## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>List of Figures</strong></td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>List of Tables</strong></td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreword</strong></td>
<td>xix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contributors</strong></td>
<td>xxiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHARD BLUNDELL, ESTELLE CANTILLON, BARBARA CHIZZOLINI, MARC IVALDI, WOLFGANG LEININGER, RAMON MARIMON, LASZLO MATYAS AND FRODE STEEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The COEURE Project</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances in Economic Research: Foundations for European Policies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Chapters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relevance of Data and Methods</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Innovation and Growth: The Schumpeterian Perspective</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPE AGHION AND UFUK AKCIGIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Introduction</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Looking for Growth Paradigms to Think about Growth Policy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 The Neoclassical Growth Model</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 The AK Model</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3 The Product-Variety Model</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4 The Schumpeterian Model</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Some Main Applications and Extensions of Schumpeterian Growth Theory</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 Growth Meets IO</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 Schumpeterian Growth and Firm Dynamics</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 Growth Meets Development: Appropriate Institutions</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.4 Growth Meets Development: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.5 Growth and Unemployment</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Enhancing Productivity Growth in Advanced Countries</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 Pillars of Innovation-Led Growth</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 Competition Policy against Industrial Policy</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

1.4.3 Reforming the State 47
1.4.4 Macroeconomic Policy 48
1.4.5 Innovation, Inequality, and Social Mobility: Making Growth Inclusive 48

1.5 Technological Waves and the Debate on Secular Stagnation 51
1.5.1 The Debate 51
1.5.2 Historical Wave Patterns 52

1.6 Schumpeterian Insights into R&D Policy 54
1.6.1 R&D Policies and Firm Selection 55
1.6.2 Basic versus Applied R&D 56

1.7 The Role of Freedom and Openness in the Innovation Process 59
1.7.1 The ADS Framework and the Role of Academic Freedom 59
1.7.2 Freedom and Openness 61
1.7.3 Evidence on the Limits of IP and the Role of Openness and Freedom 61

1.8 Towards a New Growth Pact in Europe 62
1.8.1 Structural Reforms and the Role of Structural Funds 62
1.8.2 Rethinking Industrial Policy in the EU 64
1.8.3 More Flexible Macroeconomic Policies at EU Level 65

1.9 Conclusion 66
Acknowledgements 67
Notes 67
References 69

2 European Union Dual Labour Markets: Consequences and Potential Reforms 73
JUAN J. DOLADO

2.1 Introduction 73
2.2 The Emergence of Dual Labour Markets in Europe 74
2.3 Temporary Contracts: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends? 77
2.4 Dual Labour Markets Before and After the Great Recession 80
2.5 Lessons from Spain 84
2.6 Dual Labour Markets and Youth Unemployment 88
2.7 How to Dismantle Dual Employment Protection Legislation 91
2.7.1 Recent EPL Reforms 91
2.7.2 Single/Unified Contracts in Theory 93
2.7.3 Single/Unified Contracts in Practice 100

2.8 Conclusions 104
Acknowledgements 105
Appendix 105
Notes 108
References 109

3 Population, Migration, Ageing and Health: A Survey 113
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN, GIOVANNI FACCHINI AND CORA SIGNOROTTO

3.1 Introduction 113
3.2 Main Stylized Facts 114
3.3 Migration and Demographic Developments 117
3.3.1 The Selection Hypothesis 120

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Contents

3.3.2 The Adaptation Hypothesis 121
3.3.3 The Disruption Hypothesis 123
3.4 Permanent versus Temporary Migration 124
3.4.1 Why Do Migrants Return? 125
3.4.2 Who Are the Return Migrants? 126
3.5 The Fiscal Effect of Immigration 128
3.5.1 Static Frameworks 129
3.5.2 Dynamic Models 130
3.6 Migration and Skill Shortages 132
3.7 International Migration and the Health Care Sector 136
3.7.1 International Migration of Health Care Professionals 136
3.7.2 International Migration of Old Age Carers 139
3.7.3 Immigrants’ Demand for Health Care 141
3.8 The Floridization of Europe: Old Age North–South Migration 143
3.8.1 Determinants of Old Age Migration 144
3.8.2 Effects on Host Country Economy 145
3.9 Conclusions 146
Acknowledgements 147
Appendix 147
Notes 148
References 149

