

tributions, Hoensch explores the complexities of “social structure and political reform”—the title he gave to his book. Combining difficult techniques of constitutional, social, and political-intellectual historians, the author has produced a remarkable and thought-provoking study. The book is divided into three major parts, which deal with the concepts of the reformers concerning the existing social structure, the importance of political party life for the reform of the nobles’ republic, and the reform of the institutional structure of the *Rzeczpospolita*. An introductory chapter covers reform policies and writings up to the middle of the eighteenth century.

A short review can neither do justice to the scope of this volume nor raise the multitude of questions that Hoensch touches upon in one way or another. The first part, which contains an analysis of the position of the *szlachta*, the church, the towns, the peasantry, the Jews, and the dissenters, is rich in material and interesting in interpretation. Although one may not agree with everything Hoensch says (for instance, about the castelike nature of the gentry), his is an impressive and perceptive analysis.

The author shows convincingly the native tradition in which the reform movement was embedded and recognizes the political maturity, the self-criticism, and the realism of the reformers. He stresses the continuity of the reform movement from the middle of the eighteenth century down to the May 3, 1791, constitution. He shows the destructive context created by the policies of Catherine and Frederick of Prussia. While older Russian and Prussian historians have condemned the *szlachta* on the grounds that it had failed to react to the socioeconomic changes of the eighteenth century, Hoensch rejects this criticism by pointing to the real awareness of these problems. If the reforms had been fully carried out, Poland would have entered the path of a modern, “capitalist-like” society: “It was not because of lack of original and practical political concepts, but only because of the inability to carry them out in the teeth of the noble society opposition and of that of the neighbors interested in a weak Poland, that the *Rzeczpospolita szlachecka* collapsed.”

Hoensch is right in describing his book as both a synthesis based on existing monographs and a synthesis that breaks new ground. Whatever criticism the experts on the various problems discussed by Hoensch may contribute, I feel that his work deserves serious attention. The bibliography is impressive, and the occasional mistakes in Polish names and words—though irritating—are not of major significance. If the work is bound to be controversial by its very nature, the author has shown a fairness toward his subject and a scholarly approach which merit respect.

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POLSKA A “BIAŁA” ROSJA (OD LISTOPADA 1918 DO KWIETNIA 1920 R.). By *Adolf Juzwenko*. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1973. 296 pp. 60 zł.

This important book by the Polish historian Adolf Juzwenko discusses the political relations between Poland and “White” Russia during the years 1918–20, a subject that is of continuing interest and debate. Juzwenko points out that Poland could see no political gain if either Admiral Kolchak or General Denikin came to power. On the contrary, she saw only serious danger to her independence and to the

integrity of her territory. This is the thesis that Juzwenko discusses at great length in his book.

Although circumstances in the various areas differed, the political attitudes of the "White" Russians remained constant. This was made clear by the Preparatory Committee for Negotiating the Peace that was created by Admiral Kolchak in December 1918. It was his intention, in case an independent Poland was created, that (a) no part of Lithuania or Belorussia would be attached to it, and (b) the regions of Chełm, Halicz, Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and Bukovina would be attached to Russia so that Russia would have a common border with Slovakia. Denikin went along with the pre-1914 Polish borders, that is, without the region of Chełm and without Eastern Galicia, both of which he wanted for Russia. The Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were also to remain with Russia. These obviously were not conditions that could serve the best interests of a free and independent Polish state. The paradox is that the demands made by the "White" Russians were later actually obtained by Stalin after World War II.

The third chapter deals with Polish politics regarding "White" Russia, showing the differences between the policies of Dmowski and Piłsudski. Dmowski tended toward cooperation with the coalition as far as the Russian problem was concerned. The coalition was searching for an understanding with the future Russia, both because of misgivings about communism and because of the open acknowledgment by "White" leaders of long-standing Russian debts. Piłsudski, on the other hand, made his position clear in his April 1919 proclamation to the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, advocating freedom of choice for the people of that country. This was so-called federal politics.

