A Necropower Carnival

Israeli Soldiers Dancing in the Palestinian Occupied Territories

Melissa Melpignano

In a video uploaded to YouTube on 16 August 2007, which as of November 2022 had upwards of 385,000 views, a series of close-ups show an Israeli soldier holding a rifle aimed at a Palestinian child who is about to throw a rock (Jutsinson 2007).[1] The camera frame expands, and we see that the two are actually skeet shooting. The soldier of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) successfully shoots the clay target—the rock. To (noncredited) music, an elaboration of klezmer music "orientalized" to blend in an Arab sound, the two rhythmically walk from opposite directions toward each other and high-five. Like the beginning of a contact improvisation duet, the child puts his hand on the soldier's shoulder, the soldier lifts the kid on his back, and so they follow their spiraling dynamic by spinning together. When the child lands, the soldier takes off his helmet, puts it on the child, and pats the kid's head. Finally, in a blurry shot of a steady-paced sequence, the soldier hands his rifle to the kid. The two exchange a dap greeting (a friendly, intricately choreographed substitute for a handshake that men, in particular, perform), and then walk away in opposite directions.

This video was produced by The People's Voice, a civilian campaign promoting the reconciliation between Israel and Palestine started by Ami Ayalon, Israeli Labor party politician

1. A problem with using social media as an academic source is that the provenance of the material is not authenticatable. The video under consideration was uploaded in 2007, but this may not be its first upload.

Melissa Melpignano (University of Texas, El Paso) is an interdisciplinary dance scholar and performer working as Assistant Professor of Instruction and Director of Dance. Her research focuses on the stakes of dancing and choreographing in contested regions and border areas. Her current book project explores choreographies that subvert regimes of control and surveillance in Israel/Palestine through the original framework of livability. Her forthcoming monograph "Immemorial Presences" recenters and revalues overlooked pre–20th century ballet documents and bodies that defy normalizations. Her writing appears in* The Dancer Citizen*,* DRJ*,* The Oxford Handbook of Jewishness and Dance*, among others. mmelpignano@utep.edu

TDR 67:1 (T257) 2023 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910

and former head of the Israeli secret services (Shin Bet), and Sari Nusseibeh, Palestinian professor and politician.[2] In this video, dance is utilized as the ultimate celebratory practice of a hopeful and imaginary peace, as the manifestation of a realizable coexistence, represented through the physical proximity of attuned bodies.

Figure 2. The setup before a surprising outcome: an Israeli soldier points at a target. From the YouTube video "Killer Israeli soldier" (https://youtu.be/K2caeWiuJBg). (Screenshot by Melissa Melpignano)

Dance in the Army

Civilianizing, Humanizing, and Mitigating Violence

This choreographed video, with its digital outreach, transfigures the violence embedded into the rifle and the rock by suspending and transforming them from signifiers of violence into tools for playfulness and mutual trust. In the frame that reveals the passage from anticipated violence to friendly play, dance is conceptualized as a conciliatory (almost utopian) practice that is the epitome of conflict resolution, and as a "civilianizing" tool in the militarized enmity of Israel and Palestine. Dance is employed to mitigate the military and political/governmental charge of the visual elements of the video—guns, rocks, uniforms, crumbling buildings—and reframe the conflict; dance is a reconciling, celebratory, and, maybe, innocuous, practice.[3] That is to say, in this visual example, dance works as a "civilianizing" *dispositif* that, together with camera work and editing, breaks the audience's expectations about the use of violence associated with the Israeli soldier in full army gear. The camera work first generates a sense of suspense built on the infamous violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and then tricks the viewer by flipping the visual and physical semantics of the conflict itself, and proposing a nonconfrontational, playful ending. More specifically, in this parodic performance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—where the power inscribed in the body of the soldier is purposefully deactivated, "the Israeli soldier" and "the Palestinian kid" work as dramaturgical emblems of the power disparity between Israel and Palestine. Such dramaturgical construction reemphasizes and reiterates the status quo in terms of military, economic, and infrastructural imbalance between the Israeli and the Palestinian counterparts.

2. Credited at the end of the video, The People's Voice was initiated in 2003, advocating for a peaceful reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians and a two-state solution based on the 1967 border. The group progressively dissolved and is no longer active as of 2010. Later, Nusseibeh declared support for a one-state solution.
3. In the context of Israel, the terms "civil" and "civilian" are often utilized in an antagonistic relation to "military." The "civil" and the "military" are often indicated by political scientists and sociologists as two separate "sectors" of Israeli society. Political scientists Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak (2010) recognize the limits of the existing academic conceptualizations of the civil-military discourse in Israel, contending that what is still missing is a study of "policy networks" able to illuminate the ways in which different sectors influence each other. They recognize the hegemonic force of the state as policy maker but do not propose a new way to interrogate the foundations of the academic civil-military discourse of these coexisting but separate "sectors." See also Ben Meir (1995) and Rosman-Stollman and Kampinsky (2014).

Figure 1. (previous page) A widely viewed video orchestrates a misunderstanding, then the reveal: there is no violence, just joyous dancing together. From the YouTube video "Killer Israeli soldier" (https://youtu.be/K2caeWiuJBg). (Screenshot by Melissa Melpignano)

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 3. The video shot of a Palestinian kid throwing a rock. From the YouTube video "Killer Israeli soldier" (https://youtu.be/K2caeWiuJBg). (Screenshot by Melissa Melpignano)

The use of dance as a mitigating tool for the violence expected in the interaction between the IDF soldier and the Palestinian child relies on two factors. The first is the historical investment of Israeli and pre-state institutions in dance. A commitment to the fabrication of a specific Israeli corporeal culture able to embody and represent the Zionist principles on which the state was established has informed an epistemic construction of dance in Israel as a harmless, optimistic, nation-building, peace-making, difference-leveling, and humanizing practice produced by or through state-informed institutions.[4] The Zionist political project that informed the establishment of dance institutions and of a dance culture in Israel has produced a generalized "structure of feeling" about dance in the Jewish State (which some dance artists and scholars have recently challenged).[5] Hence, in the specific context of the IDF, dance was traditionally assigned a disciplining and simultaneously recreational role. This point directly connects to the second factor that allows the use of dance as a mitigating tool for violence in Israel: the continuity and codependence of Israeli civilian and military life. In Israel, military service is compulsory for men (age 18–29) and women (age 18–26) who pass medical fitness tests, with specific exceptions. While in general Arab and Muslim citizens are exempt, men from Druze (Arabic-speaking religious minority) and Circassian (Muslim minority) communities must serve. Until 2014, Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) Jewish men were exempt. Women can request an exemption for religious reasons, pregnancy, and parenthood; all married women have automatic exemption. Often indicated as "the people's army," the Israel Defense Forces works as a metonymy of a "national corporeal history" that relied on values of toughness, operativity, and commitment to the land in order to forge the Sabra — the native Israeli.[6] The Israeli soldier, as part of an army that works as an emblem of the state and of Jewish-Zionist territorial sovereignty in the region, is the most symbolic and globally recognizable embodiment of Sabra corporeality.

