

but his writing lacks the polemic quality sometimes found in refugee works. The first four chapters describe well the evolution of West German foreign policy from the inflexibility of the Adenauer era through the cautious re-examination in the mid-1960s to Brandt's startling *Ostpolitik*. The next three chapters assess East European and Soviet reactions to Bonn's new policy. The final chapter analyzes *Ostpolitik* as it unfolded after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the signing of the West German treaties with Poland and Russia.

Although Görgey praises Brandt's foreign policy initiatives for their courage and realism, he criticizes their results. First, he charges that West Germany in effect recognized Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the legality of two Germanies while gaining little in return. These results may not be satisfactory in Western eyes, but Brandt's realism was needed to alleviate tensions and thus lay the foundations for more fruitful political and economic relations between West Germany and the Soviet orbit. Second, he charges Brandt with forgetting Berlin; however, the opposite is true. This book was written before the ratification of the Warsaw and Moscow treaties, which Brandt astutely tied to the outcome of the four-power negotiations on Berlin then in progress. The author does not mention these negotiations. While a united Berlin could not be expected, Brandt did gain major concessions from Moscow, and thus from Pankow, regarding access to West Berlin, contacts between East and West Berliners, and ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

Görgey concludes with the sober realization that boundaries and basic political alliances remain unchanged and the fear that Soviet influence in Western Europe could grow if Western statesmen are lulled by the spirit of compromise implicit in *Ostpolitik*.

CANFIELD F. SMITH

University of Wisconsin, Platteville

REGIERUNGSPOLITIK UND ÖFFENTLICHE MEINUNG IM KAISERTUM ÖSTERREICH ANLÄSSLICH DER POLNISCHEN NOVEMBER-REVOLUTION (1830–1831). By *Gernot Seide*. Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München, vol. 38. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971. 184 pp. DM 34, paper.

The November Uprising may strike many contemporary readers as an irrelevant and insignificant subject. And yet it has attracted innumerable scholars ever since the event occurred, especially in recent years. In view of the extensive bibliography that already exists, one may legitimately inquire why still another study on the subject was necessary. Gernot Seide selected this topic for several reasons. Unlike other authors who have dealt with France, England, and Russia from a diplomatic point of view, Seide is concerned with Austria and its internal situation. His main objective is to depict the attitude of each of the various nationalities within the empire and how it differed from the official policy of the Austrian government. Although Józef Dutkiewicz had already written on Austria (*Austria wobec powstania listopadowego*, Cracow, 1933), his work was based largely on material in Polish archives and concentrated on Austrian diplomacy. Seide examines unexploited archival material in Vienna, Prague, and Budapest, as well as the contemporary press, and stresses the activities of the Czechs, Hungarians, Galicians, and others in support of the Poles.

The significance of the work is that it clearly describes and explains the great divergence between official policy and public opinion. The Austrian Monarchy was trying to preserve the European system of 1815 and its alliance with Russia. Any involvement in the uprising might easily have resulted in a general European conflagration. Besides, in 1830 the Austrian government was much more concerned with the revolutionary movement in Italy than in Poland. The peoples within the Austrian Empire felt none of the concerns of their government. To them, the Polish effort reflected their own aspirations for liberation and therefore deserved all possible sympathy and support; the so-called Spring of Nations was close at hand.

As a work of careful scholarship, based on hitherto unused source material and pointing up the divergence between government and people in Austria, Seide's monograph is a welcome addition to the literature of the November Uprising.

CHARLES MORLEY
The Ohio State University

PAMIĘTNIKI. By *Maciej Rataj*. Edited by *Jan Dębski*. Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1965. 488 pp.

POLSKIE STRONNICTWO LUDOWE PIAST, 1926–1931. By *Józef Ryszard Szaflik*. Zakład Historii Ruchu Ludowego. Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1970. 383 pp. 70 zł.

POLSKA PARTIA SOCJALISTYCZNA W LATACH 1935–1939: PROBLEMY DWUDZIESTOLECIA, 1918–1939. By *Janusz Żarnowski*. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1965. 420 pp.

RZECZYWISTOŚĆ I POLITYKA: ZE STUDIÓW NAD DZIEJAMI NAJNOWSZYMI NARODOWEJ DEMOKRACJI. By *Jerzy Janusz Terej*. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1971. 457 pp.

Of the four books under review, the one by *Maciej Rataj*, a prominent leader of the Piast wing of the Polish Peasant Party and marshal of the Sejm from 1922 to 1927, covers the earliest period and is the most fascinating to read, since his diary and memoirs give an almost day-to-day account of Polish domestic politics and foreign policy from 1919 to 1927. *Rataj* was born in 1884 into a peasant family in an East Galician village appropriately named *Chłopy* (peasants). He obtained a degree in classics at the University of *Lwów*, and as a student became associated with the founders and leaders of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), particularly with those who, after the 1913 split of the party into Right (Piast) and Left (Wyzwolenie, or Liberation) parties, led the Piast. He taught classics for a few years in *Zamość* before he was elected to the Sejm in 1919. As deputy chairman of the Sejm commission charged with drafting the Polish Constitution he played an influential role, as he did later as marshal of the Sejm. It would be no exaggeration to call him Poland's outstanding constitutionalist and parliamentarian. He devoted himself to making the Polish parliamentary system work, but the task was impossible. The opposition between Right and Left was irreconcilable, and the major parties frequently underwent internal splits. At one time (1926) over sixty different political groups were in existence.

Rataj often complained in his diary that the petty ambitions of political leaders obscured the interests of the state. He gives an interesting account of the political