In the succeeding two chapters Juzwenko first describes Polish politics concerning Kolchak during the period of his command and then discusses those concerning Denikin during the period of his offensive on Moscow. On the subject of Kolchak the author cites the opinion of the Piłsudski organ *Rzqd i Wojsko* that it would be of no benefit to Poland "to destroy evil bolshevism, only to set up an evil Kolchak group." It went on to say, "Kolchak and Trotsky are two enemies, both equally dangerous, and it is not possible for Poland to consider an alliance with either one" (p. 155). As for Denikin, Piłsudski directed a communication to Lenin stating, "Helping Denikin in his battle against the Bolsheviks cannot possibly be Poland's reason of state" (p. 223).

In discussing the negotiations in Mikaszewicze the author apparently was not aware of valuable source materials available at the Piłsudski Institute in New York (records of the *Adiutantura Generalna Naczelnego Dowództwa, 1918-22*). But he should certainly be acquainted with the excellent book by Piotr S. Wandycz, *Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921* (1969). Professor Wandycz made intensive use of the documents of the Piłsudski Institute. It is also apparent that the author did not read the important book by John Bradley, *Allied Intervention in Russia* (1968). Bradley also researched the documents at the Piłsudski Institute.

After Denikin's defeat, leftist activists Sawinkow and Czajkowski began to play a greater role within the "White" emigration. Juzwenko covers this period well, citing the contents of an understanding between Piłsudski and Sawinkow, the main point of which was that Russia would renounce the 1914 borders and Poland would renounce the 1772 borders. In the disputed territories of Lithuania and Belorussia there would be a plebiscite under the supervision of an Allied commission, as soon as a democratic Russian government was firmly established

in Moscow. Subsequent political events made the realization of this understanding impossible.

Juzwenko's book is an important contribution to the history of Polish-Russian relations of this period. The author shows great objectivity in presenting the actual course of events.

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ECONOMIC REFORMS IN POLISH INDUSTRY. By *Janusz G. Zielinski*. Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow. Economic Reforms in East European Industry series. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1973. xxxvi, 333 pp. \$21.00.

This is not an easy book to read—certainly not one for the general reader and rather heavy going even for the average undergraduate. But for all serious students of East European economies this study is a valuable addition to the existing literature on this subject.

Dr. Zielinski's analysis quite often transcends the narrower boundaries of economic reforms in Polish industry to deal with more general aspects of Communist planned economies and their uphill struggle to evolve more rational methods of planning and management. In this respect his book is also a highly promising forerunner of a series of monographs on economic reforms in East European countries which Alec Nove intends to publish.

Yet the book also has some weaknesses. The author is apparently so absorbed in the finer points of various reform measures adopted in Poland since October 1956 that he pays scant attention to the political aspect of the problem. But in no country of Eastern Europe has the issue of economic reforms been so closely intertwined with the perennial political in-fighting among the ruling elite as in Poland. Zielinski is obviously aware of this interconnection (a brief glossary of the main political events for 1956–71 is included as a part of the introduction). Yet—almost deliberately—he dismisses the pertinent political factors from his subsequent analysis.

Thus the reader gets the impression that the process of reforming the Polish economy was a continuous one, although we have witnessed in Poland not less than four separate attempts at evolving four different reform models (in 1956–58, 1964–66, 1968–70, and the fourth which began in 1971) divided by two periods of dogmatic restoration and one of major political upheaval (the workers' revolt in December 1970, which put an end to fourteen years of Gomułka's rule). In each case (except perhaps for the workers' revolt) the main motives for abandoning the previous reform model were much more political than economic.

But apart from this analytical flaw (which admittedly is a question of approach), Zielinski's book is undoubtedly the best and the most comprehensive study of economic reforms in Poland published in the West. His detailed and penetrating analysis of the various aspects of the new economic model (or models) provides fascinating reading for any specialist on this subject, although he or she might not always agree with the author's conclusions. Especially valuable is his chapter on planning at the branch and enterprise level—if only because most of the existing literature tends to overemphasize the macro-economic approach to the problem of economic reforms.