The relationship between the IDF and dance is a long and institutionalized one.[7] The practice of dance (such as folk, modern, and jazz) as a civilian activity within the army worked as a strategy to bind the citizen-soldier's life to Israel's *raison d'état*, and thus reinforce the Israeli civil-military paradigm.[8] In this way, dance supports the army and advances the state polity.

4. For historical overviews on the relationship between Zionism, nation-building, and dance culture in Israel see Ingber (2011), Spiegel (2013), Eshel (2016).
5. On the notion of "structure of feeling," see Williams (1977). For a criticism of a romanticized view of dance in Israel, see Feder and Hacham (2014).
6. The Sabra is popularly connoted as "tough" or "prickly" on the outside, and "sweet" or "soft" on the inside. The Sabra body is primarily conceptualized as male, masculine, exclusively Jewish, Ashkenazi (white European), normatively healthy, preferably young, strong, and efficient — what scholar Meira Weiss (2002) exemplifies as the ideal "chosen body" of Zionist-Israeli culture. Yehuda Sharim (2016) identifies the Israeli soldier as the ideal Sabra, an emblem of Israeli corporeal history. See also Almog (2000).
7. For a genealogy of the presence of dance in the IDF as a source of knowledge formation, see my "Choreographing Livability: Dance Epistemes in the Kibbutz and in the Israel Defense Forces" (2019).
8. For the notion of *raison d'état* as the specific political rationale of a nation-state that disciplines its bodies, see Foucault ([2004] 2008).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Even the unarmed, noninstitutionalized practice of dance among on-duty Israeli soldiers promotes and reiterates the army's necropower. According to Achille Mbembe's theory (2003), necropower is the legalized power of prescribing death, inducing death, and letting die, which involves producing spaces of death and organizing the training of personnel in charge of the exercise of those tasks. Following Mbembe, I define necropower as the legalized performance of practices exercised by subjects authorized to determine who may live (and how) and who may die (and how).[9]

Videos of Israeli soldiers dancing while on duty in the Occupied Territories have been widely circulated on YouTube and other platforms. As anthropologists Adi Kuntsman and Rebecca L. Stein emphasize, digital cultures play a fundamental role in the practice and representation of "the Israeli military occupation of Palestine, a context in which the narrative of digital democracy—or rather, the proposition that the digital be understood as a 'natural' domain for anti-hegemonic politics—is widely embraced as a means to explain activist triumph in the face of repressive state military campaigns" (2011).[10] On-duty Israeli soldiers dancing outside of an institutionalized event in the Occupied Territories utilize the digital platform as a site of competition against activist, anti-Occupation, antimilitary initiatives.[11] During the Second Intifada (2000–2005, the Al-Aqsa Intifada), IDF officers, especially religious and settler ones, increased their presence on Israeli television and radio in order to orient and control the flux of information reaching the general Israeli public.[12]

In 2008, the IDF started to invest in social media outreach, launching its own YouTube channel. At that time, soldiers were not authorized to carry personal smartphones during missions and active combat for security reasons. However, oral testimonies I collected (the interviewees prefer to remain anonymous) testify that soldiers were in fact utilizing personal smartphones while on active duty.[13] In the social media era, the possibility of sharing photos of everyday military life or videos taken during clashes between the IDF soldiers and Palestinians has helped to reduce the distance between the popular perception of military life and the actual lives of soldiers, but also has put the soldiers themselves in closer contact with the civil realm.

The shortening of such a distance has radically different implications when the soldiers are simultaneously related to a variety of "networked publics," namely the Israeli and the Palestinian civil realms as well as a global spectatorship.[14] Once again, the classical discourse of the Israeli civil-military relations, overlooking the centrality of the Palestinian civilians in its theorizations of the "civil," dismisses the colonial power embedded in Israeli militarism and its ongoing performance of power through the presence of the IDF bodies.

9. Mbembe roots his discourse in imperial and colonial violence, state sovereignty, and racial and ethnic inequality. Although I do not discuss these issues here, I do consider the settler colonial and ethnonationalist discourse in Israel/Palestine as an example of necropower. For a further analysis of necropower, state sovereignty, and race, see Cacho (2012).

10. Adi Kuntsman and Rebecca L. Stein elaborate on Israel's "digital militarism," describing it as "the process by which digital communication platforms and consumer practices have, over the course of the first two decades of the twenty-first century, become militarized tools in the hands of the state and nonstate actors, both in the field of military operations and in civilian frameworks" (2015:6). In particular, digital militarism in Israel has the power of rendering "the Israeli occupation at once palpable and out of reach, both visible and invisible," while "the patina of the digital everyday can minimize and banalize this violence" (8).

11. On the use of digital media as an anti-Occupation and dissent tool, see, among others, Ashuri (2012), Doron and Lev-On (2012), Ziccardi (2013), and the website of the organization B'Tselem (n.d.).

12. The IDF also reduced international journalists' access to information. See Ilan Pappé (2002) and Uri Ben-Eliezer (1995).

13. For the larger implications of smartphones in the IDF, see Kuntsman and Stein (2015).

14. I draw on the notion of "networked publics as publics that are restructured by networked technologies" from Kunstman and Stein (2015:106n12), who borrow it from boyd (2014:8).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Taking this into account, in the videos I analyze, dance manifests as a recreational practice with which soldiers engage to simultaneously humanize themselves and overperform their power by mitigating the traditional performance of military strength through noninstitutionalized dances characterized by a cheerful character. The two dimensions—a feeling of humanization in the soldier and reaffirmation of military power—present simultaneously, and the latter prevails. The humanizing interpretation, often fostered by commentators generally aligned with the IDF's military agenda, works as a justifying frame for the soldiers' misbehavior (dancing on duty) within the IDF as well as for their status as soldiers of an occupying force. Whether it is the soldiers who dance to self-humanize or the public that reads the soldiers' dancing as a humanizing activity, "humanization" works as a mode of civilianization. In other words, in this humanizing discourse dance is read as a process of suspension of the soldier's military self. Thus, in the end, as a ready-to-use source for the momentary display of civilian and human qualities, dance reinstantiates the soldier's military status and what it implies.[15]

Dance, then, is a mitigating tool that reaffirms hegemonic and settler colonial dominion within the IDF. IDF soldiers dancing in a self-organized—or seemingly self-organized—manner in the Occupied Territories relate to the military power structure, and the organization of their dances impacts the conceptualization and representation of the conflict. Within this frame, dance operates as a practice of "soft power" for the exercise of military control and necropower.

