

FOREWORD

IF there is one distinctive feature of contemporary epistemology it is the recognition by many philosophers of the importance of questioning questions before trying to answer them. For example, questions have been asked which seem to call for our somehow *justifying*, but in a very general way, our saying some of the things we do say – about what we see, about other people, about the future, and so on. And many have taken the sort of justification required to be one which, in part at least, is a *causal explanation* of our ideas, experiences, or thoughts. Thus it has been asked, of some of our ideas, whether they are innate, or acquired through things acting on our senses. But in other cases it has seemed that the possibility of causal explanation may mean that, after all, we are not justified. If seeing is an effect in us how can we be said to see, other than in a Pickwickian sense, what is not in us? Or ‘How can we take a belief seriously, or consider it seriously as a candidate to be knowledge, if it is no better than a simple physical effect?’ (p. 132).

By ‘questioning questions’ I mean, for instance, asking whether questions which seem to call for our justifying what we say, and, moreover, doing so by reference to causal matters, may not really be the expression of philosophical perplexities which no amount of ‘justification talk’ could remove. In medicine one does not take the patient’s word for it as to what is wrong with him. Why should one do so in philosophy?

Take the case of what we say about what we see. The moves in the philosophers’ game are well known: the causal story – the representative theory of Descartes and Locke – scepticism – Berkeley’s fantastic halfway position, to meet scepticism, between the representative theory and phenomenalism, making God the one spiritual cause of our ideas – Kant’s transcendental idealism (the non-spatial, non-temporal unknown supplies the matter, we supply the structure) – Mill’s thorough-going phenomenalism, with ‘permanent possibilities of sensation’ taking over from Berkeley’s God and lying doggo until someone comes along with eyes to see and ears to hear – recent versions of phenomenalism in the form of analyses of physical object

statements into 'sense-datum' statements. Until recently few philosophers (Thomas Reid is one remarkable exception) questioned the first move in this progression to subjectivism, still less the notion we have inherited from Descartes, that it is the philosopher's task 'to secure the foundations of human knowledge'.

Let us, briefly, consider the question: Is seeing an effect in us of things outside us acting on our sense-organs?


Perhaps the first thing to note is that one is not committed, by a negative answer to this question, to denying that causation has a place in the analysis of perception. If a person seemed to see in the absence of stimulation of the sense-organs for sight, the eyes, or in the absence of nerve-impulses resulting from such stimulation reaching the brain, he would not, without qualification, be said to be seeing, but perhaps to be having hallucinations, or, if what he reported coincided remarkably with how things were in the world, to be having 'extra-sensory' perception. That our eyes function normally, respond as they normally do to stimulation originating from the object, is part of what we mean by normal vision. We build what is common knowledge about the physical basis of vision into the concept, so that if someone seemed to see under other than the normal causal conditions we could not without qualification say that he saw. But to say that causation is involved in vision in this way is not to say that seeing, itself, is an effect. All that has been built into our concept of seeing is a causal account which starts with the object reflecting light and ends with the brain being in a certain state of excitation.

Next, we must distinguish between 'seeing' and 'seeing-as'. We may so use the word 'see' that a person can truly be said to have seen a stick if he saw it as a snake and it never occurred to him that it might be only a stick. In this use of 'see' 'S saw X' entails 'X existed'. In other words, if one knew 'S saw X' one could infer 'X existed' without resort to one's experience of things being constantly conjoined. So, on Hume's use of 'cause', X's existence would not be a *causal* condition of S's seeing X, in this use of 'see'.

Someone who was not content with the sort of involvement of causation in the concept of seeing that consists in the causal account being built into the concept, and who saw the point of the last remark about the sense of 'see' in which the subject 'saw' a stick, although he saw it as a snake, might resort to saying that 'seeing-as' is an effect. He might say that the stick's looking like a snake (or like a stick) – its *appearance* to the observer – is an effect.

At this point it is necessary to distinguish two of the many senses of 'appears' or 'looks like'. In one sense of 'looks like', what an object

looks like to somebody is what, on looking at it, that person would take it to be, if he had no reason to think otherwise. In this sense of 'looks', the lines in the Muller-Lyer figure look unequal in length,



though they are in fact equal. But there is another sense of 'looks like' which is so different that it is seriously misleading to use the same word.

