

tragedy. Those who killed prisoners without any semblance of individual justice are clearly guilty of crimes. But so is Pavelić. He kept up the struggle to the bitter end, ordered the retreat, kept the army in formation even after the war was over, then deserted and escaped to Italy, and from there with the aid of some priests to Argentina, while leaving his hapless followers and soldiers to a cruel fate.

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CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA: TWENTY YEARS OF SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT. Edited by *Wayne S. Vucinich*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. xi, 441 pp. \$9.50.

It is an irony of history that war or threat of war should play a major role in shaping the political, economic, and social contours of Yugoslavia. The First World War brought the Karadjordjević dynasty to power in the newly created Yugoslav state. The Second World War, destroying that dynasty, installed the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader, Josip Broz Tito, in the seat of power. Then the threat of invasion by the Cominform states spurred a program of economic and social reform. Now, some twenty years after Tito's successful political revolution, Yugoslavia is still in the throes of another continuing revolution—socialist innovation. *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, a collection of eight research papers, attempts to place these twenty years in perspective.

Professor Vucinich characterizes the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a state beset "by a succession of parliamentary crises, a political life largely inconsistent with democratic practices, and a failure to solve major constitutional, nationality and economic questions." Yet he doubts that the best of democratic governments could have overcome these problems. Hence, he states, "it would be grossly unfair to adjudge interwar Yugoslavia a failure."

The war years are succinctly and graphically delineated by Jozo Tomasevich. His discussions of the Mihailovich-Tito conflict, and the war itself, and his analysis of the various reasons for the triumph of Tito and the partisans are dispassionate and thorough. His is a unique contribution.

Victory by Tito meant the establishment and administration of a state on the Soviet model. The masters of the new Yugoslavia were slavish in their imitation, and Woodford McClellan shows precisely how the political order evolved from the Stalinist system to national communism. The author makes no judgments on whether the new institutions will survive, but he does insist that Tito has "built a nation . . . [which] has a larger and more important voice in international affairs than the old Yugoslavia ever had." This judgment is disputed by Phyllis Auty in a pedestrian review of Yugoslavia's postwar international relations. She concludes that Tito's foreign policies realistically acknowledge that Yugoslavia, a small country, alone cannot play any great part in international affairs. Moreover, Yugoslavia's international position depends not only on the quality of leadership but on the maintenance of domestic unity.

The conflict of nationalities bedeviled the old regime as it does the new. Neither Communist federalism nor socialist ideology has solved the question, as Vucinich points out in his essay on nationalism and communism. The author attributes the re-emergence of nationalism (did it ever submerge?) less to "historically accumu-

lated prejudices" and "national sensitivity and probably the aggressive character of the Yugoslavs" than to industrial development. With its stress on self-government, industrialization encourages "nationalism and a tendency toward particularism."

While Vucinich is hopeful for the future, others are less sanguine. George Macesich assesses the direction of the economy and the prospects for the future as Yugoslavia pursues its pragmatic course toward industrialization. Yet the search to find the golden mean between the capitalist market economy and the system of Marxist planning has had some disastrous consequences. Constant experimentation has had its successes in some aspects of the economy but in others has led to unemployment, economic instability, and inefficient methods of production. When a government politicizes economic decisions, are nationality differences thereby exacerbated? Because economic problems are at the center of Yugoslavia's political problems, philosophers there are busy constructing a synthesis between national diversity and the ideal of socialist unity, trying to provide an ideology that will fit their concept of Marxism into the mold of contemporary political and economic reality. As George Zaninovich states in his essay, "The Yugoslav Variation on Marx," Yugoslav philosophers have boldly developed their own theories of state and society. What motivates them "above all else is a crude standard of workability and success."

Joel M. Halpern's contribution, "Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," is noteworthy for its emphasis on the impact of modernization on the traditional social and cultural order. Because Yugoslavia is still in the process of adapting to an evolving technology, the observer finds it difficult to draw many generalizations about ethnic diversity as manifested in urban life. Ethnic rivalries may well continue but could "develop more in the direction of competing regional economic interest groups than specific socioeconomic groups having particular subcultural identities."

*Contemporary Yugoslavia* is a highly competent work and an important addition to the literature. Of particular value to the reader are the bibliographical notes for each chapter and the excellent index.

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YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NONALIGNED WORLD. By *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. xv, 353 pp. \$11.00.

During the past two decades Yugoslavia has played an important part in attempts to develop and expand the influence of nonalignment in world politics, yet few American scholars have devoted their energies to an analysis of Yugoslavia's relations with the governments of Asia and Africa and the Yugoslavs' attempts to forge a nonaligned bloc. Professor Alvin Rubinstein has filled this gap in scholarship by applying his skills as a student of Communist diplomacy to a study of the evolution of Yugoslav foreign policy, especially toward the developing countries.

Rubinstein argues that Yugoslav leaders first initiated a policy that aimed at the creation of a group of nonaligned states for pragmatic reasons—to break out of their diplomatic isolation, to find markets for Yugoslavia's goods, especially the products of the new industries, and to develop a policy that appealed to the various factions within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Rubinstein is also careful to note the effect of Cold War pressures on Yugoslavia's foreign policy—for example, the refusal of the Soviet leaders to accept Yugoslavia as an equal, even after 1955.