How do soldiers organize dances within the military/militarized space they inhabit? What kind of status do their soldier bodies acquire when dancing in a uniform outside of their military disciplinary norm? And how does such a status alter when the dancing soldier bodies circulate on a platform of global reach such as YouTube? Rebecca L. Stein explains that "[the Israeli] State work on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube employs a new set of rhetorics, modes of address, and aesthetics that endeavor to vernacularize or personalize the state through social media platforms, lending it a new kind of everyman valence—this being a particularly important project, officials argue, in times of unpopular military interventions" (2012:912). In this way, the circulation of soldiers' dances through social media further overlaps civilian and military realms, and further amplifies the civilianizing feeling already expressed in the videos through an amateur and social dance aesthetic. At the same time, social media expose military and state bodies to comments and manipulations the army's high commands or the state cannot control. So, how do soldiers compromise their act of dancing while on duty, risking disciplinary punishment? What is at stake when dance is the chosen performance practice of soldiers on duty in a climate of normalized hostility and legalized violence such as in the Occupied Territories?

Rocking the Casbah

A video posted, removed, and reposted multiple times on YouTube, originally uploaded in Summer 2010 under the title "Soldiers Dance in Hebron," shows six IDF male soldiers from the Naḥal Brigade, armed and wearing full combat gear, in the occupied city center of Hebron/Al-Khalil, in the West Bank (Eyal Yablonka 2010).[16] While patrolling, as soon as they hear the Muslim call to prayer the soldiers start a choreographed dance to the hit "Tik Tok" by American pop singer Kesha. The camera does not shake. The point of view has been previously strategized and the timing carefully orchestrated. Six soldiers, fully equipped, slowly walk on a street in a residential area of Hebron/Al-Khalil. They arrange themselves in two lines. Initially, the soldiers act as if they are patrolling in a combat zone, attentively looking around for possible enemies, knees bent, watching

15. The use of dance as a humanizing practice that momentarily suspends a sense of the military self depends on conceptualizing dance as a "naturally" human, humanizing practice.

16. The Naḥal Brigade is a military/paramilitary division of the IDF, originally constituted to monitor the borders and establish settlements. Its military program combines army paratrooper service and service in agricultural settlements. Because of its mixed role, the Naḥal is particularly well-regarded in the Israeli collective memory. For an encompassing history of the Naḥal, see Peters (2008).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

*Figure 4. IDF soldiers in full gear dance a macarena move in the occupied city of Hebron/Al-Khalil. From the YouTube video "IDF Israeli soldiers dancing to Kesha – Tik Tok in Hebron (Rock the Casba) [*sic*]." (https://youtu.be/xVVte550dyU). (Screenshot by* TDR*)*

each other's backs, embracing their heavy rifles, simultaneously reproducing themselves and staging their own self-parody through their theatricalization of military behavior. They crouch on one knee; the song starts, and they slowly stand up: "Wake up in the morning feeling like P. Diddy / Grab my glasses, I'm out the door: I'm gonna hit this city." Once the beat intensifies, the soldiers begin to move in unison and create duets, reproducing the popular movements of the Macarena while facing one another, smoothly bouncing their legs. When the chorus starts—"Don't stop, make it pop / DJ, blow my speakers up / Tonight, I'ma fight / Till we see the sunlight"—they turn in a canon, then reestablish their duets, extending the bouncing movement quality to their upper body.

Now, their rifles hang and swing along the front side of their bodies. Phallic representations are common in military iconography, and are particularly emphasized in these self-choreographed videos. To read the dangling rifle simply as the soldiers waiving military force and enfeebling their masculinity contrasts with the bodily control, the homosocial cohesiveness, and the choreographic precision the soldiers display in the video. In fact, the rifle becomes an extension of the soldier's body, and its swinging movement coherently follows and completes the bouncy, relaxed persona the soldiers perform. In this choreography, the soldiers display how to be spatially and temporally in charge, even when suspending the performance of the military norm through dance. At this point, the six soldiers hold each other's hands, turn underneath each other's arms, and, always bouncing, exit the "scene" while reperforming an exaggerated, theatricalized version of their military patrol. "And the party don't stop, no."

The video, recorded and posted on social media by another soldier, immediately went viral on Facebook. The IDF ordered its removal but, as we know, content circulating on social media behaves like the mythological Hydra: even as you remove a video or a post, hundreds of reproductions are already circulating.[17]

It is clear that these soldiers are not professionally trained in dance, yet they are able to display both precision in the execution of their nonvirtuosic movements and a certain mastery, which likely required rehearsals. The choreography is carefully planned. The bodies of the soldiers, positioned in two rows, parallel the walls of the Palestinian homes, as if impressing their presence on the local architecture. The choreography shows the established territorial presence of the soldiers while simultaneously furthering and intensifying the territorializing strategy of occupation to which their stationing in Hebron/Al-Khalil already testifies.

This dance, based on commercial, globally marketed music and movements, explicitly interferes with the sacred moment of the Muslim call to prayer. The music of Kesha dominates the soundscape, and the choreography takes over the territory. This form of cultural harassment parallels the expanding importance that religiosity acquired in the IDF in the last couple of decades, along with the growing political control granted to extreme right-wing, religious politicians in the Netanyahu

17. Kuntsman and Stein reconstruct the circulation of and debates around this specific video (2015:131–132n15).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

government. Indeed, in this video, I conceive the dominant presence of the soldiers during the Muslim prayer as a form of colonial secularism.[18] In this video, IDF soldiers, through their spatial (physical and acoustic) and timely takeover, display a macho secularism aimed at overpowering the sacrality of the Muslim prayer in Palestinian territory. In the present context of Israel/Palestine, notions of secular and religious do not operate as a dichotomous, oppositional binary; on the contrary, they are strategically used, especially by Israeli institutional subjects, to reaffirm territorial and cultural dominion.

Furthermore, the disrespect the six soldiers manifest can be situated along the same lines as wider post-9/11, Western, anti-Muslim sentiments (and policies) nurturing the US-led rhetoric of the global West as the "free world." It is significant, in fact, that in its re-uploads the video appeared multiple times under the title "Rock the Casba" (*sic*).[19] In a probably gradual yet blatant manner, such a title attributed to the viral reiterations of this dance, along with the eloquent lyrics accompanying the choreography, alludes to George W. Bush's global war on terror, furthering Western depictions that popularize the Muslim as "other," and in particular, in this case, the Palestinian as terrorist.[20] Similarly, the self-definition of the IDF as "moral" and "pure," per its official doctrine, ultimately serves to morally, and only afterwards militarily, justify and legitimize the Israeli soldiers' behavior in the Occupied Territories.[21] In the end, the choreographic disruption of the Muslim call to prayer in the center of Hebron/Al-Khalil becomes a form of cultural, temporal, and spatial displacement, part of the normalized everyday life of conflict in the West Bank.

The audience of the six soldiers' performance is the digital global one. In the video, local Palestinians are absent—kept off scene even in their everyday, public environment. In Israel, the video had wide resonance across media. Kuntsman and Stein report that "spoofs and remakes [of the video] proliferated on popular Israeli comedy shows, whose viewers were invited to produce their own remix. Dozens would eventually make their way to YouTube" (2011:5). These reproductions transfer the parodic mode of the choreography from the military setting to the civil realm, expanding the very colonial significance of the dance while blurring the original from reproduction to reproduction. Unlike the precise reenactments that solemnly celebrate a military institution by reproducing historical battles, bridging past and present for the archive of the future, the Israeli dancing soldiers on YouTube reproduce their experience of control in Hebron/Al-Khalil through a choreographed theatricalization; its digital reproduction makes it visible beyond the space of the Occupation and extends its duration into the ongoing present of the virtual.

