalship in the two world wars
- 4 At the sharp end: combat experience in the two world wars
- 5 Attrition in the First World War: the naval blockade
- 6 Attrition in the Second World War: The strategic bombing of Germany
- 7 The transformation of war on the Western Front, 1914–1918
- 8 The British Army’s learning process in the Second World War
- 9 After the wars: Britain’s gains and losses
- Appendix
- Select bibliography
- Index
- References
5 - Attrition in the First World War: the naval blockade
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 The creation of myths after 1945
- 2 British policy and strategy
- 3 British generalship in the two world wars
- 4 At the sharp end: combat experience in the two world wars
- 5 Attrition in the First World War: the naval blockade
- 6 Attrition in the Second World War: The strategic bombing of Germany
- 7 The transformation of war on the Western Front, 1914–1918
- 8 The British Army’s learning process in the Second World War
- 9 After the wars: Britain’s gains and losses
- Appendix
- Select bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
In both world wars Britain pursued harsh attritional strategies towards Germany. Naval blockade in the First World War and strategic bombing in the Second were both effective in causing serious damage to the enemy’s infrastructure, economy and morale, but neither was in itself decisive. The naval blockade caused hardship, bordering on starvation, for the civil population, particularly women, children and the elderly, but was not much criticised in Britain, either at the time or later. In sharp contrast, strategic bombing, though generally popular during the war, has been subjected to bitter criticism in recent decades, even to the extent of being labelled a war crime. This chapter examines the development and impact of the strategy of blockade in the broad context of deciding the outcome of the First World War, and seeks to explain the contrasting reactions of public opinion.
Historically naval blockade had been a key element in British naval power with the aim of denying seaborne commerce to Continental enemies. The policy and strategy of blockade remained very attractive to the government and the Royal Navy before 1914 and had an influential spokesperson in Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This exercise of superior naval power would be much cheaper and more popular than raising a large army and, in addition to its economic effects, would have the equally important consequence of forcing the German High Seas Fleet to seek a decisive battle in the North Sea.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Britain's Two World Wars against GermanyMyth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight, pp. 88 - 99Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014