It is sometimes said that a coin, or a round plate, looks round only if seen head-on. Viewed from an angle the coin looks elliptical, the round plate like an oval one. If normal vision were two-dimensional perhaps round plates would look like oval ones in the sense in which the Muller-Lyer lines look unequal – that is, so that if one did not know better one would take oneself to be seeing an oval plate, the sort used under sauce-boats. To people with normal vision round plates viewed at an angle do not usually look like oval ones in that sense of 'looks like'. What, then, is the sense in which they do look oval?

It is a matter of the observer's point of view relative to the object, and the laws of perspective. If, like someone setting out to draw a perspective-true picture of the plate, as it appears to a given point of view, one holds a pencil at arm's length, at right angles to one's line of vision, between one's eyes and the plate, and 'measures' the plate latitudinally and longitudinally, the latitudinal measurement will be greater than the longitudinal one. More simply, if one put a transparent screen at right angles to one's line of vision, between oneself and the plate, and drew on it the outline of the plate seen through the screen, the shape drawn would be oval.

I shall call this measurable, objectively-determined appearance of an object to a point of view, its 'optical' appearance.

One can explain some illusions, but not others, by reference to the optical appearance. A straight staff, half immersed, at an angle, in water, looks, from many points of view, as if it were bent or broken at the water line. If one drew the outline of the staff on a transparent screen one would draw a bent or broken line. But in the case of the Muller-Lyer illusion the lines one drew on the screen would be equal in length.

Psychological experiments (R. H. Thouless, *Brit. J. Psy.*, **xxi** (1931) 339–59, and **xxii** (1932) 1–30) have shown that unless one

uses pencils, screens, and so on, one is likely, in judging what the optical appearance is, to err on the side of the shape the object looks like in the sense in which a round plate looks like a round plate regardless of one's angle of vision. One cannot tell, just by looking at something, whether or not an illusion is to be explained by reference to an optical appearance. Take the case of the so-called 'moon illusion'. The moon looks larger when it is near the horizon than when it is directly overhead. Is this because the optical appearance is larger – perhaps because when the moon is near the horizon it is seen through more of the earth's atmosphere and this has a magnifying effect? One can be sure that the optical appearance is not larger only by measuring it. Our field of vision does not come with a built-in grid for measuring optical appearances.

In the way in which one can be wrong about a thing's optical appearance one cannot be wrong (or right) about how it looks to one in the other sense of 'looks'. Someone may be taken in by the Muller-Lyer illusion, and be wrong in thinking that the lines are unequal. But he is not wrong (or right) about their looking unequal. If we allow ourselves to talk of 'the look' (unequal lines) of the Muller-Lyer lines, this may be said to be false, in that what looks unequal is in fact equal. Then, if someone knew it to be an illusion, there would be a false 'look' but a true belief. But there is a danger in such talk. It suggests that just as there can be representation of the optical appearance, (e.g. a picture) at which we could look, so there could be a representation of 'the look' (e.g. unequal lines) at which we could look. But if anything would be a representation of 'the look' of the lines it would be our treating them as unequal.

Another way of putting this is in terms of the distinction between 'true to' and 'true of'. J. L. Austin, in a paper entitled 'Truth' in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, xxiv (1950), writes:

If, as some also say, a belief is 'of the nature of a picture', then it is of the nature of what cannot be true, though it may be, for example, faithful. . . . A picture, a copy, a replica, a photograph – these are *never* true in so far as they are reproductions, produced by natural or mechanical means: a reproduction can be accurate or lifelike (true *to* the original), as a gramophone recording or a transcription may be, but not true (of) as a record of proceedings can be. In the same way a (natural) sign *of* something can be infallible or unreliable but only an (artificial) sign *for* something can be right or wrong.

In terms of this distinction between 'true to' and 'true of', a representation (such as an image on the retina) of the optical appearance

of an object can be said to be *true to* the optical appearance of the object. That is, given particulars about the lens of the eye, etc., one could correlate the retinal image and the optical appearance. But this is *quite* a different matter from S's belief that he is looking at unequal lines, or 'the look' itself, being false. The belief, and the look, are false *of* what is out there. They are false as propositions, not as pictures, are false. I shall mark this feature that 'the look' shares with the belief, and does not share with a representation of the optical appearance, by calling the look the 'epistemic' appearance. Perception would not be how we find things out about the world if there were not epistemic appearances. Or, in plain language, it is only because we see things as being things of a certain sort that we learn about the world by seeing things.