A Panoptical Feast

On 29 August 2013, the international edition of the *Guardian* made a case out of a video that shows Israeli male soldiers from the Rotem Battalion of the prestigious Givati Brigade dancing among Palestinian civilians in a club in Hebron/Al-Khalil (AP 2013).[22] As claimed by the

18. The secular character performed by the IDF soldiers is overemphasized in the terms expressed by Saba Mahmood, according to whom "secularism is to be understood not simply as the doctrinal separation of the church [or any religious authority] and the state but also as the rearticulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance. To rethink the religious is also to rethink the secular and its truth-claims, its promise of internal and external goods" (2013:59). This helps us keep in mind the tension between Israeli secularism (as a foundational value in the development of Israeli society), Judaism as a marker of the state, and the increasing number of religious settlers.
19. The *qaṣbah* is a fortress or protected citadel typical of North Africa. The noun has been popularized by The Clash's song "Rock the Casbah" (1982), whose lyrics recount, in a hodgepodge of religious references, that "Sheik Shareef" does not like rock music because it is not "kosher."
20. On the representation of Palestinian nationalism as a history of terrorism, and for its deconstruction, see Pappé (2009).
21. The IDF doctrine of "purity of arms" is expressed in the IDF code of ethics entitled *The Spirit of the Israel Defense* (1994, revised 2001, and again 2016), developed within the IDF Education and Training Division (the same that once managed the entertainment troupes) (IDF [1994, 2001] 2016). See also Zion (2016).
22. As it often happens on YouTube, the video is often removed and later reposted on a different account. In 2021 it was available as TheJulianShow (2013).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

YouTube user identified as the uploader of the video, IDF soldiers on duty in full gear (weapons and helmet included) enter a Palestinian wedding party during a patrol in Hebron/Al-Khalil's Jaabra neighborhood, and join the Palestinian guests in the club dancing to "Gangnam Style" by South Korean pop singer PSY, which became a global, viral hit thanks also to the easy-to-learn choreography, whose steps imitate horseback riding.[23]

The framework of the Palestinian wedding dance complicates the intertwining politics of masculinity within the Israeli and Palestinian cultures. During the wedding celebration, which represents the social recognition of a male's accomplished manhood, the groom (and sometimes other males after him) is "lifted onto the shoulders of his friends and family and processed through the crowd triumphantly" (McDonald 2010:202). This ritual is similarly practiced in Jewish weddings and doubtlessly was familiar to the IDF soldiers. In the video, an Israeli soldier gets lifted on the shoulders of a Palestinian man. At this point, the Israeli and the Palestinian next to him join hands, while the soldier keeps holding his rifle with the other hand. Following the rhythm and the energy of the pop song, the two men bounce on the other men's shoulders. In this video, dance works as a laissez-passer for the temporary suspension of hostility and the reciprocal acknowledgment and display of triumphant masculinity, the ultimate, reciprocal recognition of the homosocial code on which nationalisms and state formations are built.[24]

Figure 5. An Israeli soldier is still holding his rifle while on the shoulders of a Palestinian man. From The Guardian's *"Israeli soldiers dance to Gangnam Style at Palestinian wedding-video" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/aug/29/israeli-soldiers-gangnam-style-dance-palestinian-wedding-video). (Screenshot by Melissa Melpignano)*

The video, recorded with a mobile phone, was broadcast on Israeli television. Channel 2 presented it as an "incident," and acknowledged that the IDF suspended the soldiers (boycott apartheid 2013). Among the audience of YouTube viewers, several greeted the viral video as an example of peace and coexistence; others blamed the soldiers for risking their lives, assuming the presence of Hamas members at the party. Mainstream media did not acknowledge the soldiers' trespassing on a private space during a private celebration. Despite the improvisational organization of this dance, the soldiers never ceased to manifest their military function of control over the territory and the Palestinians. This is emblematically represented by the soldier holding his rifle

23. The song "Gangnam Style" was released in July 2012. By the end of the first day on YouTube, the video had over half a million views. As of January 2019, it was the third-most viewed video in the history of YouTube; as of June 2021, it still is the eighth-most seen YouTube video.

24. On homosociality and nationalism in Zionist culture, see Presner (2007).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

above the crowd in a panoptical configuration, further emphasized by the ongoing jumpy motion of the male crowd below him. This all-male scenario, in which competing masculinities meet, reaffirms and exalts the oedipal core of the historical emergence of state-nationalism and colonialism (Deleuze and Guattari 1983:170). In particular, while in the previous video the six Naḥal soldiers performed group discipline and their ruling authority over the public space, the Givati soldiers further display their military control by exercising it in a private space. At the same time, the Israeli soldiers allow the Palestinians to be in charge of their bodies. During this Palestinian wedding party, dance operates as an instantaneous, conciliatory strategy that suspends the hostility between Israeli male soldiers and Palestinian men through a performance of reciprocal trust, coexistence, and enjoyment based on an implicit, homosocial contract between masculinities. Indeed, in this dance of celebration, the absent figure is that of the woman, which is probably what made the participation of the Israeli soldiers acceptable in the first place.

A War Dance

A third example comes from a video recorded in a military outpost in Gaza during Operation Protective Edge, in Summer 2014.[25] The video was uploaded on 21 July 2014 by YouTube user The Heartland of Israel with the title "IDF Soldiers Take a Little R&R" (The Heartland of Israel 2014). The account belongs to Lev HaOlam, an organization that supports the expansion of Zionist settlements, and promotes the commercialization of the settlers' agricultural products.

Even though the title suggests that this video represents a moment of "rest and recuperation," different elements arguably reveal it as a preparatory ritual for soldiers getting ready for a mission. The caption of the video combines a sense of soldier's bravado—it frames the dance as "a break from fighting the terrorism in Gaza"—and a sense of care and fear for the soldiers' destiny—"They are singing and dancing, celebrating while they can, before they must return to danger." But this video neither celebrates the soldiers' lives nor mourns their finitude; instead, it exalts the state and, more specifically, the state in its religious, messianic articulation. The video is set in a military warehouse full of soldiers in uniform, some with backpacks, their faces covered with camouflage paint. Many wear a *kippah* (the skullcap some Jewish men wear). At the entrance of the building, three soldiers and two Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) men jump on the roof of a partially visible, multicolored minivan. This works as a rhetorical, aesthetic marker of the recreational framework of the event, which authorizes the use of movement and dance within the military context.

The amplified voice of a man leads the event. The set-up replicates a club party; the music comes from speakers. The song "Mi Shemaamin" (Those Who Believe; 2010) by Eyal Golan starts like the chorus of a football chant with male voices singing "The one who believes is not scared."[26] The

25. Operation Protective Edge is the English name the IDF gave to what is otherwise known as the 2014 Gaza War or as Operation Strong Cliff. On the 2014 Israel-Gaza war, see, among others, the biopolitical reading of Perugini and Gordon (2015:84–90); the analysis in the context of neoliberal sovereignty of Simon (2017); and an analysis of the journalistic coverage of Protective Edge in Weisman (2017). On the use of social media and digital innovations in this war, see Malka, Ariel, and Avidar (2015).

