Conclusion
Summary
Glendinning ends The Idea of Continental Philosophy by leaving philosophers with an existential predicament of sorts: whether we are to be “enders” or “benders” in relation to the perceived divide between analytic and continental philosophy.
The ender is “the one who knows that (what is in any case obvious) the very idea of a Continental tradition is contentious or even perverse and so will be inclined to work with a certain lack of interest in securing or maintaining the idea of the analytic/Continental distinction” The bender, on the other hand:
demands that we acknowledge the de facto, real-world gulf or, at the very least, real-world gulf-effects, holding apart many whose work is marked by a serious interest in (among others) the usual suspects and many analytic philosophers. And the bender is (at least on occasion) willing to appropriate the title “continental philosophy” in order to do so.
(2007: 119–20)Some so-called “continental philosophers” based in Anglo-American countries are deflationary; they are “enders” They read work from each tradition seriously, and are very reluctant to proffer any kind of more general enquiry into each. This is the programme that Glendinning recommends more generally in his book, but we are not sure it is the way to go in philosophy as a whole. Frankly, we still do not understand enough about the divide to put it strategically in abeyance: to work as if it did not exist philosophically.
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- Analytic versus ContinentalArguments on the Method and Value of Philosophy, pp. 253 - 256Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2010