Someone who held 'seeing-as' to be an effect would have to add, to the causal account which ends with the brain's being in a certain state of excitation, 'and the brain's being in a certain state of excitation causes us to see the object as a such-and-such'.

Making use of the 'true to'/'true of' distinction, the difficulty about adding this to the causal account can be brought out as follows. The stimulation of the eyes represents the optical appearance of the object to the point of view occupied by the eyes; and the impulses in the optic nerve represent the stimulation of the eyes; and the state of excitation of the brain represents the impulses in the optic nerve. Throughout we are dealing with something which if true at all, is, *true to* – which does not mean *like* – the optical appearance of the object. Then this is supposed, somehow, to give rise to an epistemic appearance, the object's looking to the subject like a such-and-such, which is *true* (or false) *of* the object. Somehow this last alleged link in the causal chain is one which bridges the *categorical* gap between what is *true to* and what is *true of*. It is as though one could put pictures into one end of a machine, crank a handle, and produce propositions (not sentences, but propositions) at the other.

The Cartesian way of attempting to meet this difficulty is to posit an immaterial substance, somehow located (having its 'seat') in the head, on which can be impressed something – a 'sense-impression' – which is a 'mental' representation of the optical appearance. The 'sense-impression' itself cannot be said to be right or wrong, but about it a judgement is made, somehow 'based' on it: first, to the effect that it is of a certain kind; second, that there is something, of a related kind, which is its remote cause, 'external to' the immaterial substance.

The difficulty exists, of course, only on the presupposition that causation has a place in the analysis of epistemic concepts other than

that recognised earlier. The signs that someone makes this pre-supposition are well known. Foremost is talk of 'the mind' as if it were a part of nature (not that I am suggesting that it is supernatural!), a part about which we know so little that we can unblushingly credit it with a 'structure' which enables it to transform an input which *cannot* be said to be true of the world into an output which *can* be said to be true of the world. Another sign is the inevitable concern with the sceptical problems that beset any attempt to locate epistemic concepts wholly within the causal nexus. It is not too much to say that these problems, and the various 'solutions' to them (Berkeley's idealism, phenomenalism, etc.) have been the major concern of epistemologists for the past three and a half centuries. No doubt they will continue to be so, but perhaps with new reasons given for old answers to misconceived questions.

If R. Edgley, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, is right, then Professor Chomsky is one who gives new reasons for an old answer to a misconceived question. Chomsky, he says, claims support in research in the empirical science of linguistics for 'a theory of psychological *a priori* principles that bears a striking resemblance to the classical doctrine of innate ideas'. Edgley remarks that 'if one thing is clear it is that the classical theory is not.' One source of unclarity is the bewildering variety of meanings that is given to the word 'idea' in the work of Descartes, Locke and others. Are ideas 'sense-impressions' (that is, things to understand which we must first have accepted as meaningful the positing of an immaterial substance, 'seated' in the head, capable of taking and retaining 'impressions' from the sense-organs via the brain), or are they 'principles'? And if they are principles – of inference, perhaps – does having the idea consist in having the *capacity* to see that a conclusion follows from certain premises (which someone might have without being able to say what the principle of inference is), or does it consist in knowing (and so being able to say) what the principle is? In short, is having the idea an instance of knowing *how*, or of knowing *that*? Edgley's contention is that Chomsky illegitimately concludes from his linguistic studies that certain principles are innate in the sense that people know *that* certain things are the case independently of finding them to be so.

Whether he is right about Chomsky I do not know. What I find particularly interesting is his treatment of the question he poses in the section on The Classical Doctrine: 'Experience involves being affected by our surroundings: the type of access to the external world that the mind gets through experience is essentially access provided by causal contact. How, if at all, can this causal relation be conceived

if it is to be compatible with its yielding knowledge of that external world?' He does not provide an answer of his own. The nearest he comes to abandoning the notion that seeing is an effect is his remarking, uncomfortably, that 'there seems, then, to be a tension between the truth of an idea and its being the product of the mind's causal interaction through experience with the external world' and that 'we may be tempted to suppose that for the external world to be represented as it really is, independently of our knowledge of it, there would have to be no mind there at all'. I would say: let us yield to this temptation, if by 'the mind' is meant the immaterial substance, posited by Descartes, impressions on which, caused by 'external' material substances, are said to represent the latter.