26. Eyal Golan, a former soccer player, is a star of the Mizraḥi pop music industry, a TV host and judge in talent shows, and an icon of Israeli masculinity. On Mizraḥi music and Mizraḥi stardom as a reiteration of the idea of the Israeli cultural melting pot, and the specific case of Eyal Golan, see Regev and Seroussi (2004:229–35). Despite evidence, when Golan was accused of sexual relations with underage women, the Ministry of Justice dropped charges against Golan in February 2014 (see Hartman and Bob 2014). The song in the video is a track from Golan's 2010 album *Derech LeḤaim* (A Way to Life), which reached the top of the Israeli radio chart. One track on this album was produced in collaboration with the IDF radio to commemorate Yom Hazikaron (Memorial Day for Fallen Soldiers). In 2018, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) awarded Golan the honorary title of "Seventieth Singer of the State of Israel" for his contribution to Hebrew music, despite the protests of some members and women's advocacy groups. Ultimately, using Golan's music before a military incursion in Gaza exemplifies the role he performs in official Israeli culture as a symbol of both the ethnic melting pot and patriarchal masculinity. For more on patriarchy in Israeli culture from a dance perspective, see Kosstrin (2021) and Melpignano (2021).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 6. Haredi men and soldiers rally other IDF soldiers from the roof of a minivan. From the YouTube video "IDF Soldiers Take a Little R&R" (https://youtu.be/zL7J6G3BM1k). (Screenshot by TDR*)*

soldiers sing along, and some form a circle while jumping. The lyrics remind the soldiers that they are in God's hands, that "He protects us from everyone," and that "the nation of Israel will not give up." Here, the typical Israeli military brotherhood and camaraderie assumes a clear religious imprint.[27] The soldiers in the circle hold each other's shoulders or waists, and rhythmically jump in unison, a frantic hora deprived of lightness and choreographic detail.[28] Arranged with the sound strategies of EDM (electronic dance music), characterized by a powerful bass and intense rhythmical frequency, Golan's song invites the soldiers to participate in the experience of club culture (Malbon 1999). This scenario modernizes the culture of the ecstatic religious dances of the Ḥasidic tradition, recontextualizing them in the Israeli war context. As Jewish modern dancer Pauline Koner writes in a program note, "The ḥasidic dance portrays the ecstatic mood of the old ḥasidic cult to whom song and dance was a means of reaching a state of religious exaltation" (in Rossen 2011:342). In the video, religious exaltation serves the warfare system. At the same time, the ecstatic dance contributes to the current mainstream discourse on Religious Zionism, for a long time marginal in the traditionally secular Israeli army, within the structure of the IDF as one of the most emblematic sites of performance of Israeliness.[29] Utilizing dance and mainstream pop music to normalize religious zeal in the army, religious leaders and soldiers employ secular strategies to implement their messianic agenda within the IDF.[30] Dancing and combat are conceived as two markers of Israeli identity, channels to achieve full Israeliness. Dance can also propel the social normalization of Haredi Israelis and religious settlers living in the Occupied Territories who previously have been considered marginal, problematic elements of Israeli society by secular Israelis (see Dalsheim and Harel 2009; and Ellis 2014).

27. On this topic, see Almog (2000) and Kaplan (2003). While traditionally the Ultra-Orthodox population was exempt from mandatory service and reserve duty, with the expansion of the settlements in the Occupied Territories under the Netanyahu governments, religious Jews and, in particular the Ultra-Orthodox, who constitute the majority of the settlers, increasingly demanded to join the IDF and its combat units. 2014 saw a record of enlistments of both religious men and women (Ettinger 2015). On Haredi in the IDF, see Cohen (2013) and Hakak (2016:39–56). On the dangers of religious fanaticism in the IDF, see Landsmann (2017) and Shahak and Mezvinsky ([1999] 2004).
28. On the specific characteristics of folk dances, and, among them, the *hora* in Zionist culture, see the instructional manuals and texts of Zionist folk dancer Gurit Kadman (1946, 1966, 1969).
29. Pre-state Religious Zionists advocated for the integration of religiosity in the predominantly secular Zionist project and for a Jewish return to the Biblical "Land of Israel." The establishment of Israel in 1948—with the religious-national element incorporated in the State's name—demanded a reconfiguration of the relationship between religiosity, religious authorities, and Zionism, with a further shift activated by the new territorial conquests of the 1967 war, which relaunched discourse on the process of settlement in the Land of Israel. Since the mid-1990s, in particular with Netanyahu's investment in religious settlers to reinforce the Israeli dominion in the West Bank, the more left-leaning parts of the Religious Zionist movement were increasingly marginalized and associated with the radical nationalist fundamentalism of right-wing settlers (see Troy 2018:85–102, 233–66, and 415–38). On the ideological changes within Religious Zionism, see, among others, Don-Yehiya (2014), Feige (2009), and Hellinger, Hershkowitz, and Susser (2018). For more specific distinctions among religious groups and political religious institutions in Israel, see Cohen and Kampinsky (2006).
30. The commitment of religious parties to Operation Protective Edge needs to be read within the wider process of a takeover of Israeli institutions by religious Israelis connected to the expansion of the settlements (see for example Levy 2014). The kidnapping and murder of three teenage settlers by Hamas terrorists triggered the armed conflict in July 2014.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 7. A Haredi man emerges from the mass of IDF soldiers, waving the flag of Israel. From the YouTube video "IDF Soldiers Take a Little R&R" (https://youtu.be/zL7J6G3BM1k). (Screenshot by TDR*)*

More men join the conglomerate of soldiers, forming concentric circles. When the refrain starts, the majority of the men push one arm up in the air on the beat—a typical techno/house music dance club gesture. This collective stance contributes to the ecstatic communal feeling of the event (see Malbon 1999:93). These "brothers in arms," through their gesturing and the jumping, exalted by the lyrics, simultaneously perform military tribalism and godly verticality.

The choreography is spatially dominated by a Haredi man, who stands out among the soldiers with his *payot* (curled sidelocks), beard, and *kippah*, a full-head covering. Waving the Israeli flag, he emerges from the mass, lifted by some soldiers. The Haredi man with the flag occupies the center of the choreography and becomes the body of reference.

In fact, he initiates the further development of the collective dance ritual by passing the flag to the soldiers who keep waving it while he continues to chant and dance, waving his arms. Through his choreographic—visual and kinesthetic—leadership, the Haredi man represents the "Jewish State" and the reiteration of its messianic political struggle, namely to settle in all of the Biblical Land of Israel or Greater Land of Israel—including of course where the Palestinians hope to establish their state. Other soldiers get lifted on their comrades' shoulders, all collectively clapping on the beat to increase the communal exaltation. At the margins of the circle, many soldiers not dancing are filming with their phones or laughing. The two Haredi men on the roof of the minivan also monitor and film the scene from above. Some soldiers look worried and nervous, probably thinking about the upcoming mission, not to be persuaded by this war-dance ritual. From the panoptical perspective of the Haredi man with the flag and the visual peripheral dominion of the other two Haredi, this war dance celebrates the spatial and political sovereignty of Ultra-Orthodoxy over the soldiers.

