

and peace without first subduing their own nationalism.

Never in all the history of politics has it been so imperative that men "think straight" about peace as now. The soul-force in which most pacifists and proponents of disarmament believe is an asset of tremendous worth, but its creative power can be demonstrated only in the operation of institutions based on the appeal of mind to mind and heart to heart. The need of the hour therefore is to get on with the building of such institutions.

Redoubling the agitation for disarmament will get humanity nowhere. Nor does the oft-heard plea to "strengthen the United Nations" hold much more promise. The U.N. is an organization of nations based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states—with each member being peace-loving simply by legal definition. That is its strength and that is its weakness.

At this stage in history mankind plainly needs an organization loose enough to enable all the members of the family of nations to qualify for admission and participation. Only an organization based on the principle of "sovereign equality" can accommodate at one and the same time over a hundred states varying from the democratic to the despotic and from the advanced to the primitive. But by the same token such an organization must remain an organization. It cannot become a government dispensing true justice, for only a government of flesh-and-blood people can do that.

The U.N. is much like the American Confederation before 1789, which Alexander Hamilton called a "would-be government of governments" and therefore "a monstrosity" that would not work. This may

overstate the matter somewhat, but the point should be clear: the U.N. may do something useful here and there to maintain the peace, but it can never, by itself, guarantee peace because it cannot operate in terms of assuring actual justice either to nations or to individuals. Only a *bona fide* democratic government of a federal union of nations and peoples practicing democracy among themselves can ever guarantee the kind of justice that will persuade men not to resort to arms. The ultimate need therefore is for a federal democratic world government.

Obviously mankind is not ready for such a global commonwealth today. But does this mean that nothing can be done? Not at all. In the face of an immediately insoluble problem the course of wisdom is not to let the situation fester but to do what can be done to put it, as Abraham Lincoln said, "in the course of an ultimate solution."

The implication for coping with the issue of peace and disarmament is plain. Let the democratic nations of Orient and Occident—those who are dedicated above all to freedom and justice for the individual—form now, inside the United Nations Organization, an open "Union of the Free." Let this Union, in line with the Charter, pledge its armed might to help every nation defend itself against attack. After that let the Union grow, over the generations and the centuries, until its membership embraces the whole world.

Then, but not until then, will disarmament become practical. For with the assurance of justice, men and nations will be at peace and the need for arms will have disappeared. The true goal is the rule of law and the way to achieve it is through the erection, slow and painful though it may have to be, of a democratic world government.

correspondence

"AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

New York, N.Y.

Dear Sir: Mr. Pfaff's condescending approach to my book *The Two Faces of American Foreign Policy*, (*worldview*, April 1963) does not discourage me from answering: he is otherwise polite and serious, rare qualities among Liberal reviewers. Let me profit by the occasion.

There are, it seems to me, two controversial issues on which Mr. Pfaff and I differ. One is the problem of de Gaulle which, however, transcends

even that towering figure because it has to do with the nature of politics. Calling de Gaulle a "creative conservative" would sound ludicrous to any Frenchman today, with the exception of François Mauriac. Men as ideologically distant as Professor Louis Rougier and M. Maurice Duverger agree on the Jacobin character of the General's policies. As Rougier points out, the American insurgents charged Lord North with the same breach of contract with which de Gaulle is charged—by the still honest segment of

July-August 1963 13

the press: suppression of juries, exceptional tribunals, and the use of mercenaries (*barbouzes, police parallele, specialists in kidnapping and torture*). Duverger speaks of de Gaulle's "consulate" and rule by "*bon plaisir*," and adds: "there is no continuity, political institutions, or civilized order in a land which rests on the precarious existence of one man." And precarious is the word: de Gaulle the conservative travels by helicopter even in Paris, such is his popularity.