John W. Yolton, Professor of Philosophy at York University, Canada, wants 'to avoid the misleading implications of terms like "idea", "sense-data", or even Hirst's much better term "percepta"'. He says that 'what is misleading about this sort of term for characterising the nature of perceptual consciousness is that they easily open the door for the matching-question: do my ideas, sense-data, or percepta match or represent physical objects?' He prefers to talk of mental or perceptual contents. 'To perceive a table just is to have mental contents.' Perhaps by 'perceptual contents' he means what I, in my jargon, called 'epistemic appearances'. He says: 'The matching-question is legitimate when we want to determine the veracity of our perceptions, but what is being matched with our perceptual contents does not differ from those contents.' In other words, we check that something is what it looks like by looking more closely, feeling it, etc. Perceptual consciousness is not 'some rare transmuting process able to turn base metals into gold, to transform physical processes into mental contents'. In my Austinian terminology, there is no 'process' of turning what is true *to* our surroundings, what 'represents' them as an effect represents its cause, into what may be true *of* them. Yolton says: 'To reveal the mental nature of perceptual consciousness just is to reveal the nature of seeing, perceiving, etc. To suppose a counter-example of seeing devoid of mental contents would not be to suppose seeing at all.' I said: 'Perception would not be how we find things out about the world if there were not epistemic appearances. Or, in plain language, it is only because we see things as being things of a certain sort that we learn about the world by seeing things.' The difference between us is that Yolton finds himself flirting with idealism. For instance, he talks, as do some phenomenologists, of the development of awareness as being 'the constituting or formation of a world of objects'. I think it is no more than a temporary aberration.

Like Yolton's paper, that by B. A. Farrell, Reader in Mental Philosophy at Oxford University, is half psychology, and half drawing a moral for philosophers. He writes: 'We may soon be getting clearer hints from psychology on how to develop a causal theory of knowledge. When this happens, we may then be in a better position to transport much of this traditional branch of philosophy [epistemology] upstairs into the secure, grant-supported chambers of empirical science.' I am not sure what to make of this. Does he mean that a psychologist, as such, can show that to a philosopher's conceptual question ('Is seeing an effect in us of things outside us acting on our sense-organs?') a certain answer ('Yes') is the right one? Or does he mean no more than we already know – that the psychologist can tell us under what conditions someone will see something as an X, and under what conditions as a Y? He says that for an answer to the philosopher's question 'What is it to see the thing in front of me as a piece of chalk?', 'the obvious place to look is in psychological theory'. Yes, but is it the *right* place? Looking in that place, he says, 'we cease to be traditional philosophers. But, as long as we are clear what we are doing, why should we be concerned about traditional boundaries between subjects? Why bother about them? And if philosophers do move in this general direction, they will simply be co-operating in the business of transforming this part of their own subject into science.' But are we clear what we are doing?

Peter Alexander, Reader in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, is partly concerned to differentiate (a) seeing an object, in the use of 'see' in which when you see X it follows that, if X is Y, you see Y whether you realise it or not, (b) seeing an object *as* an object of a certain kind, and (c) seeing *that* an object is an object of a certain kind. To distinguish it from 'seeing as' and 'seeing that' he calls (a) 'simple seeing'. 'Simple seeing', he says, 'is not a sort of seeing different from other sorts; it is involved in seeing of all sorts. We might say that the claim to see simply is a minimum claim involved in all claims to see.' He remarks that 'it is clear that there is some difficulty about reporting my own present simple seeings', but concludes that 'if I can claim to have seen at all then there is something that I myself can correctly claim to have seen, even if it is only a brown moving patch on the plain, and that claim would involve a claim to have simply seen that something.' If by 'correctly' he means 'truly', then I think he has been misled by his own choice of terminology into giving to a question to which Farrell refers, 'Are there any statements of a perceptual character where the risk of error is so minimal that it vanishes altogether?', the answer 'Yes, for example, statements about brown moving patches.' I think this is the only

point in his paper with which I have any quarrel. I do not see why there should have to be anything in perception which is immune from the risk of error, in this sense.

