

qualified for the task. He admittedly does not know Russian and is unfamiliar with the vast Soviet literature on Stalingrad. His knowledge of German is questionable. He lists documents, but the lack of footnotes keeps us in the dark about the extent of their use. He leaves a strong impression that he has based his book on secondary sources, including such questionable items as the bogus *Khrushchev Remembers* memoirs. There are many sources the "selected bibliography" fails to list—primarily Russian, but also some German ones.

In addition, the narrative contains numerous factual errors. For instance, Franz Halder did not seriously plot against Hitler, Vasilevsky was not a marshal at the time of Stalingrad, and the Twenty-first Army was not a tank unit. The book also fails to come to grips with the central questions of the Stalingrad campaign. Why did Stalin, despite his superb intelligence service, so badly miscalculate Hitler's intentions in the summer of 1942, and why did the Red Army perform so poorly in the field? It is now fashionable in some quarters to consider Stalin an able war chief, and yet the disaster that befell Russia in the summer of 1942 had the earmarks of bungling leadership. De Gaulle's keen observation that he was less impressed with the Soviet victory at Stalingrad than with the depth of the German advance is indeed on the mark.

If the author's goal was to write a melodramatic and popular account of this epic conflict, then his rambling and exaggerated book (no one dies a simple death in *Enemy at the Gates*) is already outclassed by the writings of Paul Carell. For those interested in a history of the great battle, the excellent little paperback by Geoffrey Jukes, *Stalingrad: The Turning Point*, should be quite adequate for the present.

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AID TO RUSSIA, 1941–1946: STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. By *George C. Herring, Jr.* Contemporary American History Series. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1973. xxi, 365 pp. \$15.00.

The author presents a realistic picture of the place of lend-lease aid to the USSR in the policy of the United States. Herring's fundamental thesis is that lend-lease for Russia and Britain was intended mainly to facilitate the victory over Germany and was to terminate with the end of hostilities and not continue into the postwar period for reconstruction or any other purpose. The book therefore stands against the general views of the American revisionists of the 1960s who in one way or another imply that the United States perfidiously broke an understanding with the Russians after it became clear that the aggressive American use of economic power had failed to produce the desired results. Herring maintains, always with sound reasoning, that no amount of American aid to the Soviet Union could have brought about major Soviet concessions, particularly in East Central Europe, which was of pre-eminent importance for Soviet security interests. He suggests that limited concessions were obtainable from the Soviet Union, but only if large-scale aid had been offered and used for leverage carefully and adroitly. Economic assistance could not have accomplished much in the absence of a general agreement on postwar problems, something the "wide divergence of attitudes and objectives rendered . . . impossible" (p. 275).

Herring's study clearly shows the lack of any clear U.S. policy on aid to the

USSR. The lend-lease program was beset by political factionalism and bureaucratic infighting at the policy-making levels of the Roosevelt administration. Although the president himself had "flatly rejected" Ambassador Standley's proposal to demand greater cooperation of the Soviets, and to a degree had insulated aid to the USSR from the effects of the bureaucratic struggle, he never attempted to gain acceptance of postwar aid or to use it for definite American advantage. Roosevelt's conferral of a protective executive mantle upon lend-lease to the USSR led to false hopes and unrealistic expectations in several quarters. Significantly, the attempt led by Ambassador Harriman late in the war to extract concessions or at least a more cooperative attitude from the Soviet Union on a few key issues foundered abysmally on the U.S. bureaucracy's "clumsy and unnecessarily offensive" actions. The author singles out the "serious diplomatic blunder" of Harriman and Truman in letting pass a carelessly worded memorandum, which subordinates interpreted rigidly, to stop shipments to the USSR temporarily in May 1945, thus giving the former ally a real grievance. Herring's emphasis on "poor planning and bureaucratic confusion" is remarkably well supported by hard evidence, which must have been painstakingly acquired. One of the author's accomplishments is to use the bureaucratic politics and interest-group perspectives instead of the image of elitist American policy-making toward the Soviet Union. He notes the reappearance of the popular roots of American anti-Sovietism in late 1944 and the limits it imposed on the president and lend-lease. Herring points out that not one interest group publicly supported the continuation of lend-lease—to any country.

This study uses extensive documentation, including several manuscript collections and unpublished studies of participants in the lend-lease process, records of the agencies involved, several newspapers of the period, official histories, and the major pertinent books. The author has cast his net both wide and deep, probably neglecting no current of opinion and presenting the facts in impressive array and quantity in a clear and readable style. (What we still lack is a book which is based on comparable Soviet sources and processes.) This is a serious and intelligent work with, unfortunately, meaning and implications the author has not developed as strongly as his evidence would warrant.

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AFTER YALTA. By *Lisle A. Rose*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. vi, 216 pp. \$7.95.

Lisle A. Rose, who has recently joined the Historical Office of the U.S. Department of State, has contributed a significant volume to the better understanding of a critical phase in American diplomacy. *After Yalta* is a scholarly investigation of the domestic and foreign policies of the United States in the years 1945 and 1946. The purpose of this book is to clarify and untangle the complicated events which set the stage for the cold war era. Dr. Rose has been eminently successful in performing this function, and lives up to the highest professional expectations. The book is clearly organized—the main chapters deal with Yalta, Potsdam, the "Atomic Dilemma," "Ordeal of Peace," and the subsequent "Grand Disillusion." The style throughout is clear and colorful, the documentation extensive, and the book exceptionally well integrated. Rose has succeeded in presenting a well-balanced picture covering both European and Asian events, conventional and atomic military