

to be ceded to them, especially Trieste, which a "natural process" would render Slovene. Urban people, the Italians demanded the sparsely populated peasant hinterland (Novak's map, p. 5, appears to exaggerate the Italian penetration in the Istrian interior).

Novak is of Slovenian origin and lived at the heart of the problem from 1947 to 1951. I had a male Slovenian assistant and a female Triestine assistant, but my contact with the problem was less direct. This explains the fact that on the Yugoslav resistance, the war, and the role of the London government, his book is more precise and detailed than mine. On the other hand, I had access to the Italian, Yugoslav, and—I can say it now—French archives, which enabled me to set forth with more precision the Italian viewpoints, the disagreements among Italians, and the hesitant attitude of the Allies. I suggest also that Novak's book should be consulted on the diverse local political factions, and mine particularly for a criticism of the census figures. In sum—and I hope Novak will share my view—two historians by profession, if they are sincere and try to consult all the accessible sources, are apt to arrive at the same interpretations and end by concluding that unbridled nationalism is the source of a large share of human suffering.

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THE BATTLE STALIN LOST: MEMOIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1948–1953.

By *Vladimir Dedijer*. New York: Viking Press, 1971. x, 341 pp. \$8.50.

Ironically, the first fissure in the Soviet bloc monolith after World War II occurred in Yugoslavia, where Partisan zealots had died with Stalin's name on their lips. In exploiting the revolutionary idealism of "honest fools," as he termed his Yugoslav followers, Stalin provoked the most calamitous and consequential schism in the Communist world since Trotsky. However, even after being cast out of the pale by the June 28, 1948, Cominform Resolution and subjected to Moscow's campaign of slanderous vilification and threats, the Yugoslav Communists had enough residual idolatry of the Soviet Union to feel an involuntary revulsion at the thought of fighting an invading Red Army.

Vladimir Dedijer, journalist, biographer of Tito, and erstwhile high Communist functionary, presents us with his lucid recollections of those dramatic days after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the bloc, when many expected the Tito regime to fold under Stalin's relentless pressure (State Department specialist Charles Bohlen predicted it would last three weeks). In the manner of outraged innocents, the Yugoslavs refused to take the advice of Italian Communists "to be flexible, go to Moscow, daub a little ash on our foreheads, then go home and do as we pleased" (p. 179). After Molotov's 1949 ultimatum the pressure was applied in earnest. Dedijer says little about Stalin's intensive preparations to invade Yugoslavia (former Hungarian Army Chief Béla Király's letter of December 11, 1970, to the *New York Times* revealed that plans were laid in 1949 and that Soviet advisers, technicians, men, and equipment were poised in readiness in Hungary in 1950–51). As Edvard Kardelj had correctly guessed, the Russians would threaten to use force but would refrain for reasons of foreign policy. Uncertain whether the war could be localized or might escalate into a world-wide conflict, Stalin relented and took Bulganin's purported advice "not to strike at a hornets' nest."

Dedijer's work goes over much old ground. Its rambling journalistic style, minimal documentation, many digressions and asides, and occasionally breathless "gee whiz" tone detract from its worth. Nevertheless, this is an important account, by an influential insider, of a small power's struggle to retain its independence against great odds, and reminds us of the often underestimated influence of small countries on world affairs.

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YUGOSLAV CIVIL LAW: HISTORY, FAMILY, PROPERTY. By A. G. Chloros. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. xv, 285 pp. \$9.75.

This excellent book does not attempt to treat the whole civil legal system of Yugoslavia. Three fields are chosen for discussion: the history of Yugoslav law is summarized in forty-two pages; family law takes about twice that length; and the law of property occupies seventy-six pages. The book is supplemented by four basic statutes (all dealing with domestic relations) and a minutely prepared index. For the two branches of the law he considers, Professor Chloros has collected and thoroughly mastered a wealth of available materials in Serbo-Croatian, and offers his conclusions. His style is simple, his presentation lucid, and the book will be easily understood by persons having no legal background.

The author discusses the various elements that have blended with and influenced each other to create especially difficult problems: local customary law (which prevailed particularly in Montenegro), Greek-Byzantine thinking (introduced mainly into Serbia, which later was for centuries a part of the Ottoman Empire), and Hungarian and then Austrian solutions (in force in Croatia). Besides unwritten law, numerous codes and statutes have from early times shaped the legal systems of present-day Yugoslavia. The Byzantine code *Hexabiblos* (1345), the Code of Emperor Dušan (1349), the Austrian Civil Code (1811), and the Serbian Civil Code (1844) were most important.

Thus a maze of legal rules were in force when a united Yugoslavia was established at the end of World War I. Before a uniform codified system could be achieved, the country was conquered by communism. To former problems was added a new "dilemma." Chloros finds that the Yugoslavs have acted with caution when faced with the problem of "how to retain the doctrinal link with Marxism, yet interpret it in a way which takes into account the faults of the Soviet system and the changed conditions of today" (p. 39).

The author finds that post-World War II Yugoslav family law is "not unlike modern French or German law" (p. 50). In the Marxist approach it is not considered to be part of civil law. The Marxist view is that in traditional society the family is an economic institution that is based on the class structure (the husband, the stronger partner, exploits his wife, the weaker one). Family law is thus considered to be quasi-public law (p. 46). Chloros sees property law (which in general follows the pattern of Roman law) as the field in which the Yugoslavs "can lay the greatest claim to originality" (p. 133), and explains his conclusion by analyzing the outstanding features of "social property" and private ownership. He also discusses the Yugoslav principle of workers' self-management.

Chloros does not expect that complete codification will be achieved soon—