The paper by M. R. Ayers, Lecturer in Philosophy at Oxford University, is an ingenious, and I think original and successful, attempt to show that Locke and Berkeley cannot, by use of the principle that, as Locke puts it, 'the objects of the senses do obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or no', escape the scepticism about our knowledge of the 'external' world to which their Cartesian 'way of ideas' leads. For Locke the unavoidability of the ideas of sensation is a reason for a belief in 'some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind'. But this anti-sceptical argument, Ayers contends, is circular. For the distinction it requires us to understand between causing an alteration in our ideas by acting in the physical world, and causing an alteration in them by imagining, is one which presupposes 'precisely what the sceptic doubts, that there is a physical world'. Berkeley takes 'what Locke gives as reasons for our belief in an external physical reality, as constituting a *definition* of the concept of reality', but involuntariness is a necessary condition of ideas being ideas of sensation, and the only plausible interpretation of involuntariness depends upon the assumption that human action in the physical world is possible: 'When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to . . . determine what particular objects present themselves to my view.' Furthermore, the neo-Berkeleyan view of modern phenomenologists, that physical objects are merely theoretical entities, has no answer to Berkeley's dilemma.

Although he criticises answers to scepticism, Ayers is not a sceptic. In the second half of his paper he argues for its being a necessary truth 'that any experience is necessarily the experience of an animal, that is, a physical object'. His argument involves an examination of Strawson's attempt, in the second chapter of *Individuals*, to give meaning to talk of reidentifiable particulars in a purely auditory universe. He sees this attempt as being, like Leibniz's attempt to replace the system of spatio-temporal relationships with one of qualitative relationships, doomed to failure.

A. Palmer, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton, says that he will 'try to show that behaviour is a necessary condition for thinking about movement'. That is, 'if one could not do things like signing a cheque or building a house then one could have no idea of change or movement'. On the face of it, this seems a tall order. The chosen route is via reflection on what it is to perceive and

think. The Cartesian account of perception as a reception of particulars, 'sense-impressions', leaves thought, as that which has generality, and can be true or false of how things are, unintelligible. Now, 'one necessary condition for thinking of movement or change is the possibility of having the idea of something being other than it is', and 'thought has to have some generality for it to be possible to think of things as other than they are'. If Palmer could show that thought could have generality only if thinkers behaved – that is, did things like signing cheques and building houses – or if he could show that thinking itself was behaving, he would be home and dry. What he does do is to argue that while 'thinking' is not a performance verb, still less an activity verb, there are parallels between thinking and performances. 'Take as an example "walking to the university". The parallel to the possible non-existence of the object of thought is found by noticing that the correct description of what a person is intentionally doing may still be "walking to the university" even if, perhaps because of a recent fire, the university no longer exists.' This, and other parallels, such as that just as a person doing something intentionally knows what he is doing so a person thinking knows what he is thinking, enable us 'to explain how it is that thought possesses the characteristics it does . . .'. These characteristics which thinking shares with performances are 'intentional characteristics'. Without them 'thought about movements or change . . . would not be possible'. As if this showed that 'behaviour is a necessary condition for thinking about movement', in the sense that unless we could first understand behaviour we could not understand movement, Palmer goes on to draw the conclusion that 'an attempt to account for intentional activity in terms of such movements or change is self-stultifying'.

Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*, and Malcolm in *Dreaming* have things to say which it is sometimes hard to understand. To C. W. K. Mundle, Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Wales, Bangor, it seems that 'in each of these books, a version of the verification principle is a suppressed premiss', and consequently that the authors, in spite of their denials, are in some sense behaviourists. For example, what else can Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of a private language be but 'a sophisticated kind of behaviourism'? How else are we to understand *Philosophical Investigations*, 1 304? If I knew of a short answer to these questions, this would be the place for it. I do not.¹

¹ My 'Being and Feeling', *Proc. Arist. Soc.* (1968–9), 'Sensations of Colour', in *Mill*, ed. J. B. Schneewind (London, 1969) and 'Wittgenstein on the Myth of Mental Processes', *Phil. Review* (1968) have a bearing on them.

In the first half of his paper, David Wiggins, Professor of Philosophy at the University of London, considers the question 'How can we take a belief seriously, or consider it seriously as a candidate to be knowledge, if it is no better than a simple physical effect?' One form this question takes is 'the so-called causal argument for scepticism about perception'. Wiggins writes: 'This argument, which it is rare to see sympathetically treated, finds reason in the complicated mechanical genesis of perception to question the veracity or real representativeness of the end-state of the process of coming to see something.' By 'the end-state of the process of coming to see something' does he mean the state of excitation of the brain which is the effect of something acting on the sense-organs, or does he mean an object's looking like something – say, a piece of chalk – to someone? The former 'represents' the stimulus, the latter can be said to be true if what is being looked at is in fact a piece of chalk. Wiggins says: 'For there to be *perception* of it, the scene I report must itself figure in the explanation and causal ancestry of my visual state.' I think he thinks that the only way causality can be involved in the concept of perception is one which puts seeing in the category of effects. At the beginning of the first section of his paper he writes: 'If we suppose that mind is just one part of nature and that it does not there enjoy any special autonomy or metaphysical insulation from ordinary causality . . .'. He thinks he *has* to suppose this. He is serious when he says that 'if my beliefs are to relate to the world at all, I simply have to lay myself open to the world in order to let the phenomena put their print upon me. How otherwise can my beliefs even aim at a correct account of the world?' I would ask: But how can a 'print upon me' (cf. Descartes's 'sense-impression') be true or false of the world?

