This chapter concludes Part II's focus on method, by briefly analysing the respective conceptions of the role and value of philosophy in each tradition, as well as how it relates to scientific (and hence the relation of philosophy to naturalism) and artistic endeavours (and hence the relation of philosophy to concept creation).

PHILOSOPHY AND ART

Let us begin with art, which has historically been associated more with continental philosophy than analytic philosophy. It is uncontroversial to claim that almost all of the major continental philosophers have been heavily concerned with art (Husserl seems to be an exception), and with the relation of art to the creation of the new. In no particular order consider: Walter Benjamin, Adorno, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Heidegger, Bergson and so on. This is so, even if they propound inaesthetics, like Badiou, since this is just the name for the philosophical reflection on art that nonetheless gives art primacy with respect to philosophy, and even if some Marxist traditions have been highly wary of certain forms of art. On the other hand, Richard Campbell (2001) suggests, with some plausibility, that there is a tacit Platonism that persists in the analytic tradition. Even if few analytic philosophers will explicitly proffer a Platonic rejection of art and excise the poets from Athens, and even if there are plenty of analytic philosophers working in aesthetics and the philosophy of art (such as Nelson Goodman and Arthur Danto), an engagement with art is not mandatory for the major systematic philosophers in the tradition and as a group they are not preoccupied with art in the way that most continental philosophers are.