Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Anti-Base Movements and the Security Consensus Framework
- 2 Under a Weak Security Consensus
- 3 The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Anti-Base Movements in Okinawa, 1995–1996
- 4 Anti-Base Movements in Ecuador and Italy
- 5 South Korean Anti-Base Movements and the Resilience of the Security Consensus
- 6 Alliance Relations and the Security Consensus Across Time
- 7 Activists, Alliances, and the Future of U.S. Basing Strategy
- Appendix: Selected List of Interviews
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
4 - Anti-Base Movements in Ecuador and Italy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Anti-Base Movements and the Security Consensus Framework
- 2 Under a Weak Security Consensus
- 3 The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Anti-Base Movements in Okinawa, 1995–1996
- 4 Anti-Base Movements in Ecuador and Italy
- 5 South Korean Anti-Base Movements and the Resilience of the Security Consensus
- 6 Alliance Relations and the Security Consensus Across Time
- 7 Activists, Alliances, and the Future of U.S. Basing Strategy
- Appendix: Selected List of Interviews
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
We'll renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami – an Ecuadorian base.… [I]f there's no problem having foreign soldiers on a country's soil, surely they'll let us have an Ecuadorian base in the United States.
– Rafael Correa, President of EcuadorI am about to tell the U.S. Ambassador that the Italian government won't oppose the decision by the previous government and the town council of Vicenza to allow the expansion of the military base.… Our attitude in regards to the U.S. is that of friend and ally.
– Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of ItalyThe preceding two chapters examined anti-base movement episodes from the Asia-Pacific region. Movement episodes from the Philippines and Okinawa suggest that host-government elite perceptions, ideas, and beliefs regarding the U.S. alliance affect the likelihood of anti-base movement success in winning concessions from governments. Additionally, alliance relations and the degree of security consensus shape government responses to civil societal pressure. This chapter extends the security consensus framework to anti-base movement episodes in other regions. Two cases, the No Bases movement in Manta, Ecuador, and the No Dal Molin movement in Vicenza, Italy, are used to test the robustness of the theoretical argument. In Ecuador, a weak security consensus among political elites, and the ties formed between sympathetic politicians and activists, paralleled the 1991 Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines. Conversely, a relatively strong security consensus among Italian government officials raised serious obstacles for anti-base protestors.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests , pp. 86 - 117Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011