The Necropower of the Soldiers' Carnival

The three dances analyzed share the same stage, the Occupied Territories, and, more broadly, the Occupation. Dance movement is superimposed over military movement. The former, performed by lower-level conscripted soldiers, inserts itself into a much larger choreography, that of the Occupation, a movement regulated from above by military discipline and rule, and governmental power. All three dances are characterized by jumping and bouncing as a movement marker that, in this context, underlines the soldiers' reliance on gravity as a choreographic tool to perform literally the weight of the Israeli military's territorial rootedness. By wearing their uniforms and carrying their rifles and other military equipment, the soldiers never stop performing their role as the ruling force.

In the first video (Hebron, 2010), soldiers do not merely mock military discipline by choreographing an MTV-like dance. In the second video (Palestinian wedding, 2013), the soldiers joining the Palestinian wedding do not merely represent a possible, peaceful coexistence. In the third video (precombat ritual, 2014), the collective dance is not merely a traditional motivational ritual among soldiers. In all three videos, dance increases the soldiers' representational index of power: dance adds a further dimension of power to their role. As soldiers, the vector that regulates their power works top-down (military hierarchy), while choreographic and dance initiatives install on

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and through their bodies an extra vector of dominion that moves from the bottom-up. Within this view, therefore, I do not consider these soldiers to be practicing dance as an antianxiety, recreational tactic or as a return to (or illusion of) civilian life, but as a strategy to reaffirm their own control over the local territory, hence as a reinforcement of their military role. By dancing in the Occupied Territories, the soldiers are not actually mitigating their military power. On the contrary, what dance allows them to mitigate is the blatancy of the violent power their role implies and legalizes. In this way the Israeli dancing soldiers adhere to their military task but subvert the behavioral code prescribed by the military institution. In particular, in the cases of the first and second videos (Hebron, 2010 and Palestinian wedding, 2013), the IDF high command reprimanded and punished some of the dancing soldiers, accusing them of misconduct. In the history of the IDF, dance has been utilized as a practice of entertainment by soldiers for fellow soldiers during missions and for military as well as civilian audiences in state-funded international tours in the West to promote the IDF's "purity of arms" doctrine. Under the command of Rafael Eitan, at the dawn of the 1982 Lebanon War, such dance initiatives were banned because the authorities argued that dance had become a distracting and feminizing practice (see Melpignano 2019). In other words, the use of dance in the IDF, like any other behavioral and aesthetic code that defines the soldier's body, needs to be regimented. Hence, what the IDF high command actually punished in the cases of the dancing soldiers here analyzed is their claim to power — the power to autonomously redefine the use of their soldier bodies through dance, but without deviating from the IDF's strategic agenda.

In fact, the first two videos in particular display how the occupying force domesticates the space of the occupied population; the manifest power is a form of knowledge rather than the blatant exercise of violence (see Foucault [1978] 1991; Deleuze 1995; and Barney et al. 2016). The soldiers utilize dance in a military setting to mitigate and substitute for the overt exercise of violence. In other words, dance is employed as a strategy of control. These videos manifest an articulation of dance as "soft power," a power aimed at attracting interest, consent, submission, affiliation.[31] It is revealing to observe, through a qualitative sentiment analysis I conducted on the comments to the three videos, that only 1.8% of the commentors perceived the soldier's dances as distracting from their military function, while 26.3% of the comments directly linked dance practice to the exercise of military and political power.[32]

Ultimately, by filtering dance as soft power, the Israeli dancing soldiers find their way to affirm their bottom-up territorial power in the Occupied Territories as well as on the digital stage where their videos circulate. Since conscripted soldiers utilize "soft" digital channels like YouTube to affirm their power, the IDF official top-down power is not undermined; on the contrary, the soldiers' dances restate and reinforce the IDF power overall.

These globalized, public, bottom-up, irrepressible (because they are viral and regenerated through sharing) videos of dancing soldiers on duty represent the parodic development of the life cycle of the Israel Defense Forces. To theoretically frame this point, I rely on Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of parody in *Rabelais and His World* (1984a), where parody does not merely indicate a caricature or an exaggeration (as it is often intended). Instead, here parody indicates a sort of mechanism of forgery, through which a word that in a "serious" genre (like a tragic novel) has a specific semantics is brutally separated from that "serious" discourse and, as such, shows new possible meanings and generates new discourses. Similarly, I look at the bodies of the Israeli soldiers as subjects of a parodic mechanism: by separating their bodies from the disciplined and historically expected behavior of the institution in

31. On the control that digital technologies exercise over the users' bodies and the intimate relationship that humans thus develop with surveillance devices, see Miller (2017).

32. On qualitative sentiment analysis as a methodology that evaluates comments on social media to assess reactions and opinions, see Gaspar et al. (2016).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

which they are inscribed (the IDF), they engage in actions and behaviors that exceed the prescribed ones, potentially generating discourses that go beyond those the institution conceived for them.

These dances enact the main tool of the occupying military power: they take up Palestinian civilian space (the city-center of Hebron/Al-Khalil, a private Palestinian wedding, a temporary military outpost in Gaza), exercising and reasserting territorial control through the "soft" means of dance performance. The dancing Israeli soldiers appropriate the utterance of dominion and control designed by the highest ranks and reinforced on a daily basis by means of the Occupation—their *shared-insta-tweeted* presence in Palestinian space—utilizing it for their own purpose "by inserting a new semantic orientation into a word [in this case "Occupation"] which already has—and retains—its own orientation" (Bakhtin 1984b:156). Therefore, here, dance is a tool of the soldiers practicing the Israeli Occupation. Individual soldiers may or may not be aware of this situation; may or may not know that, for instance, in "celebrating with" they are demonstrating their "occupying force." Whether approved or not by the IDF high ranks, whether practiced by soldiers for their own recreational, humanizing, civilianizing, or celebratory purposes, these dances restate and reinforce the Israeli military occupying power.

The dancing discussed here works as a reiteration of dominion, a tool of the colonial apparatus. Dance is neither a parody of the Palestinians nor of the Occupation; instead, soldiers utilize the parodic strategy to exercise power by deviating from the hierarchy that dictates the limits of their own power. And, yes, this further excludes the Palestinians from the Israeli military-political discourse about the Occupation and from the soldiers' horizon of livability—meaning that, within this discourse, soldiers measure how to make their lives more livable in the army where they perform the hierarchy of dominant power. The exercise of a desire for and reiteration of power feeds the military machine, which is to say that, by dancing on duty and by violating the normative behavioral code of the army, the soldiers do not escape the military framework of power and dominion but on the contrary, it is that framework that allows them to behave as they do—to dance.