4 Education Systems: Assignment, Admissions, Accountability and Autonomy 159
SIMON BURGESS
4.1 Introduction 159
4.1.1 What Can Economics Contribute to the Study of Education? 161
4.2 The Aims of Education: Rates of Return, Inequality and Social Mobility 161
4.3 Education Systems: Assignment, Admissions, Accountability and Autonomy 164
4.3.1 Assignment Mechanisms 164
4.3.2 Accountability, Autonomy and Regulation 175
4.3.3 Education Market Structure: Policy Summary 185
Acknowledgements 185
Notes 186
References 186

5 Competition and Regulation in Markets for Goods and Services: A Survey with Emphasis on Digital Markets 194
NIKOLAOS VETTAS
5.1 Introduction 194
5.2 A View on Competition Policy Developments in Europe 199
5.2.1 Competition Policy: The General Context 199
5.2.2 Digital Trade and Online Markets 200
5.2.3 Some Recent Competition Cases 203
5.2.4 Online Travel Agencies and MFNs 207
5.2.5 The Digital Single Market Initiative 208
5.2.6 Distinguishing Features of Digital Markets 209
9.3 The Trade-Off between Commuting and Housing Costs 376
  9.3.1 The Monocentric City Model 377
  9.3.2 Why Do Employment Centres Emerge? 379
  9.3.3 Land Capitalisation and Housing 380
  9.3.4 Residential Segregation 382
9.4 More Cities or Bigger Cities? 384
9.5 The Organization of Metropolitan Areas 387
9.6 Managing Traffic and Congestion 388
  9.6.1 External Costs of Urban Transport 390
  9.6.2 The Difficult Road to First-Best Pricing of Congestion 391
  9.6.3 The Patchwork of Policy Instruments 394
  9.6.4 Public Transport Pricing 396
9.7 The Benefits of New Transport Infrastructure 398
  9.7.1 Does New Infrastructure Reduce Congestion? 398
  9.7.2 The Wider Benefits of Urban Transport Projects and New Developments in Assessment Methods 399
9.8 Where Do We Stand? 401
Acknowledgements 403
Notes 403
References 403

10 Fiscal and Monetary Policies after the Crises 409
CHARLES BRENDON AND GIANCARLO CORSETTI
10.1 Introduction 409
10.2 The Pre-Crisis Consensus, and Heterogeneity 411
10.3 The Context and Challenges Posed by the Crisis 413
  10.3.1 Headline Macroeconomic Trends 414
  10.3.2 Market Impairment and the Transmission of Stabilization Policy 416
  10.3.3 The Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 417
10.4 The Zero Lower Bound: Implications for Stabilization Policy 418
  10.4.1 Savings Decisions and Nominal Interest Rates 419
  10.4.2 Shocks to the ‘Natural’ Rate of Interest 420
  10.4.3 Forward Guidance as a Solution? 422
  10.4.4 Fiscal Stimulus as a Solution? 425
  10.4.5 Central Bank Asset Purchases as a Solution? 433
  10.4.6 The Benefits and Risks of Structural Reform 439
  10.4.7 Empirical Evidence on the ‘Expectations Channel’ 440
10.5 Policies and Diagnoses of the Crisis 442
  10.5.1 What Causes ‘Savings Shocks’? 442
  10.5.2 The Possibility of Secular Stagnation 445
  10.5.3 Dynamic Interactions through the Labour Market 448
  10.5.4 Deflation Traps, Self-Fulfilling Dynamics and Equilibrium Selection 450
10.6 Risk Sharing and Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union 455
  10.6.1 Imbalances and Imperfect Risk Sharing 456
  10.6.2 Complete Markets are not a Substitute for Risk Sharing via Transfers 457
  10.6.3 Fiscal Devaluation 458
11 Financial Regulation in Europe: Foundations and Challenges 470
THORSTEN BECK, ELENA CARLETTI AND ITAY GOLSTEIN

11.1 Introduction 470
11.2 Recent Financial Reforms in Europe 472
11.2.1 Capital Requirements 473
11.2.2 Liquidity Requirements 474
11.2.3 Resolution Framework and Bail-In Instruments 475
11.2.4 Banking Union 476
11.2.5 Activity Restrictions and Other Reforms 478
11.3 Microfoundations for Financial Reforms 479
11.3.1 Basic Failures in the Financial System 479
11.3.2 Mapping between Basic Failures and the Reforms Enacted in Europe 488
11.4 Moving beyond Banks and Traditional Activities: The Regulatory Perimeter 492
11.4.1 The Regulatory Perimeter 492
11.4.2 Financial Innovation 495
11.4.3 Complexity 498
11.5 Special Issues in Europe and How they Affect Future Regulation 499
11.5.1 Crisis Resolution and Macro-Management in a Monetary Union 500
11.5.2 Financial Structure: Does Europe Suffer from a Bank Bias? 501
11.6 Summary, Policy Lessons and Directions for Future Research 502
Acknowledgements 503
Notes 505
References 505

