

GRČKATA POLITIKA SPREMA MAKEDONIJA VO VTORATA POLOVINA NA XIX I POČETOKOT NA XX VEK. By *Risto Poplazarov*. Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1972. 324 pp.

One of the main concerns during the past thirty years of most Macedonian historians in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia has been the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Macedonian history. The fundamental objective of their writings has been to demonstrate that the historical development of Macedonia, especially from the eighteenth century onward, led to the awakening of a Macedonian national consciousness, the formation of a Macedonian nationality, and the establishment of a Macedonian national state. Dr. Risto Poplazarov's study belongs to this category. The author's assumption is that during the period with which he is concerned (1853–1912), the majority of the Slavic-speaking population of Macedonia had developed a Macedonian national consciousness, and he attempts to show that the Greek state and the Greek patriarchate of Constantinople used all available means to Hellenize, that is, to assimilate and denationalize, the Macedonian people.

The Greeks had the oldest and most systematically organized anti-Macedonian policy. The activities of the Greek armed bands in Macedonia, which commenced during the second half of the nineteenth century, culminated in 1903–8, when they acquired the character of "an undeclared war" by the Greek state against the Macedonian people and their national liberation movement. The author states that Greek policies, and especially the armed bands, were directed at a systematic extermination of the Macedonian people and the preparation for the incorporation into Greece of as much of Macedonia as possible. He describes in great detail the terroristic activities of all known Greek armed bands against the Macedonian communities, which rejected the Greek patriarchate for the Bulgarian exarchate, as well as against the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which fought the Turks and stood for an independent Macedonian state. Poplazarov shows how Greek officers, bishops, priests, consuls, teachers, and merchants, working in close cooperation with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Greek institutions, organized, financed, and directed the Greek armed bands in Macedonia.

The author gives special attention to the diplomatic endeavors of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and states that the Greeks were able to come to an oral agreement with the Turks to work together against the Macedonian movement for liberation. He cites many examples which prove how this understanding was put into practice by both sides. The successes achieved by the Greeks in Macedonia before the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 were attributable, in large part, to the material support the Greek state gave to the armed bands, the patriarchate, and the cultural institutions which attempted to Hellenize Macedonia. Poplazarov believes that Greece would not have been able to gain such a large portion of Macedonia without the support of Bulgaria and Serbia. Moreover, the success of denationalization of the Macedonian people would have been even greater had the IMRO not resisted foreign propaganda and fought against armed bands. The author shows that the Greek bands found little support among native Macedonians. In addition, almost all of the leaders and most of the rank-and-file members who fought in Macedonia against the IMRO and only incidentally against the Turks were natives of Greece.

Poplazarov's work is a good study as far as it presents the Macedonian viewpoint. It complements an earlier study on the same topic by Douglas Dakin which presented the Greek position. Although Poplazarov has been unable to use Greek and Bulgarian archives, he was able to collect an incredible amount of new evidence, especially in regard to the Greek armed struggle in Macedonia and the relations between Greeks and Turks. There is no doubt that the difficulties in writing on Macedonia are still tremendous. Because of the unreliability of many of the published and

unpublished sources, not all factual statements can remain independent of interpretation, and attempts by various authors to present them as such conceal implicit presuppositions and make the study of Macedonia's past even more difficult. As with almost any work on the Macedonian question, scholars will find some of Poplazarov's interpretations controversial. There is no doubt that many areas of Macedonia's past need further elucidation. Poplazarov's study has both strengths and weaknesses. The latter are primarily the result of preconceived notions and the lack of archival materials, which are still not available to all scholars.

Two summaries are included in the book, one in Russian and the other in English. Although the Russian-language summary is good, the English-language one is unclear and contains many errors. A rather good bibliography and index are provided.

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USTAŠE I NEZAVISNA DRŽAVA HRVATSKA: 1941–1945. 2nd ed. By *Fikreta Jelić-Butić*. Monographies-Biographies, no. 5. Zagreb: Liber and Školska knjiga, 1978. 331 pp. Maps. 280 dinars.

Fikreta Jelić-Butić, a member of the Institute for the History of the Croatian Worker Movement in Zagreb, has published many works dealing with wartime Croatia. The subject of her book has been the topic of numerous studies, both in Yugoslavia and abroad, but this one is the most comprehensive to date. The book is well thought out, well written, and certainly honors Yugoslav historical scholarship.

The volume is divided into five parts. The introduction—which relies primarily on secondary sources—traces the history of the Ustasha from its ideological institutional origin within the Party of (Constitutional) Right to March 1941. The first part of the book reviews the cooperation of the Ustasha with the Axis powers, the organization of the Independent State of Croatia, and the drafting of its borders. Although Jelić-Butić uses the works of B. Krizman, F. Čulinović, and others extensively, she offers many new insights into the creation of a German-Italian satellite. This section is followed by an illuminating and innovative survey of the Ustasha regime, its organization, and *modus operandi*. The discussion encompasses the state's administration, the setup and tasks of the Ustasha movement, the armed forces, and economic and social policies. The next part analyzes the Ustasha's conception of a Croatian state and its social structure, and also outlines racial policies, the use of organized terror, and the impact of outside forces (the Axis, the church, the Muslims, and the Peasant Party) on the regime. Resistance activities and attempts to save the state are examined in the last part of the book. A synopsis, maps, and an index of names (but no bibliography) complete this well-annotated volume.

The only criticism that can be levied is based on political and ideological differences rather than on factual objections. To begin with, the author neglects non-Croatian sources—except for those deposited in Yugoslav archives—as well as numerous Croatian and non-Croatian studies published abroad (the most notable exception being Hory and Broszat's *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*). Prejudices particularly distort the descriptions of the Catholic church and of the Peasant Party. The first is depicted as an open partner, and the last as a silent one, of the Ustasha. But, as Western documentation demonstrates, the Peasant Party was opposed to the Ustasha. Unwilling to accept the reins of government from the Axis powers, the Peasants nonetheless sensed a certain Western coolness and apprehension. The Vatican did not offer de facto recognition of Pavelić's regime, as claimed on page 217. Its friendly attitude toward the state notwithstanding, the Holy See and the church had reservations about its rulers. In spite of the Muslims' frequent cooperation with the Axis powers, Jelić-Butić treats them