Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-99c86f546-swqlm Total loading time: 0.344 Render date: 2021-11-27T20:32:02.424Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

9 - Boycotts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2009

Keith N. Hylton
Affiliation:
Boston University
Get access

Summary

The question this chapter considers is when a concerted refusal to deal, or boycott, violates Section 1. There are really two questions involved. The first is the threshold question of whether an agreement exists. Without an agreement, there is no conspiracy and no violation of Section 1. If an agreement does exist, then the question turns to whether the agreement unreasonably restrains trade. Several issues examined in the cases below become relevant. Is the challenged practice an agreement to refuse to deal, or merely an agreement to share information on an actor or group of actors? Does rule of reason or per-se analysis apply? What does it mean to apply per se analysis? Would the per-se rule apply only after proof of an agreement to refuse to deal, or would it apply after evidence established that an agreement, of any sort (e.g., to share information), resulted in several members of a group refusing to deal with someone else?

Boycott doctrine can be divided into three developmental stages. The first is pre-Socony, in which the Court applied the rule of reason. The second is post-Socony, in which the Court shifted toward a per-se rule. The third period is post-BMI/Sylvania, in which the Court adopted a hybrid rule of reason/per-se test. I trace the development of boycott doctrine in each of these periods below.

PRE-SOCONY

The first Supreme Court case to deal with the questions set out above, Eastern States, involved a group of retail lumber dealers that boycotted wholesalers who sold directly to consumers.

Type
Chapter
Information
Antitrust Law
Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution
, pp. 166 - 185
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Send book to Kindle

To send this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Boycotts
  • Keith N. Hylton, Boston University
  • Book: Antitrust Law
  • Online publication: 12 November 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610158.010
Available formats
×

Send book to Dropbox

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

  • Boycotts
  • Keith N. Hylton, Boston University
  • Book: Antitrust Law
  • Online publication: 12 November 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610158.010
Available formats
×

Send book to Google Drive

To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

  • Boycotts
  • Keith N. Hylton, Boston University
  • Book: Antitrust Law
  • Online publication: 12 November 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610158.010
Available formats
×