12 Inequality and Welfare: Is Europe Special? 511
ALAIN TRANNOY

12.1 Introduction 511
12.2 Inequality and Welfare: Two Interconnected Notions 513
12.2.1 Inequality 513
12.2.2 Welfare 515
12.2.3 Aggregating Welfare 517
12.2.4 The Relationship between Inequality and Welfare 518
12.2.5 Two Assumptions about Individual Welfare 519
12.3 Normative and Positive Issues Involving Several Sciences 523
12.3.1 Political Philosophy 524
12.3.2 History 525
12.3.3 Sociology and Political Science 527
12.3.4 Psychology 530
12.3.5 Neurosciences: Happiness in the Twenty-First Century 530
12.4 Europe’s Inequality Pattern vis-à-vis the US 532
12.4.1 Inequality of Income 533
12.4.2 Forces behind the Increase in Gross-Income Inequality 535
12.4.3 Convergence Process in Europe 538
12.4.4 Inequality of Opportunity and Intergenerational Mobility 540
12.4.5 Attitudes to Inequality 545
12.4.6 Well-Being and the Size of the Welfare State 548
12.4.7 Partial Conclusion 550
12.5 Europe Is at the Forefront of Research on Many Topics 551
12.6 Data Are Improving but Remain Largely Incomplete when Looking at More Specific Issues 553
12.7 Inequality and Welfare as Transversal Issues 554
12.8 Cutting Edge Research Issues 555
12.9 Issues More Specific to Europe 557
12.10 Conclusion 558
Acknowledgements 560
Notes 560
References 561

13 Developments in Data for Economic Research 568
ROBERTO BARCELLAN, PETER BØEGH NIELSEN, CATERINA CALSAMIGLIA, COLIN CAMERER, ESTELLE CANTILLON, BRUNO CRÉPON, BRAM DE ROCK, LÁSZLÓ HALPERN, ARIE KAPTEYN, ASIM I. KHWAJA, GEORG KIRCHSTEIGER, VIGDIS KVALHEIM, JULIA LANE, MARKUS MOBIUS, LUKE SIBIETA, JOSEPH TRACY, FREDERIC UDINA, GUGLIEMO WEBER AND LISA WRIGHT
13.1 Introduction 568
13.2 Organizing Access to Microdata 569
13.2.1 Legal and Technical Background 570
13.2.2 The Nordic Leadership 571
13.2.3 Improving Data Access: Two Case Studies 574
13.2.4 Concluding Remarks 577
13.3 Data Standards and Cross-Country Datasets 577
13.3.1 The Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Data Environment 578
13.3.2 The G20 Data Gaps Initiative 579
13.3.3 Linking Existing Microdata 581
13.3.4 Towards a New Data Environment 584
13.4 Researcher-Generated Databases 585
13.4.1 Measurement and Experimentation in the Social Sciences Project 586
13.4.2 The UMETRICS Programme 587
13.4.3 The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 588
13.4.4 Lessons from Successful Researcher-Led Databases 589
13.5 Data Generation in Controlled Environments 590
13.5.1 Laboratory Experiments 590
13.5.2 Randomized Control Trials 594
Contents

13.6 The Changing Face of Public and Private-Sector Collaborations in Economic Research 598
   13.6.1 New Private-Sector Collaborations in Economic Research 599
   13.6.2 New Public-Sector Collaborations in Economic Research 601
   13.6.3 Risks, Challenges and Outlook 603
13.7 Concluding Comments 605
   Notes 606
   References 608

14 Big Data in Economics: Evolution or Revolution? 612
CHRISTINE DE MOL, ERIC GAUTIER, DOMENICO GIANNONE, SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, LUCREZIA REICHLIN, HERMAN VAN DIJK AND JEFFREY WOOLDRIDGE
14.1 Introduction 612
14.2 The Curse of Dimensionality and Regularization 614
14.3 Policy Analysis and Causal Inference 619
14.4 Prediction 623
14.5 Computational Issues 625
14.6 Conclusions 627
   Notes 628
   References 628

Index 633