

Kutuzov. As a study of the fighting at Borodino it is the best-informed and most informative account to date in English. There is a vast literature in Russian on the battle, and though Duffy has not covered it all, he has digested a great amount and presents an admirably clear analysis of its successive stages, notable for its unerring emphasis on the salient features and sober assessment of the role of individuals and formations. Here again he does justice to Barclay without denigrating Kutuzov. He is probably correct in stressing the crucial importance of Platov's apparently futile cavalry thrust against the French left, which enabled Barclay to rally his almost broken forces, but he is disappointingly brief on the Russian use of artillery (evidently he is unaware of A. P. Larionov's 1962 article on this subject), and his account of the action around the Shevardino Redoubt derives from the reports of Ermolov and Barclay, whose version of events has been challenged by another Soviet historian, L. P. Bogdanov. Mr. Duffy, however, has no particular axe to grind, and his book is attractive both for its scholarship and for its readability.

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THE CLASSROOM AND THE CHANCELLERY: STATE EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN RUSSIA UNDER COUNT DMITRY TOLSTOI. By *Allen Sinel*. Russian Research Center Studies, 72. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. xiii, 335 pp. \$14.00.

The publication of a monograph on a phase of the history of education in pre-revolutionary Russia is a welcome event, since such works are rather rare, especially in English. All the more so when the volume is thoroughly documented and makes a serious effort to be objective with respect to a person who has generally been characterized as a reactionary.

The author concentrated his research on the work of Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Tolstoy as minister of education (1866–80). With the exception of Sergei Semenovich Uvarov, who was minister of education from 1833 to 1849, Tolstoy held this office longer than any other official. It is all too easy to trace Tolstoy's devotion to autocracy, nationality, and orthodoxy to the influence of Uvarov and to infer that both ministers were equally reactionary. Both initiated educational reforms to achieve identical goals, but Tolstoy's reforms, as Sinel demonstrates, achieved results that advanced Russian education.

Count Tolstoy was bred a bureaucrat par excellence. As a faithful servant of his tsarist master, he fought the influences of Catholicism, liberalism, and revolutionism. A dedicated Slavophile, he glorified the Russian tradition in education. Yet as an educated man and historical scholar he did not disdain to learn from the educational experience of other countries, particularly Germany. He was not troubled by the ideological inconsistency of borrowing from Western nations; the main thing was the attainment of the regime's objectives by the most expeditious and effective ways, regardless of origin.

Sinel analyzes in a dispassionate manner the successes and failures of Tolstoy's reforms in elementary, secondary, higher, and teacher education. The evidence shows that there was some democratization of the student population in secondary education, an outcome unintended by Tolstoy but also not overturned. His fair-mindedness was discerned in his remark that the gymnasium was not for the aristocracy as such, but rather for aristocrats of intellect, knowledge, and hard

work (p. 207). The very rigidity of Tolstoy's policies contributed to the failures he experienced and to the rise of opposition leading to his dismissal. As Sinel shows, despite Tolstoy's positive contributions to Russian education, he "actually stimulated the phenomenon he wished to combat, the growth of antistate sentiment among the students" (p. 213).

The book is interesting to read and adds considerably to the knowledge of the educational history of tsarist Russia. It is somewhat repetitious, but this is not a serious problem. However, the efforts to relate the nineteenth century to the contemporary era are not very felicitous—nor are the attempts to compare Tolstoy's "Boy Scout Code" (pp. 178–79) with the Twenty Commandments of the Soviet pupil, or the cheating in Tolstoy's time (pp. 199–200) with that of the Soviet period.

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THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH: AN ADVENTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. By *Eugene P. Trani*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969. xi, 194 pp. \$6.75.

This study of the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth focuses on the personal diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. As a Harvard graduate, world traveler, sportsman, and advocate of physical fitness and imperialism who could, if necessary, converse in French and who was socially at ease with old-world aristocrats, President Roosevelt was well prepared to assume the role of mediator between Japan and Russia in 1905. It was above all his initiative in bringing together the Japanese and Russians, his ties of friendship with several key Japanese leaders, and his persistence, powers of persuasion, and diplomatic skill that avoided an unnecessary prolongation of the Russo-Japanese conflict. For this achievement and for other peacemaking activities, Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906.

Trani's study is mainly of interest for the Russian diplomatic historian because of the details it provides concerning Japanese and American diplomacy and internal politics during 1904 and 1905. The author has used not only the available secondary literature and printed sources concerning the Portsmouth Conference but also American and Japanese manuscript and archival sources. He is therefore able to provide insights into American and Japanese attitudes and motives that usually are not to be found in Soviet and American studies of tsarist diplomacy during the Russo-Japanese War.

Trani's discussion of Russian attitudes and policy is the least satisfying part of his book. Here it is important to note that a scholarly edition of Russian Foreign Ministry documents comparable to the *Grosse Politik*, the *Documents diplomatiques français*, and the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* has yet to be published for the period 1871–1911. Trani was able to consult the Archives of the Japanese Foreign Office microfilmed by the American government after 1945, as well as State Department records and personal papers at the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Columbia University Library, and the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale. He did not have access to Soviet archives.

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