

tual, religious, and cultural trends. On these subjects there is at present considerably less literature of good quality available in English than on political and economic subjects.

Of the political chapters the one by Lothar Schultz on constitutional law covers familiar ground, but explains the main problems clearly and well. The chapter by Erwin Oberländer on political parties is superficial and blurred. It would be interesting to learn how this writer formed the opinion that the view that the Bolsheviks were "the only really important political group in Russia" and that their victory was preordained by historical necessity has been "espoused by the majority of western observers." What is an observer, and what is western?

Miss Violet Conolly shows, in her chapter on the "nationalities question," the grasp of detail and the sense of political realities which one has learned to expect of her. Her discussion of the Ukrainian problem is fair, but leans to the Russian point of view. Her account of Turkestan is admirable, but she leaves out the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The only weakness of her contribution is that she does not distinguish sufficiently between Russification, as practiced under Nicholas II, and the earlier policies of the tsars. She writes: "The criterion of acceptance was not race but loyalty to the personal autocracy of the Tsar." The first half of this sentence is certainly true, but the second ceased to be true precisely in the period with which this book deals. Loyalty to the tsar did not protect Armenians from having their school funds confiscated, Baltic peoples (Estonians and Latvians as well as Germans) from having their schools Russified, or Tatars from being harried by Orthodox missionaries backed by the secular power. These matters are well discussed in the chapter, but the facts she gives contradict her generalization. The chapter by Hans Bräker on "The Muslim Revival in Russia" is of much lower quality. It is based on a few excellent secondary sources, but has some curious errors. The author refers to Rizaeddin Fakhreddin-oğlu as "Oglu" (which is like referring to Popovich as "Ovich"), and he appears to believe that Djemaladdin al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh were Indians.

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STOLYPIN I TRET'IA DUMA. By *A. I. Avrekh*. Moscow: "Nauka," 1968. 520 pp. 2.24 rubles.

A student of the State Duma is concerned with all aspects of Russian political thought at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the relevance of the various political philosophies to the resolution of basic problems. The Russian parliamentary scene was a kaleidoscope of attitudes, opinions, and dogma in which organizational instability and splintering were inevitable. And the Duma represented a society with little tradition for compromise. Forced to contend with old racial and cultural animosities and the changes that accompany a swift industrial revolution, the infant parliamentary institution was in a position that would have been difficult under the most favorable circumstances. The analyst can only help to unravel this extraordinarily complex scene by identifying as accurately as possible the contribution of each sociopolitical element. The least productive approach is an *a priori*, dogmatic one which holds that only Lenin's and other Bolshevik positions regarding the Duma were correct because the inevitable revolution was to be Bolshevik.

Professor Avrekh characterizes the interparliamentary action as a tug of war within the Duma and the government which led to ministerial and parliamentary crises that sharpened the crises of the ruling element and led to the bankruptcy of the bourgeois-*pomeshchik* parties. His rigid adherence to class motivation and definition and his assumption that the oppositional and governmental policies were complete failures leave the reader with the polaric choices familiar in the old Bolshevik arguments.

The Kadets—the essential element of the parliamentary effort—are identified as the intellectual segment of the bourgeoisie who feared revolution and were motivated mainly by political and economic considerations. Avrekh will not accept the possibility that the social revolutionary course could have been rejected on philosophical grounds—as the least desirable way to realize a stable and affluent society—and the parliamentary solution preferred. Hence any recognition of the real limitations of the Duma is seen as an accommodation with the ruling forces and the Right; and efforts to protect the fledgling institution against charges of illegality, with their drastic potential for further restrictions, are regarded as evidence of treachery and cowardice. Anything to the right of the Kadets is flatly reactionary, and ultimately the Kadets must be so stamped, because of their opposition to the “democratic,” proletarian revolution.

A consistent Leninist, Avrekh does not admit the viability of a constitutional solution. To identify the failure of the regime’s nationalist policies with the collapse of the parliamentary movement is to beg the question. The problem of the Third Duma requires at least an analytical focus on the possibilities for accommodation to the realities of the period. The land settlement, education, and western zemstvo laws were about what could be expected, given the “relationship of forces.” But they were not necessarily the last word in their respective legislative areas. Avrekh’s exposition of the parliamentary course of labor bills (trade union, insurance) is enlightening. It is eminently clear that the bureaucracy, regardless of its motivation for enacting these bills, understood the need for reform and was aware of the workers’ attitudes—as opposed to those of management and its special interests.

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FAREWELL TO THE DON: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IN THE JOURNALS OF BRIGADIER H. N. H. WILLIAMSON. By H. N. H. Williamson. Edited by John Harris. New York: John Day, 1971. 290 pp. \$6.95.

This book is based on a diary kept from April 1919 to early 1920, when its author served as a volunteer with the British military mission in Russia, in the Don Cossack region. His job was to advise the Don army on the use of artillery supplied through the aid effort mounted by Churchill on behalf of the anti-Bolshevik forces after the Allied governments failed to achieve either a peace conference or a clear policy on intervention. The book is the story of the painful disillusionment of an adventurous young officer whose energies were fired by conservative anti-Communist zeal. Consisting almost entirely of his own experiences, the diary presents an intensely personal microcosm of the larger conflict. The editor, who is responsible for its publication, has added general comments which attempt to put these reminis-