Moreover, referring once more to Bakhtin, these dance videos express the Israeli soldiers' own carnival. Bakhtin defines carnival as "a temporary suspension of all hierarchic distinctions and barriers among men and of certain norms and prohibitions of usual life" (1984b:122–23). Building on the parody of military discipline that allows the soldiers to represent their occupying power, soldiers employ dance to suspend the disciplinary norm (including the norm that defines the Palestinians as the enemy, as in the case of the wedding video), and grant themselves permission to employ and enjoy dancing among and with the people they institutionally dominate. Considering the necropower these dances demonstrate and increase, the dancing soldiers are enacting a perverse carnival.[33]

This perverse carnival manifests differently in each of the three videos. The first utilizes choreography as a ruling paradigm, while mocking it within a global-pop-commercial frame, the strategic system of territorialization based on the synchronized movement of the collective. The second, the Palestinian wedding dance where Palestinians lift Israeli soldiers, is a strategy that, even as the soldiers suspend their own military discipline, demonstrates their control over Palestinian civilians beyond the military frame. Finally, in the third video, the precombat war dance, the perverse carnival manifests in the staging of the nationalist parade where the accumulation of aggressive energy for combat builds up as a mass celebration of national symbols, following the lyrics of an Israeli pop song.

The anchorwoman of Israel's Channel 2 characterized the scene of Israeli soldiers at the Palestinian wedding as "surreal" (boycott apartheid 2013). I think that what she called surreal is the perverse use of dance as a means to reiterate necropower: the unexpected but not innocent

33. I intend "perversion" in the Deleuzian sense (1990), not as a deviation from the "normal," but as a transformation of energy.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1054204322000910 Published online by Cambridge University Press

use of dance as an intensifier of dominion as the soldier moves in an unconventionally smooth, loose, and bouncy manner. In all these instances dance is used — wittingly or not — by the IDF as a new tool of hegemonic control that so-called "democratic" social media with its global reach has introduced from the bottom of the hierarchy of power.

References

Almog, Oz. 2000. *The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew*. Trans. Haim Watzman. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ashuri, Tamar. 2012. "Activist Journalism: Using Digital Technologies and Undermining Structures." *Communication, Culture & Critique* 5, 1:38–56. doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-9137.2011.01116.x

Associated Press in Jerusalem (AP). 2013. "Hebron Style: Israeli Soldiers' Dance with Palestinians Angers Top Brass." *The Guardian*, 29 August. www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/29/hebron-israel-soldiers-dance-palestinians-gangnam-style

Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich. 1984a. *Rabelais and His World*. Trans. Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich. 1984b. *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Trans. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Barney, Darin, Gabriella Coleman, Christine Ross, Jonathan Sterne, and Tamar Tembeck, eds. 2016. *The Participatory Condition in the Digital Age*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ben-Eliezer, Uri. 1995. "A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, 2:264–85. doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500019666

Ben Meir, Yehuda. 1995. *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.

boycott apartheid. 2013. "ITF [*sic*] soldiers of Givati brigade dancing Gangnam Style in Hebron/al-Khalil." YouTube, 29 August. youtu.be/aylCQ_JaEQ0

boyd, danah. 2014. *It's Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

B'Tselem. n.d. B'Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Accessed 4 June 2021. www.btselem.org

Cacho, Lisa Marie. 2012. *Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected*. New York: New York University Press.

Cohen, Asher, and Aaron Kampinsky. 2006. "Religious Leadership in Israel's Religious Zionism: The Case of the Board of Rabbis." *Jewish Political Studies Review* 18, 3/4:119–40. www.jstor.org/stable/25834700

Cohen, Stuart A. 2013. *Divine Service?: Judaism and Israel's Armed Forces*. London: Routledge.

Dalsheim, Joyce, and Assaf Harel. 2009. "Representing Settlers." *Review of Middle East Studies* 43, 2:219–38. doi.org/10.1017/S2151348100000677

Deleuze, Gilles. 1990. *The Logic of Sense*. Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1995. "Postscript on Control Societies." In *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin, 177–82. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1983. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Don-Yehiya, Eliezer. 2014. "Messianism and Politics: The Ideological Transformation of Religious Zionism." *Israel Studies* 19, 2:239–63. muse.jhu.edu/article/543638

Doron, Gideon, and Azi Lev-On, eds. 2012. *New Media, Politics and Society in Israel*. London: Routledge.

Ellis, Donald. 2014. "Three Discursive Dilemmas for Israeli Religious Settlers." *Discourse Studies* 16, 4:473–87. www.jstor.org/stable/24441992

Eshel, Ruth. 2016. *Maḥol Poresh Chenafayim: Yetzirah Yisraelit laBamah, 1920–2000*. 2 vols. Tel Aviv: Dance Diaries. (Hebrew).

Ettinger, Yair. 2015. "Record Number of Religious Women Enlisted in Israeli Army in 2014." *Haaretz*, 6 May. www.haaretz.com/.premium-idf-record-number-of-religious-women-enlisted-in2014-1.5358895

Eyal Yablonka. 2010. "IDF Israeli soldiers dancing to Kesha – Tik Tok in Hebron (Rock the Casba) [*sic*]." YouTube, 5 July. youtu.be/xVVte550dyU

Feder, Ido, and Shir Hacham. 2014. "A Dancing Body Offers Legitimacy to the State." *TkH (Walking Theory)* 21:47–52.

Feige, Michael. 2009. *Settling in the Hearts: Jewish Fundamentalism in the Occupied Territories*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

Foucault, Michel. (1978) 1991. "Governmentality." In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 87–104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, Michel. (2004) 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*. Ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador.

Gaspar, Rui, Cláudia Pedro, Panos Panagiotopoulos, and Beate Seibt. 2016. "Beyond Positive or Negative: Qualitative Sentiment Analysis of Social Media Reactions to Unexpected Stressful Events." *Computers in Human Behavior* 56:179–91. doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.11.040

Hakak, Yohai. 2016. *Haredi Masculinities between the Yeshiva, the Army, Work and Politics: The Sage, the Warrior and the Entrepreneur*. Trans. Myriam Ron. Leiden, NL: Brill.

Hartman, Ben, and Yonah Jeremy Bob. 2014. "State Drops All Charges against Eyal Golan." *Jerusalem Post*, 5 February. www.jpost.com/national-news/state-drops-case-against-eyal-golan-340433

Hellinger, Moshe, Isaac Hershkowitz, and Bernard Susser. 2018. *Religious Zionism and the Settlement Project: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Disobedience*. New York: SUNY Press.

Ingber, Judith Brin, ed. 2011. *Seeing Israeli and Jewish Dance*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

Israelie Defense Forces (IDF). (1994, 2001) 2016. "Israel Defense Forces: Ruach Tzahal - Code of Ethics." Jewish Virtual Library. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ruach-tzahal-idf-code-of-ethics

Jutsinson. 2007. "Killer Israeli soldier." YouTube, 16 August. youtu.be/K2caeWiuJBg

Kadman, Gurit. 1946. *Palestine Folk Dance Series*. Tel-Aviv: Lion the Printer for the Zionist Organisation, Youth Dept.