Now I mentioned these *internal* realities of France only to underline that Gaullist foreign policy lacks solid ground. First because de Gaulle does not have the power to carry out his design, however healthy Mr. Pfaff and I may judge his attempt to detach Europe from an ambiguous Washington; secondly, because he confuses history and politics: in the historical perspective communism may be a bad memory a century hence; but in the political *hic et nunc* Khrushchev, riding high on the double force of communism and Russian nationalism, has only one interest: to divide the Atlantic partners. In Europe, Gaullism is a welcome instrument of Kremlin policies; in the western hemisphere such an instrument is Cuba (and Communist infiltration in Latin America) which will eventually oblige this country to concentrate on its own backyard and neglect its other interests and alliances.

The second controversial issue with my reviewer is on American foreign policy itself, the framework in which even such a great man as de Gaulle moves, which defines him, and to which he reacts. It is not clear to me whether Mr. Pfaff understands the thesis of my book: I did not analyse the American liberal-leftist view of the nature of politics; as my title indicates, I analysed American foreign policy itself which is *leftist* in so far as it is fundamentally and inescapably utopian, eschatological, and which under the present circumstances, represents an element of dangerous ambiguity in world affairs. My critic resorts to rather cheap methods when he includes me in the ranks of the "rabid Right." He knows, I am sure that I condemn the exasperating oversimplifications, name-calling, and lack of political culture in extreme rightist circles no less than in the A.D.A. In fact, if this exchange is at all possible, it is because I suspect Mr. Pfaff has the same reservations.

In short, he accuses me of substituting "rightist" illusions for "leftist" ones, when in reality I denounce American illusions about the world. This attitude, in the American context, does not put me either in the rightist or the leftist camp: it makes me a realist as one of my reviewers, Mr. Edgar Ansel Mower, perceived when he called me more of a realist than Hans Morgenthau, Jr. and Henry Kissinger.

What are my illusions, according to Pfaff? 1) be-

lief in a "great historical confrontation"; 2) the monolithic nature of communism; 3) the impression that the Left is ready for an alliance with the Kremlin against the Right.

1. Mr. Pfaff succumbs to wishful thinking about a coming pluralistic, many-centered world because he looks at the future from a cold war perspective which dramatizes the existence of two blocs. In my view, the confrontation takes place between two world views (as in religious wars) and all nations, grouped or not in *apparent* blocs, are taking sides in the only two meaningful camps which are, at the same time, the only two serious power- and economic concentrations. Unless Pfaff subscribes to the ludicrous notion that the "third world" or the United Nations represent forces of moral arbitration, he must agree with me.

2. He ought to agree with me also that China and Russia are inseparably in one camp. Their quarrels are similar to medieval conflicts between factions within the Church; the faith of each was not in question, and they presented a united front to non-Christians. Similarly: the revolutionary parties after 1792, while murdering each other, conducted a successful war against all of Europe. It is true that medieval factionalism ended in schism and Reformation; and that the opponents of the *Terreur* finally eliminated Robespierre. But we do not know, with regard to communism, whether we are, *mutatis mutandis*, on the eve of 1517 and of Thermidor. We do not know whether communism is falling apart. Indeed it seems that with "de-Stalinization" communism has become more elastic, more tolerant of internal conflicts. For us, it is a united enemy. And besides, the West proved, in confrontations with the dictators of the last thirty years that it does not know how to exploit differences between them or internal crises. Thus in the perspective of politics the same power propels Moscow and Havana. (See Castro's statement in *Le Monde* that not he, but Khrushchev insisted on putting missiles in Cuba.)

3. Our Left today calls Khrushchev a "potential ally" (James Warburg in the *New York Times*), the *New York Times* again favors *entente* with Castro but keeps denouncing the "rightist warmongers" (and Franco, etc.) as the real obstacles to peace between East and West. The Kennedy administration destroys Tshombe and the Laotian Right, saves Castro, rewards Sukarno, browbeats the hard anti-Communist regime of South Korea, and actively promotes an opening to the Left in Europe and Great Britain. In short, only the Rightist warmongers delay the arrival of millennium. They are the real enemies of mankind.

After this, let Mr. Pfaff call my statements "phantasies."

THOMAS MOLNAR