R. G. Swinburne, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Hull, regards determinism as making a significant claim, as opposed to its being a piece of advice (to go on looking for causes), analyses what would be evidence for or against the truth of the claim, and concludes that the achievements of modern science – quantum theory, in particular – give good grounds for its being false.

Michael Clark, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, is concerned with the question whether differences in discourse about the future, and about the past and present, 'reflect a logical asymmetry between the past and future beyond the merely defining fact that the future succeeds, and the past precedes, the present time'. The first half of his paper is taken up with a discussion of a view he attributes to Hartshorne about the meaning of statements like 'X will happen'. It is the view that in saying 'X will

happen' I am saying something about present conditions and causal laws, so that 'I wonder whether present conditions causally determine that X will happen' means 'I wonder whether present conditions causally determine what present conditions causally determine'. If Clark is right then Mundle should have taken Hartshorne as an example of a verificationist instead of Wittgenstein.

Although 'verificationist' would evidently be a term of abuse for Mundle, 'empiricist', I think, would not. At any rate, when he refers to 'the traditional conception of empiricism' at the end of his paper it is to oppose an empiricist theory of meaning ('a sentence is meaningful for a person only if he can interpret each of the linguistic expressions which it contains in terms of what he himself has observed or experienced') to a verificationist one ('a sentence used to make a statement about a person, P, is meaningful for anyone if and only if it is verifiable by people other than P'). Other contributors to this collection are as suspicious of empiricism as of rationalism. Edgley, for instance, remarks that 'many contemporary philosophers have been convinced that empiricism and rationalism are equally unacceptable, and that both positions, and the conflict between them, are the result of trying to answer confused, misleading, and perhaps senseless questions'. At the beginning of this foreword I suggested that we should regard with suspicion questions which seem to call for our somehow *justifying*, in a very general way, our saying some of the things we say. Mary Hesse, Reader in Philosophy of Science at Cambridge University, is concerned with the justification of the things scientists say. Traditional empiricists seem to her to have assumed that 'there are statements of some kind whose meaning as descriptions of states of affairs is supposed to be transparent, and whose truth-value is supposed to be directly and individually decidable by setting up the appropriate observation situations'. Such observation statements express what Duhem calls 'practical facts'. About practical facts she writes: 'There is a sense in which they are literally inexpressible. The absence of distinction between fact and linguistic expression here is not accidental. As soon as we begin to try to capture a practical fact in language, we are committed to some theoretical interpretation.' Nevertheless she evidently regards the notion of a 'transparent observation language' as meaningful, for she goes on to consider whether there is such a language, to provide a foundation for scientific theory, or whether scientists should be content with a language in which the predicates are theory-laden from the start. The latter view is the 'new empiricism' of Duhem and Quine. I wonder whether a transparent observation language would

be what one would have if one could transform what, in us, is true to the stimulation of our sense-organs into something which was true of the world. If so, then since the notion of such a transformation is meaningless, so is the notion of a transparent observation language, *and* the denial that there is such a language.

In the second half of his paper, Don Locke, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Warwick, argues, rightly I think, that 'memory provides each of us with a special privileged insight into his own identity', in the sense that if I remember (that is, do not merely seem to remember) breaking the window then I am identical with the person who broke the window, and I can know that I remember it 'just in virtue of the fact that I remember it'; I do not have to find out that I remember it in the way others find it out, by asking me. I am not so sure about what Locke seems to conclude from this, namely that, in Shoemaker's terminology, memory 'provides a criterion of self-identity distinct from the criteria we have for the identity of others'. It depends what he means by 'distinct'. The wording suggests that memory could be the *sole* criterion of self-identity. But we usually distinguish between somebody's really remembering something – being at a party, say – and only seeming to remember it but really imagining it, by whether *he* was at the party, where 'he' refers to a *person*, identifiable by bodily characteristics. If we did not, as a rule, employ some such means to distinguish between real and seeming memories, I do not know what we could mean by 'remember'. I suppose that, in special circumstances, exceptions to the rule could be allowed, without 'remember' going out of currency, rather as, in special circumstances, we allow promises not to be kept, without putting 'I promise' out of work. But there could not be nothing but exceptions. Memory and the bodily criterion of personal identity could not be distinct to that extent.

