There exists a widespread consensus that Alfred Schutz and Émile Durkheim are the main referents of two opposed, confronting perspectives in sociology; one objectivistic, another subjectivistic; one holistic, another, individualistic. One of the most outstanding representatives of this idea, Pierre Bourdieu argues (1987, 149) that Schutz is the purest expression of the subjectivistic viewpoint and that, in accordance, he takes the opposite view to that of Durkheim. Even more, Bourdieu claims that, as regards the relation they establish between common sense and scientific knowledge (whether of rupture, whether of continuity), their opposition is “absolute.” Also, at a methodological level, these perspectives are presented as opposite: one is deemed to prefer “holistic constructions,” another, to prefer “methodological individualism” (Eberle 2012, 283).

The aim here is to challenge this kind of assumption. Not that they are completely mistaken. They involve schematic simplifications of what is an overly complex issue. Of course, there is some truth in these general arguments, but not the whole truth.

Two main misunderstanding are involved in the perspectives just described: the idea that there is an absolute opposition between Durkheim and Weber and that Schutz took Weber's side in clear opposition to Durkheim.

As regards the first misunderstanding, I agree with Berger (2011, 215n2) that a theoretical synthesis of the Weberian and Durkheimian approaches to sociology is possible “without losing the fundamental intention of either” and that the “propositions of Durkheim about the subjective opaqueness of social phenomena and of Weber about the possibility of Verstehen” are only “apparently contradictory” (Berger 2011, n21). For more context, here is a longer quotation from Berger (2011, 215–216n2):