Kadman, Gurit. 1966. *Rikudi-'am: Tadrikh leMadrikh* [Israeli Folk Dance: A Handbook for Instructors]. Tel-Aviv: Tarbut veḤinukh (Hebrew).

Kadman, Gurit. 1969. *Am Roked* [A Dancing Nation]. Tel-Aviv: Schocken Publishing House (Hebrew).

Kaplan, Danny. 2003. *Brothers and Others in Arms: The Making of Love and War in Israeli Combat Units*. New York: Southern Tier Editions, Harrington Park Press.

Kosstrin, Hannah. 2021. "Queering Nationalism: How Three Choreographers Redefine Israeli Patriotism." *Journal of Jewish Identities* 14, 2:171–96. doi.org/10.1353/jji.2021.0026

Kuntsman, Adi, and Rebecca L. Stein. 2011. "Digital Suspicion, Politics, and the Middle East." *Critical Inquiry*. criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/digital_suspicion_politics_and_the_middle_east/

Kuntsman, Adi, and Rebecca L. Stein. 2015. *Digital Militarism: Israel's Occupation in the Social Media Age*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Landsmann, Carolina. 2017. "Drafting Ultra-Orthodox Jews Into the Israeli Army Is Dangerous." *Haaretz*, 15 September. www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-drafting-ultra-orthodox-jews-into-the-israeli-army-is-dangerous-1.5451098

Levy, Yagil. 2014. "The Theocratization of the Israeli Military." *Armed Forces & Society* 40, 2 (April):269–94. www.jstor.org/stable/48609144

Mahmood, Saba. 2013. "Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?" In *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech*, ed. Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, Saba Mahmood, 58–94. New York: Fordham University Press.

Malbon, Ben. 1999. *Clubbing: Dancing, Ecstasy and Vitality*. London: Routledge.

Malka, Vered, Yaron Ariel, and Ruth Avidar. 2015. "Fighting, Worrying and Sharing: Operation 'Protective Edge' as the First WhatsApp War." *Media, War and Conflict* 8, 3:329–44. doi.org/10.1177/175063521561161

Mbembe, Achille. 2003. "Necropolitics." Trans. Libby Meintjes. *Public Culture* 15, 1:11–40. muse.jhu.edu/article/39984

McDonald, David A. 2010. "Geographies of the Body: Music, Violence and Manhood in Palestine." *Ethnomusicology Forum* 19, 2:191–214. doi.org/10.1080/17411912.2010.507463

Melpignano, Melissa. 2019. "Choreographing Livability: Dance Epistemes in the Kibbutz and in the Israel Defense Forces." PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles.

Melpignano, Melissa. 2021. "Choreographing Livability after Oslo: Israeli Women Choreographers and Collective Responsibility." In *The Oxford Handbook of Jewishness and Dance*, ed. Naomi M. Jackson, Rebecca Pappas, and Toni Shapiro-Phim, 565–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, Kiri. 2017. *Playable Bodies: Dance Games and Intimate Media*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pappé, Ilan. 2002. "Donning the Uniform: The Military and the Media in Israel." *Middle East Report* 223:46–51. doi.org/10.2307/1559465

Pappé, Ilan. 2009. "De-Terrorising the Palestinian National Struggle: The Roadmap to Peace." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2, 2:127–46. doi.org/10.1080/17539150903021399

Perugini, Nicola, and Neve Gordon. 2015. *The Human Right to Dominate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Peters, Joshua Nathan. 2008. "The Origins and Development of the Nahal Brigade in the Israel Defense Forces, 1949–1999." MA thesis, University of New Brunswick.

Presner, Todd Samuel. 2007. *Muscular Judaism: The Jewish Body and the Politics of Regeneration*. London: Routledge.

Regev, Motti, and Edwin Seroussi. 2004. *Popular Music and National Culture in Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rosman-Stollman, Elisheva, and Aharon Kampinsky, eds. 2014. *Civil-Military Relations in Israel: Essays in Honor of Stuart A. Cohen*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Rossen, Rebecca. 2011. "Hasidic Drag: Jewishness and Transvestism in the Modern Dances of Pauline Koner and Hadassah." *Feminist Studies* 37, 2:334–64. www.jstor.org/stable/23069906

Shahak, Israel, and Norton Mezvinsky. (1999) 2004. *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*. London: Pluto Press.

Sharim, Yehuda. 2016. "Choreographing Masculinity in Contemporary Israeli Culture." In *Choreographies of 21st Century Wars*, ed. Gay Morris and Jens Richard Giersdorf, 133–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190201661.003.0007

Sheffer, Gabriel and Oren Barak, eds. 2010. *Militarism and Israeli Society*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Simon, Joshua. 2017. "Neoliberal Politics, Protective Edge, and BDS." In *Assuming Boycott: Resistance, Agency, and Cultural Production*, ed. Kareem Estefan, Carin Kuoni, and Laura Raicovich, 123–32. London: OR Books.

Spiegel, Nina S. 2013. *Embodying Hebrew Culture: Aesthetics, Athletics, and Dance in the Jewish Community of Mandate Palestine*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

Stein, Rebecca L. 2012. "StateTube: Anthropological Reflections on Social Media and the Israeli State." *Anthropological Quarterly* 85, 3:893–916. doi.org/10.1353/anq.2012.0045

The Heartland of Israel. 2014. "IDF Soldiers Take a Little R&R." YouTube, 21 July. youtu.be/zL7J6G3BM1k

The Julian Show. 2013. "[RAW]: ISRAELI SOLDIERS DANCE AT PALESTINIAN WEDDING GANGNAM STYLE!!!" YouTube, 29 August. Accessed 4 June 2021. youtu.be/EEW5KbiEqXk

Troy, Gil. 2018. *The Zionist Ideas: Visions for the Jewish Homeland—Then, Now, Tomorrow*. Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society.

Weisman, Chad M. 2017. "Just Coverage and the Path to Peace: Reporting Operation Protective Edge in *Haaretz*, *BBC Online*, and the *New York Times*." MS thesis, Ohio University.

Weiss, Meira. 2002. *The Chosen Body: The Politics of the Body in Israeli Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Williams, Raymond. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ziccardi, Giovanni. 2013. *Resistance, Liberation Technology and Human Rights in the Digital Age*. New York: Springer.

Zion, Noam. 2016. "Purity of Arms: Educating Ethical Warriors in the Israeli Army." Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman Institute. shi-webfiles.s3.amazonaws.com/Study_Noam_Zion_2016_Purity_of_Arms_Curriculum.pdf

TDReadings

Abeliovich, Ruthie. 2016. "Choreographing Violence: Arkadi Zaides's Archive." *TDR* 60, 1 (T229):165–70. doi.org/10.1162/DRAM_a_00531

Jawad, Rania. 2011. "Staging Resistance in Bil'in: The Performance of Violence in a Palestinian Village." *TDR* 55, 4 (T212):128–43. doi.org/10.1162/DRAM_a_00127