In the course of her paper on 'Dreaming' Martha Kneale, formerly Tutor in Philosophy at Oxford University, opposes to Malcolm's contention 'that no mental activities other than dreaming can occur during sleep' the case of Coleridge 'who did not merely dream that he composed a poem beginning "In Xanadu did Kubla Khan a stately pleasure-dome decree", but who did in fact compose such a poem in a dream'. I asked Malcolm what he thought of this, and he wrote:

I am puzzled as to how the example of Kubla Khan is supposed to prove 'that mental activities other than dreaming may occur during sleep'. Mrs Kneale says that Coleridge 'did not merely dream that he composed' Kubla Khan, but he 'did in fact

compose' it 'in a dream'. True enough. This is a distinction we often make in telling dreams. I might dream that I climbed Pikes' Peak, but without the actual climbing of the mountain being part of my dream. But I might have another dream in which I did not merely dream *that* I climbed Pikes' Peak, but the actual climbing occurred in the dream: 'I scrambled across boulders, up rock faces, traversed a glacier, and camped in a small tent near the summit.' I might dream that I had a conversation with Freud. But also I might not merely dream *that* I had a conversation with him, but actually have a conversation with him in a dream. On telling the dream I would report that I said this and Freud said that. If the gentleman from Porlock should interrupt me when I was telling the dream, or if a fire should break out in the house, then I might not be able to remember the rest of the conversation. But we have to think of how the word 'remember' is used here, and not assume that it carries the same grammar as it does in other contexts. As it clearly does not.

It is no more surprising that a person should compose a poem in a dream than that he should climb a mountain in a dream or carry on a conversation in a dream. What is surprising in the Coleridge example is that when he wrote down the dream-poem it turned out to be both long and beautiful. Most dream-poems, dream-proofs, and dream-conversations are not worth preserving.

In any case, we should not confuse composing-in-a-dream with composing, or believing-in-a-dream with believing. If in a dream I believed that my wife was a murderer it does not follow that ever, at any time, did I believe that my wife was a murderer. Coleridge did compose *Kubla Khan* in a dream; but it strikes me as being of dubious correctness to say that he *composed* it. I don't mean that someone else did.

J. B. Schneewind, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, opposes two views of moral knowledge. The first, with which he disagrees, is that moral knowledge requires there to be first principles with certain features (they must have a high degree of generality, allow of no exceptions, not be merely formal, and be such that other principles derive their validity from them) to serve as the support for our particular moral judgements. On the second view, morality is understood along the lines of a science. Rather as, in science, a law is formulated to cover a set of well-established data and used to predict experimental results, so, in morality, moral principles are formulated to systematise our particular judgements, and enable us to apply our moral beliefs to new situations and prob-

lems. It is very interesting to compare Schneewind's scientific view of morality with Mary Hesse's non-traditional-empiricist view of science.

Terence Penelhum, Professor of Philosophy at Calgary University, discusses what he calls 'theological non-naturalism'. By this term he means, not what someone brought up on Moore's *Principia Ethica* might take him to mean, namely the view that theistic statements are not *analysable into* non-theistic ones, but the view that theistic statements are not *verifiable by reference to* non-theistic ones. Moreover he is concerned not with the 'non-understander', for whom theistic statements are not verifiable because they are not meaningful to him in the first place, but with the atheist, the sceptic and the believer. He suggests that if a sceptic were to find himself after death in a community of persons whose personalities are as they would be if they were infused by grace, ruled over by Jesus in love and forgiveness, he would be irrational if he did not take this as verifying the claims of Christian theism. I am inclined to agree – though perhaps in the light of what I said in the foreword to last year's lectures, *Talk of God*, I should, to be consistent, not do so.

This is the third volume of Royal Institute of Philosophy lectures. The fourth volume, containing lectures on topics in the philosophy of the social sciences, will be published early in 1971 under the title *The Proper Study*.

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