

As in the earlier volumes of this series, the redaction is excellent. The protocols are annotated, and each is preceded by an outline of its contents. There is a separate chronological list of the protocols with a brief summary of each, as well as a short bibliography, an index, and helpful lists of archaic words, abbreviations, and the participants in the discussions. The introductory essays by Waltraud Heindl and Friedrich Engel-Janosi are indispensable.

ROY A. AUSTENSEN
Illinois State University

AUSTRO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE ANSCHLUSS ERA. By *Radomír Luža*. Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975. xvi, 438 pp. \$20.00.

In the flood of writings on the Third Reich, one major subject has gone largely unexplored: what happened to Austria after March 1938. This excellent study fills a large part of the gap. The title appears anomalous; how can one discuss Austro-German relations after Germany has swallowed up Austria? But it proves accurate. For this is not a full history of Austria between 1938 and 1945 (a project both too large in scope and, according to Professor Luža, still impossible because some vital materials remain inaccessible). Instead, the book portrays the Nazi takeover and rule of an independent state and people theoretically an integral part of Germany before the Anschluss and therefore not to be handled like other conquests, by exploitation, decimation, and expulsion, but to have its special form of German *Kultur* integrated and developed under the Nazi aegis. Hence, though Austria certainly was ruled from Berlin with little autonomy, by *Reichsdeutsch* rather than native leaders and by the Nazi Party even more than by the German state, Austrian feelings and traditions did have to be considered, special problems of the Austrian society, economy, and culture taken into account, and Austrian loyalty to the Reich preserved. Thus the story becomes one of Austro-German relations, not simply German rule in Austria.

The work has a few blemishes. It is not easy or compelling reading, for various reasons. Administrative history, which comprises a good part of it, is a vital but not especially exciting genre. The author has worked hard and successfully at penetrating the Nazi bureaucratic jungle himself, but does less well in guiding the reader through it. Ambiguous or confusing phrases and sentences sometimes obscure the meaning of a passage, and the partly topical, partly chronological organization inevitably entails some overlap and repetition. The attempt to integrate the vast, diverse material under the theme of the survival and emergence of Austrian self-consciousness does not seem to me to have worked.

But these defects weigh little alongside the book's outstanding merits. Based on massive, painstaking research, it is a mine of useful information, including many tables and appendixes. The tone is objective and dispassionate throughout, even where some moral denunciation would be understandable (for example, on the prominent role Austrians played in the Final Solution, or the shabby record of postwar Austrian denazification). The author's judgments are sound, his insights occasionally quite acute, and his conclusions clear, important, and often suggestive of the irony of history. Hitler's determination to break up Austria as a nation led him to exploit regional loyalties so as to expand the rift between Vienna and the provinces. But precisely these regional feelings became the source of ultimate Austrian regeneration. The Germans failed to solve the economic troubles which had done much to make Austrians accept and endorse the Anschluss, and this failure contributed to Austrian

disillusionment. Yet the economic modernization carried on by Germany has laid the basis for much of Austria's postwar prosperity. Above all the book portrays the contradictions, tensions, cross-purposes, and internecine struggles of German policy in Austria—phenomena characteristic of Nazi rule everywhere, to be sure, but here proof that finally Hitler did not know what to do with his own native land any more than he did with his other conquests.

In sum, a major contribution.

PAUL W. SCHROEDER

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FERENC DEÁK. By *Béla K. Király*. Twayne's World Leader Series. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975. 243 pp. Bibliography. \$8.50 in U.S. \$9.35 elsewhere.

Every small European nation produced outstanding men who would receive more than passing attention in history books written in our country were they better known. Ferenc Deák usually rates one sentence as the Hungarian statesman whose negotiating skill produced the Compromise of 1867 and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Few ever ask the obvious question: Who was Deák and what made him the universally accepted spokesman of his countrymen and also acceptable to Vienna? Those who ask this question would have great difficulty in finding a satisfactory answer in English unless they happen to discover the somewhat dated and overly adulatory work by Florence Foster-Arnold, *Francis Deák, A Hungarian Statesman: A Memoir*, published in London in 1880.

In presenting one of the major but insufficiently known historical figures to the English-speaking world, two basic approaches are possible. One is the scholarly monograph of which a good example—to remain within the limits of nineteenth-century Hungary—is the first volume of the planned two-volume work, *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism, 1791–1841* by George Barany, published in 1968. The other approach is the one selected by Professor Király for his study of Deák—a less scholarly treatment, but a short work that makes it easy for the average reader to get acquainted with the protagonist. Professor Király can produce admirable scholarly monographs as proven by his *Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Decline of Enlightened Despotism* (1969). His choice of approaches was made consciously, and the author makes this clear in the preface. The reviewer must accept the author's decision to write a "popular" book this time and must judge the results of his efforts accordingly.

It is no easy task to write a good "popular" study that presents all the relevant and salient information in a relatively simple manner without sacrificing scholarship and accuracy. It is a pleasure to note that Professor Király succeeded in this difficult undertaking. Deák emerges from these pages not as a faultless, idealized knight in shining armor, but as a true human being with shortcomings, foibles, and idiosyncrasies, making him and his greatness even more understandable and admirable. By devoting most of the volume to Deák's political career prior to the crucial years of the mid-1860s, the author not only answers satisfactorily the question raised in the first paragraph of this review, but presents the reader with a picture of a true and amazingly consistent—even dogmatic—"classical" liberal of major magnitude. This is not only important for the understanding of Deák, but is also an important lesson in Hungarian history.

The liberalism of Deák and those who worked with him gave Hungarian politics a steady line from the calling of the Diet of 1830 to the Compromise of 1867, in spite of the violent upheavals and oppression of the events of 1848–49 and the Bach period.