Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 A Beginning: Kant's Political Theory
- 2 The Categorical Imperative: The Ultimate Norm of Morality
- 3 The Formula of Autonomy or of Universal Law
- 4 The Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons
- 5 The Formula of Legislation for a Moral Community
- 6 The Limits of the Categorical Imperative
- 7 Morality and Prudence (Foundations 2)
- 8 Moral Character
- 9 Living under the Moral Law
- 10 The Defense of Morality (Foundations 3)
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- Index
6 - The Limits of the Categorical Imperative
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 A Beginning: Kant's Political Theory
- 2 The Categorical Imperative: The Ultimate Norm of Morality
- 3 The Formula of Autonomy or of Universal Law
- 4 The Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons
- 5 The Formula of Legislation for a Moral Community
- 6 The Limits of the Categorical Imperative
- 7 Morality and Prudence (Foundations 2)
- 8 Moral Character
- 9 Living under the Moral Law
- 10 The Defense of Morality (Foundations 3)
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- Index
Summary
Readers of the Foundations often come to believe that Kant's moral theory is supposed to determine by itself exactly what we should or should not do. This is a deep error. However right Kant's analysis of the ultimate moral law may be, the Categorical Imperative does not offer us a recipe or formula for making our specific moral decisions. What it does offer are principles of great generality that either serve as negative boundaries or set out very general positive guidelines.
To put this point another way, Kant did not hold that living a morally good life consists in a blind adherence to absolute rules. Some passages in the Foundations may give the impression that he thought that morality consists only in adopting and following moral rules (see, e.g., 412–13); and, as we saw in the first chapter, he did think we need to define our public moral life in a system of public laws. But he also insisted that making the connection between general principles and individual moral decisions always requires judgments that cannot be reduced to a schematized rule-bound procedure (389). And this is what we should expect, for his respect for the subtlety of ordinary moral consciousness (391, 404) could hardly have led him to develop a moral theory that would reduce autonomous moral judgment to a mindless following of moral formulas.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Kant's Ethics , pp. 94 - 113Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994